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Software startups are an important source of innovation and wealth creation.  
Startups must develop and release software quickly to gain early cash flow and legitimacy 
for firm survival. They must search and identify a suitable market in a tight time frame. 
Aambiguity in the quality of the novel software designed can further intensify uncertainty 
for startups.  Also, the entrepreneur-investor relationship is a critical conduit for financial 
and social resources, yet the investors’ influence on software design is understudied. This 
leads to the following research question: How does the entrepreneurial context in which 
the startup operates affect software design process and product in the early years?   
Given the exploratory nature of the research question, I drew on an eighteen-month, 
participant-observation case study of a three-year-old, digital healthcare startup, 
HealthCom.  HealthCom designed a software to facilitate knowledge transfer between 
nurses and patients.  I leveraged the attention-based view (ABV) as an organizing 
framework for analysis.  By looking at how the environmental context influences the 
designers’ attention and actions, researchers can begin to understand the rationale behind 
design decisions.  
The findings illustrate how the attention of the designers were directed by financial-
focused and quality-focused attention drivers.  Financial-focused attention drivers 
originated from players (e.g. clients and investors) that intensified pressures for funding 
 vii 
and led to the reframing of software as an enabler of funding.  This contradicted quality-
focused design alternatives grounded in user requirements and software design rules.  It 
underlined the move from attention to designs that accommodated user requirements 
towards those that captured emerging business opportunities.  Designers had to balance the 
tensions between financial and quality-focused design decisions that could lead to 
inhibition of future growth, compromises in quality or over-optimization of quality. 
Designers simplified and coupled requirements throughout the design process and 
postponed investments of design resources to meet client-imposed deadlines. The design 
product became disposable, quick to build, limited in adaptability, spartan, and vulnerable, 
and it enabled the startup to capture the business opportunities amidst time constraints, 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Software startups are an important source of innovation and new wealth creation 
(Gimmon & Levie, 2010; Grilli & Murtinu, 2012; Leong, Pan, Newell, & Cui, 2016; 
Nambisan, 2017), and are a growing phenomenon.  Not only are software startups receiving 
more funding, but the average amount of money being invested in deals is larger than those 
in the dot.com bubble (Relander, 2015). Software startups need to manage both the design 
of the business model and the software product1 in the early years (Antonopoulou, 
Nandhakumar, & Panourgias, 2014). Unfortunately, there are limited studies in 
Information Systems (IS) that provide insight into the way software design occurs in 
startups, particularly in the early years (Tumbas, Seidel, Berente & Brocke, 2015; 
Antonopoulou, Nandhakumar & Henfridsson, 2016; Tumbas et al., & vom Brocke, 2017).  
A review of the entrepreneurship literature highlights aspects of the entrepreneurial 
context that may affect the work of designers in startups.  To reduce the likelihood of failure 
and to succeed in building a new business, entrepreneurs must acquire financial resources 
(Van de Ven, Polley, & Garud, 1999) to fund software design, deploy marketing 
campaigns, and hire designers.  The designers in a startup must also build a software to 
help support the digital business design.  Startups are expected to operate under high 
uncertainty and, as a result, time to market is important (e.g. Huang, Rand, & Rust, 2016; 
Deeds, Decarolis, & Coombs, 1997). Designing software quickly provides startups with 
early cash flows, external visibility and legitimacy, early market share, and increases the 
                                                 
1 I define design of the software as the entire process from analysis, design, coding, testing, maintenance 
and revision (Apte et al., 1990). Throughout design, interaction among the designers are focused on 
translating user needs into the design, converting the design into code and ensuring that different modules 
of the code work together without error (Sawyer, Guinan, & Cooprider, 2010).  
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likelihood of survival (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990). This leads to my first 
research question:  How does the entrepreneurial context in which the startup operates 
affect the software design process and product in the early years?  
By entrepreneurial context, I am referring to the characteristics and design contexts 
of the software, particularly those occurring in startups.  Context effects can be broadly 
defined as “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and meaning 
of organizational behavior as well as functional relationships between variables” (Johns, 
2006, p. 386).  In this study, the focus is on the early years of the firm, which refers to the 
stage of the startup beyond the initial inception of ideas.  At this stage, risks are taken in 
terms of investments, and the focus is on sales (Adizies, 1979).  Adizies (1979) suggests 
that the early stage of a startup is an experimental phase in its life.  Not only do designers 
in the startups face high financial pressures (Dahl, Nielsen, & Mojtabai, 2010), they also 
face high uncertainty resulting from the need to concurrently make sense of the unfolding 
business model with the novel software and capture emerging market opportunities 
(Hedman & Kalling, 2003; Chesbrough, 2012). 
Additionally, entrepreneurship scholars have long underscored the relationship 
between entrepreneurs and investors as critical for the transfer of resources (Aldrich, 
Zimmer, & Jones, 1986) and for advice (e.g. Sapienza, Korsgaard, Academy, & Jun, 2007; 
Shane & Cable, 2002). Researchers have likened investors to large block stockholders in 
leveraged-buyout firms (Jain & Kini, 1995). The entrepreneur-designer relationship is a 
conduit though which financial and social resources critical to the survival of the startup 
flow (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001), yet their influence on software design is 
understudied. There are also entrepreneurs who choose not to seek investment because of 
the implications for product design so the entrepreneur’s attention will not be directed by 
the investors towards growth and cashing out  (Campbell, 2015).  The entrepreneurs 
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interviewed describe the tension between building their brand and product versus taking 
actions to meet target revenues  (Campbell, 2015).  While software startups are 
proliferating, the influence of investors on software design is unclear.   
The above discussion suggests that recognition of the early stage entrepreneurial 
contexts in which design occurs warrants further theorization.  The entrepreneurial contexts 
challenge assumptions in existing software design literature: the existing software design 
research focuses on the design practices to help designers in large software design teams 
streamline their processes to meet user requirements (e.g. Chakraborty, Sarker, & Sarker, 
2010; Maruping, Venkatesh, & Agarwal, 2009; Maruping, Zhang, & Venkatesh, 2009).  
Entrepreneurs in software startups often alter their business models based on opportunities 
(e.g. Kranz, Hanelt, & Kolbe, 2016; Ojala, 2015), which has implications for software 
design. At the same time, they operate in resource-constrained environments in the early 
years, so there is a tension between resource constraints and dedicating resources to 
designing new features that enable the capturing of emerging business opportunities.  The 
context thus makes salient different sources of attention drivers that direct attention and 
resources of the designers in the design process.  
1.1 TOWARD A MODEL OF SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS DESIGN IN THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
CONTEXT  
This dissertation is an account of how designers in software startups work in the 
early years of software design. The designers take on dual roles as entrepreneurs and 
designers of software. Given the exploratory nature of the research question, I draw on an 
eighteen-month, participant-observation case study of a three-year-old, digital health 
startup, HealthCom.  The startup was designing a software to help nurses and patients 
communicate before and after patient treatments.  HealthCom allowed me to study in real-
  4 
time how designers at a startup made design decisions based on environmental factors and 
stimuli.  
I illustrate the presence of financial and software quality-focused attention drivers 
that directed the attention of designers.  Attention to financial-focused design alternatives 
was driven by players, such as clients and investors of the firm.  Clients refer to the 
healthcare facilities that licensed the software from HealthCom.  Client intermediaries refer 
to administrators who participated in the purchase of the software at the client sites with 
whom the HealthCom designers maintain contact throughout the licensing agreement.  The 
intermediaries dictated the success and renewal of contracts with HealthCom, and their 
requirements were therefore often prioritized by designers to ensure the financial 
performance of the firm.  Investors, on the other hand, set expectations for firm 
performance for fundraising milestones.  Attention to quality-focused design alternatives 
was driven by user requirements and designers’ knowledge of software quality best 
practices.  
Despite the tension between attention allocation to financial and quality-focused 
design alternatives, designers often moved from designing to accommodate existing user 
requirements towards designing to capture emerging business opportunities.  In the case of 
HealthCom, the financial pressures led to the reframing of software was an enabler of 
funding, which meant designing software quickly and with minimal resources.  These 
characteristics were at odds with designs for software quality.  Designers had to balance 
the tensions between design decisions that could inhibit the startup’s growth, compromise 
quality or over-optimize quality.  The pressure for designs that contributed to funding led 
to designers leveraging design actions, such as simplifying of requirements, coupling of 
designs, and postponing of investment in design.  I call the design product as a digital 
exoskeleton.  The digital exoskeleton encompasses the following characteristics: (1) 
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disposability, (2) speed, (3) limited adaptability, (4) spartan functions, and (5) 
vulnerability.  The work presented here is an attempt to outline a design process and 
product that captures the spirit and essence of the conflicts designers experience in the early 
stage entrepreneurial context. 
The analyses presented do not serve to undermine existing theory, but rather offer 
an alternative view of software design that complements existing theory and research, 
helping to bridge gaps in the existing literature.  The discussion on attention allocation in 
design is based on the principles of the attention-based view (ABV) theory.  By looking at 
how the firm’s environmental and organizational factors provide the general stimuli that 
direct the attention and actions of the designers, we can begin to understand when, why, 
and how designers decide what to design.  Furthermore, an attention-based framework 
lends insight into how designers would respond under varying conditions.  The rules of the 
game, the players, their structural positions, and resources within the firm all interact to 
affect attention allocation (Ocasio, 1997). What became evident in the analyses is that the 
attention of designers was influenced largely by investors and clients.  The designers were 
subjected to two different sets of rules in software design and business design that resulted 
in design alternatives that frequently competed for the limited attention of the designers. 
The need to balance the tensions resulted in design actions that departed from typical 
software design approaches of Agile and Waterfall.  
Applying ABV to design provides insights on the micro foundations of design in 
an entrepreneurial context and offers a lens for examining the impact of externally-oriented 
attention drivers on design actions and process.  The model also explicates the impact of 
the early stage entrepreneurial context in intensifying financial pressures, uncertainty, and 
shaped design decisions, given the limited attention of designers.  
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1.2 DISSERTATION GUIDE 
In chapter 2, I provide background on the IS software design research to highlight 
the gap in existing software design research.  I also review the entrepreneurship literature 
to understand the contextual factors that might drive differences in software design in the 
entrepreneurial context.  I illustrate how consideration of the ABV and entrepreneurship 
literature reveal gaps in the discussion on software design.   
Chapter 3 explains the methodological foundation upon which this study was built.  
Specifically, I discuss the methodology, provide background on the research site, and 
describe procedures employed to collect and analyze data for this dissertation.  
Chapter 4 illustrates the attention drivers directing the attention of designers and 
the tensions resulting from the financial and quality-focused attention drivers.  
Chapter 5 further describes how the tension between the attention drivers resulted 
in design actions of reframing and simplifying requirements, coupling in design, and 
postponing of design effort.  I conclude the chapter with an examination of how these 
actions culminated in the design product and a summary of what happened to the firm post-
study.   
Finally, in chapter 6, I explore the implications of the findings for theory of 
software design in entrepreneurial contexts and expand on the digital exoskeleton 
construct.  I suggest that these findings can help researchers reconsider the impact of 
external players and rules of the game on software design and question the changing 
relationship between software quality and firm performance.   I conclude with implications 
for future research on software design in the entrepreneurial context.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER  
In this chapter, I begin with an understanding of the entrepreneurial context. I 
review existing IS software design literature for the key types of design processes (plan 
based and flexible approaches) and the benefits and challenges of the respective methods 
in design, particularly in the early stage entrepreneurial context. To better understand the 
impact of the entrepreneurial context, I leverage the attention-based view (ABV) as an 
organizing framework to understand how the different components of the entrepreneurial 
context (e.g. players, rules of the game, and resources) affect the attention of designers in 
the design process. Adoption of the ABV sheds light on how attention of the designers may 
influence their design actions.  
2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT IN WHICH DESIGN OCCURS 
As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation focuses on design that occurs in 
an early stage entrepreneurial context. In IS research, context has been referred to as the 
characteristics and use contexts of the technology artifact (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). By 
entrepreneurial context, I refer to the characteristics and design contexts of the software 
designed in startups, such as environmental and organizational factors experienced by 
designers in the startup. Context effects have been broadly defined as “situational 
opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and meaning of organizational 
behavior as well as functional relationships between variables” (Johns, 2006, p.386). 
The study of context is important because it influences what individuals and groups 
see, decisions they make and the outcome (Autio, Kenney, Mustar, Siegel, & Wright, 
2014). Yet there is limited agreement on what constitutes entrepreneurial contextual factors 
(Levie, Autio, Acs, & Hart, 2014; Zahra, Wright, & Abdelgawad, 2014). Scholars have 
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begun to isolate the dimensions of contexts that influence the actions of entrepreneurs: 
these factors include institutional, temporal, industry, market, spatial, 
social/organizational, ownership, and governance aspects (Levie et al., 2014; Zahra et al., 
2014). For instance, technology innovation management scholars show that examining the 
industry life cycle can inform the difference in design focus of the firm: entrepreneurial 
activity in the early stages of an industry life cycle drive attention towards design of 
features and alternative designs (P. Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Utterback & Abernathy, 
2003). The technological aspects of the context, which have been defined as the 
architectural attributes of the technology around which the entrepreneur acts (Thomas & 
Autio, 2012), also influence the actions of the designers and the stakeholders (thereafter 
called players) (Autio et al., 2014).  These contexts change over time and shape 
entrepreneurs’ actions (Wright et al., 2013). By considering the context, it focuses the 
attention beyond the individuals to examine how they direct attention to the various 
opportunities and threats (Alvarez & Barney, 2013; Autio et al., 2014) to understand the 
effects of the individual, situation, or serendipity.  
While the relevance of contextual factors on design also applies in large firms 
(Zahra et al., 2014), the focus of this dissertation is in the entrepreneurial context, as much 
of the software design work is in the larger firms (e.g. Chakraborty, Sarker, & Sarker, 
2010a; Lyytinen & Robey, 1999; Persson, Mathiassen, & Aaen, 2012).   
Even though researchers have discussed the role of context in influencing their 
findings, significant challenges remain in integrating context in theory (e.g., Bamberger, 
2008; Johns, 2006). For instance, context can serve as a main effect, have cross-level 
effects, interact with other variables, change the situational strength of factors (Johns, 
2006), or abet or constrain human agency (Mischel, 1968). Context can also be understood 
as a configuration or bundle of stimuli that may be hard to tease apart but still yield “a more 
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interpretable and theoretically interesting pattern than any of the factors would show in 
isolation” (Rousseau & Fried, 2001, p.4). Johns (2006) asserted that the challenge with 
studying contextual factors is the lack of emphasis of the interactions between these factors. 
These contextual factors are often studied in isolation, with other aspects of the context 
excluded from the study, even though they could be interdependent. 
2.2.1 Stage of Startup of Interest 
Scholars and practitioners also recognize that there are different phases in the 
process of entrepreneurial design of new products and software that varies with the 
organizational lifecycle (e.g.  Gersick, 1994; Vohora, Wright, & Lockett, 2004). In this 
study, the focus is on the early years of the firm, beyond the initial inception of ideas. At 
this stage, risks are taken in terms of investments and the focus is on sales (Adizes, 1979). 
Adizies (1979) suggest that in this stage of the firm, the structures and processes within the 
firm are coalescing and that this is an experimental phase which demands continuous 
commitment of the founder, who is the only management body at the time. Beyond this 
stage, the attention is not sales but on growth. Startups in nascent markets are in the 
exploratory stage, in which startups have to learn, make sense of, and adapt to changes in 
the market and firm, while needing to stay dynamic, flexible, innovative, and agile (e.g., 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) 
2.2.1.1 Salience of Firm Performance in the Early Years 
Entrepreneurship scholars have emphasized the high failure rates of new firms (e.g., 
Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983) and the negative repercussions of failure for the 
startup’s employees (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001; Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin & 
Miranda, 2014; Burton, Dahl, & Sorenson, 2017). The fear and stresses of failure (Dahl, 
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Nielsen, & Mojtabai, 2010) have resulted in increased attention to firm performance in the 
discussions and decisions.  
Additionally, attention to firm performance is affected by the involvement of 
investors that can influence decisions in the firm. Collewaert and Sapienza (2016) suggest 
that while investors and entrepreneurs generally work together towards maximizing the 
value of the startup, they may disagree on how to do so. Disagreements ensure about 
focusing attention on product development, gaining technology superiority, market share, 
or additional financing, all aspects which are essential to a venture’s progress (Fiet, 1995; 
Politis, 2008). Venture capitalists can also hinder venture growth if they offer the wrong 
strategic input or impose ill-advised constraints (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Welbourne, 
1990; Steier & Greenwood, 1995). Venture capitalists distinguish between different 
investment stages with financing provided for different purposes. But despite the 
proliferating venture-backed software firms, there is little recognition of the stages on the 
process of software design. Given the pressure for entrepreneurs to demonstrate value and 
generate sales in the early years, entrepreneurs may make decisions that can be myopic and 
detrimental for design in the long run (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998). Thus, the design decisions 
of startups in the early years warrant further study.   
2.2.2 Changing Nature of Software Designed 
Software designers in startups face pervasive uncertainty regarding market 
acceptance, the ability to mobilize resources, recognition of opportunities and whether their 
designs will actually work (Autio et al., 2014). The uncertainty they face is exacerbated by 
the changing of digital technologies, such as platform designs (Yoo, Henfridsson, & 
Lyytinen, 2010) or cloud computing, that shape the way software is designed (Lehmann & 
Rosenkranz, 2017). These technologies are viewed as a combination of “information, 
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computing, communication and connectivity technologies” (Bharadwaj et al., 2013). In the 
case of design processes in early stage startups, new digital technologies introduce new 
challenges in developing a business model, as the software may be designed prior to 
identification of a market, resulting in uncertain or difficult assess market potential 
(Shepherd, Mcmullen, & Ocasio, 2017; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009, von Briel et al., 
2017).  Designers in startups may continue to receive additional information that changes 
their attention allocation to design alternatives. (Antonopoulou et al., 2014). The market 
for the software, and the absence of a business model upfront (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 
2002) results in uncertainty for entrepreneurs. Therefore, designers in early stage startups 
would not only have to manage the uncertainty of the design process as in large software 
design firms (Lyytinen, 2001; Tuomi, 2002; Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2010), but also 
concurrently make sense of the unfolding business model and capture emerging market 
opportunities (Hedman & Kalling, 2003; Chesbrough, 2012). 
Instead of a relatively stable product and well-defined service boundaries 
(Davidsson, 2015; Nambisan, 2016), the design products underlying entrepreneurial 
opportunities are intentionally incomplete and can be expanded even after a product has 
been shipped (Garud, Jain, & Tuertscher, 2008; Yoo et al., 2010). For instance, in the case 
of a startup trying to find a market for its software, its software continues to evolve as it 
obtains more clients (e.g., Antonopoulou et al., 2016, 2014). Antonopoulou et al. (2016) 
illustrate the use of reusable designs that can be repurposed for other business contexts 
critical for firm performance in the early years of a startup. Overall, the changing digital 
technology (Nambisan, 2016) has improved the ease of capturing new business 
opportunities outside existing functionalities and contexts (e.g., Kranz et al., 2016; Ojala, 
2015) but can still be unwieldy for entrepreneurial firms to manage in the early years. 
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When designers and users struggle to make sense of the value of the software, this 
often results in ambiguity in quality and requirements. The design process in a startup can 
“unfold in a nonlinear fashion” (Nambisan, 2016, p. 6). Unlike the traditional software 
design firm, the designers in startups undergo greater extents of experimentation and 
changes in design trajectories (Nambisan, 2016). The goal is thus not to design a scalable 
robust software in the early years but to identify, through existing design efforts and 
exploration of opportunities, a scalable and repeatable business model (Blank, 2013). 
While the nature of the software and the environmental context can influence the 
software design process, IS scholars have yet to adequately consider the contingencies 
surrounding processes of designing software in entrepreneurial firms. Unlike large firms, 
these early stage startups operate under high uncertainty and time and financial pressures, 
as they concurrently design and search for product market fit.  
Because of this uncertainty, designers have been observed to postpone investment 
in design. For instance, Tumbas et al. (2015) adopted a digital façade concept that describes 
how mid-stage entrepreneurs have leveraged digital technology to give the appearance of 
an established and mature firm. Behind the scenes, the designers improvise with manual, 
ad hoc processes to meet the needs of their clients. The adoption of a digital façade is an 
example of a minimal commitment in design while waiting for uncertainty to resolve. 
However, the digital façade refers to digital technology that supports the operations of the 
startup but is not the core product offering of the startup. The digital façade example begins 
to highlight the possibility that startups in the early years may adopt design actions at odds 
with the espoused software design practices.  
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2.3 EXISTING METHODS OF SOFTWARE DESIGN 
While the design process encompasses analysis, design, coding, testing, 
maintenance, and revision (Apte et al., 1990), one of the key foci in the software design 
literature in IS is the analysis process, in which scholars examine the problems in 
requirements elicitation and changing requirements (Iansiti & MacCormack, 1997; Lee & 
Xia, 2005; Maruping et al., 2009; Banker & Slaughter, 2000), or coordination within 
designers (Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Maruping, Zhang, et al., 2009). For instance, Guinan et 
al. (1998) describe the problems with users’ inability to specify requirements accurately 
(e.g., Boland, 1978) and identify problems with designers who were unable and unwilling 
to work with users (e.g., Lyytinen & Newman, 2015), resulting in a final product that failed 
to meet users’ needs (Guinan et al., 1998). Guinan et al. (1998) also acknowledge the 
complexity of the requirements resulting from the elicitation/determination process, the 
importance of creating common goals, managing team progress, and failure and team 
culture. Guinan et al. (1998) further suggest that it is not the tools or software design 
methods but people, skills, and team characteristics that affect team performance. To that 
end, to better understand how to elicit user requirements and manage the changing 
requirements, software design practitioners have created two key types of software design 
methods to manage the costs of changing and/or inaccurate user requirements: plan-based 
and flexible design approaches.  
2.3.1 Plan-Based Methods of Software Design 
2.3.1.1 Practices in the Waterfall Method  
In the plan-based approach, such as the Waterfall method, there are distinct phases 
of specification of requirements, design, implementation, and testing (Sommerville, 1996). 
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However, a designer can only move to the next phase after the completion of the previous 
phase (Pressman, 1997; Royce, 1970). In the specification of requirements phase, the 
designers elicit and capture the requirements of users in a product requirements document, 
which is verified before design occurs. Design results in the creation of the software 
architecture and coding of the design. The implementation and testing then occurs, as the 
designers systematically discover and resolve the defects (Royce, 1970). In modified 
versions of the Waterfall model, designers can return to the previous cycle if defects or 
problems have been identified downstream (Royce, 1970).  
2.3.1.2 Benefits of the Waterfall Method 
Planned based approaches are effective when software requirements are fully 
specifiable, predictable, and can be built through meticulous and extensive planning 
management (Dybå & Dingsøyr, 2008).  Because of the emphasis on documentation 
through requirements documents and design documents and source code, it ensures 
continuity in design if team members were to leave midway during the design process or 
for other designers to understand the code. Plan-based methods are also more relevant for 
requirements that remain stable. Additionally, designers have to pay attention to strict 
budgetary or schedule constraints, or quality, for software that require high reliability, such 
as safety-critical systems (Maruping et al., 2009). Attention to these aspects of design thus 
leads to a design process that is largely plan-based, as the plan will outline the 
requirements, architectures, designs, budgets, and schedules with little deviation 
(Maruping et al., 2009). 
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2.3.1.3 Challenges with the Waterfall Method  
Critics of the Waterfall approach point to the difficulty in eliciting accurate user 
requirements upfront (Lyytinen, 1987; Sommerville, 1996). The plan-driven, formal and 
tool-oriented Waterfall approach often leads to unnecessary redesign downstream after 
significant investment in design and implementation (Conboy, 2009).  The long lead times 
can lead to redesign, redesign, retesting, and increased costs (Cooper & Woolgar, 1994). 
Risk is therefore high for developers, as it will not incorporate newly-discovered 
constraints, requirements, or problems in the meantime (Parnas & Clements, 1986). The 
risks suggest that adoption of the Waterfall method in the entrepreneurial setting with high 
uncertainty and evolving and emergent players will result in requirement documents and 
design plans that will quickly become obsolete.  
2.3.2 Flexible Methods of Software Design 
2.3.2.1 Practices in the Agile Method 
Flexible design methods, such as the Agile method (e.g. Abrahamsson, Conboy, & 
Wang, 2009), recommend organizing design processes in rapid prototyping cycles. The 
Agile method shifts the attention away from practices common in plan-based design 
methods: it prioritizes the creation of working software over comprehensive 
documentation, user collaboration over contract negotiation, and responding to change 
over following a plan  (Beck, 2004). 
The Agile method also recommends design practices, such as paired programming, 
daily standup meetings, depending on the variant of Agile method (e.g. Scrum, XP). Agile 
methods recommend using prototypes as validation mechanisms to avoid waste in upfront 
design, particularly in complex projects (Cao, Ramesh, & Abdel-Hamid, 2010).  Prototypes 
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are used for establishing a common basis for understanding and communicating design 
ideas between a designer and the players (Mathiassen, Seewaldt, & Stage, 1995), enabling 
the designer to respond quickly to changing requirements (J. Highsmith & Cockburn, 
2001). Planning only happens in detail for the features and requirements to be implemented 
in a specific cycle. These practices enable flexibility to incorporate changes in a late stage 
of the project with less consequences and improve the ability to demonstrate business value 
more quickly (Dagnino, Smiley, Srikanth & Ant, 2004) and improve the value of the 
software to users (Beck, 2004). The design process is thus adaptive and iterative (Lee & 
Xia, 2010). 
2.3.2.2. Benefits of the Agile Method  
In principle, flexible approaches are good for complex systems and projects with 
dynamic, non-deterministic characteristics that render accuracy in estimates useless, as 
feedback is frequently sought from users that will then be used to guide further design 
(Maruping et al., 2009). While the Agile method is also said to be developed for small, co-
located teams (Boehm & Turner, 2005; J. Highsmith & Cockburn, 2001) due to the extent 
of daily coordination, use of Agile methods has been adapted for larger team sizes (Cao, 
Mohan, Xu, & Ramesh, 2009; Brian Fitzgerald, Hartnett, & Conboy, 2006; Maruping, 
Venkatesh, et al., 2009) as a result of desire for agility in design. Adoption of Agile 
practices has increased due to challenges resulting from a changing environment, 
ambiguous user requirements, and time constraints (Boehm, 2002; Maurer & Melnik, 
2006; Abrahamsson & Still, 2007).  
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2.3.2.3 Challenges with the Agile Method  
Although the Agile method seeks to deal with uncertainty to generate innovations 
at a high rate, it requires the adoption of many routines (Berente & Lyytinen, 2007; 
Fitzgerald, 1997) that an early stage entrepreneurial firm can find too resource-intensive to 
adopt. Additionally, Conboy (2009) asserted that designers can adopt Agile method 
practices but still not achieve agility in the software design process. For instance, he saw 
that the use of standup meetings, while beneficial, had a varying impact on agility. Other 
scholars have also found that adoption of Agile practices used is not necessarily correlated 
with the achievement of agility because the context of use and implementation process 
matters (Cao et al., 2009; Conboy, 2009; Vidgen & Wang, 2009).  
The Agile method is also limited in its benefits as it has been normative, in that it 
has a list of prescribed practices that have little clarity with regards to its contribution to 
agility and theoretical grounding. In fact, scholars have found that designers often do not 
adopt Agile practices holistically, not because of ignorance but for pragmatic reasons (e.g., 
Fitzgerald, 1997; Conboy, 2009). In fact, scholars have suggested that a software design 
method may be interpreted, not as a set of rules or rigorous prescription, but as an ideal 
that is not expected to be followed literally (Conboy, 2009; Iivari & Maansaari, 1998). 
In the entrepreneurial context, the use of Agile methods can also be limited, due to 
the novel nature of the software. Scholars have shown that the value of user interactions in 
Agile is limited when users have insufficient knowledge of the requirements due to the 
complexity of the designs or lack of user participation (Fitzgerald et al., 2006). Users and/or 
client intermediaries need to be available frequently (Highsmith, 2002), but in the startup 
in the early years, the startup is still trying to identify its product-market. As such, it does 
not yet have a fixed user group but one that may change frequently over time. Additionally, 
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the Agile method also often assumes an “ideal” user representative, who can answer all 
developer questions correctly and is empowered to make binding decisions correctly 
(Paetsch et al., 2003). Communication may be ineffective or resource intensive when 
dealing with many players and vast amounts of information (Fitzgerald et al., 2006).  
Additionally, the assumption is that designers in the Agile method will incorporate 
changing requirements in the design (Beck, 2001). However, scholars have found that 
updated requirements may only be incorporated if designers have time (Lee & Xia, 2010). 
Requirements may change frequently, which leads to a high overload cost for designers to 
get frequent testing at the end of each sprint (Beck, 1999). Environmental uncertainty for 
the designers is higher compared to that in the plan-based methods, as user requirements 
and specifications can change over the course of a project (Maruping, Zhang, et al., 2009; 
Nidumolu & Subramani, 2003). 
The use of Agile methods also has negative repercussions for the software product, 
as a result of inadequate architecture planning, overemphasis on early results (E. Anderson, 
Lim, & Joglekar, 2017), and low levels of test coverage (Highsmith & Cockburn, 2001; 
Boehm, 2002). Additionally, the use of Agile over time can lead to a lack of architectural 
scalability, as the absence of a design phase may lead to the overlooking of design problems 
upfront with consequences downstream (Erickson, Lyytinen, & Siau, 2005). The use of 
flexible methods, such as Agile, have been posited to increase the intensity of technical 
debt beyond that discussed in traditional software design (Elbanna & Sarker, 2016). 
Because of the need to reduce design time and focus on the delivery of functional 
requirements, designers have postponed the repayment of technical debt.  
Overtime, use of the Agile method results in trouble meeting schedules and lowers 
software quality, as technical debt accumulates, and software grows in complexity and 
becomes more difficult to maintain. Additionally, the focus on designs associated with 
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business also means reduced attention to stability and reliability in the software. The 
problems with use of Agile method highlighted by scholars thus contradicts Tumbas et al. 
(2017), who suggest that startups have little technical debt in the early years. Collectively, 
the research suggests that flexible methods, such as Agile, can result in software with 
different risk and success factors from traditional software design (Elbanna & Sarker, 
2016) that may present opportunities and constraints for startups in the early years trying 
to concurrently design a software and a business.  
2.3.2.4 Practices in Lean Startup, Another Flexible Method of Software Design 
A related flexible software design approach espoused for startups is the Lean 
startup (Ries, 2011), particularly for startups navigating nascent markets that face high 
levels of uncertainty and ambiguity (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). The Lean startup is 
grounded in Lean thinking. Lean thinking focuses on cost reduction and quality and has 
shifted to focus on increased value (Conboy, 2009). The value refers to the value 
experienced by users through the product offering (Ries, 2011), instead of value from the 
designers’ perspective. 
2.3.2.5 Benefits of Lean Startup  
The impact of the entrepreneurial context (Tumbas et al., 2017, 2015) has changed 
how software products are designed. Practitioners have recommended prototypes, such as 
the minimum viable product (MVP), for designers in startups. According to Eisenmann, 
Ries and Dillard (2012), p. 1), “an entrepreneur translates her vision into falsifiable 
business model hypotheses, and then tests those hypotheses using a series of MVPs. Each 
MVP represents the smallest set of activities needed to disapprove a hypothesis.” An 
effective MVP design approach requires rigorous discipline approach to generate and test 
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hypotheses. Hypotheses are tested in short prototyping cycles. The objective of the MVP 
is to maximize the amount of learning and uncertainty reduction with the minimum 
resources expended. The notion of prototypes common in the flexible appeals to 
entrepreneurs operating in a resource-constrained environment (e.g., Ries, 2011). It 
involves relatively little upfront investment in the design process but focuses on iterations 
to allow entrepreneurs the opportunity to validate their business models efficiently. Note 
that the goal of the design effort advocated in the Lean Startup is not to build robust 
software but to validate and identify a scalable business model (Blank, 2003).  
2.3.2.6 Challenges with Lean Startup   
The focus of the Lean Startup is thus on the design of single features and conducting 
experiments, such as split testing, to verify the desirability of the feature (Ries, 2011). The 
interdependencies between the features and cohesiveness of the features as a whole are 
thus secondary (Sharkey, 2013).  Additionally, because of the recommended frequency of 
experiments and feedback evaluation (Ries 2011), the process is resource intensive, which 
bears similarities to the problems with the Agile method but intensified.  
2.3.3 Summary of design Methods  
In general, these software design methods do not provide guidance to designers on 
how to approach “dynamic, chaotic, multi path and expansive” (Yoo et al., 2010, p.7) 
design of digital technology often designed in startups. A literature review by Park, Boland 
and Yoo (2011) indicate that only 12 percent of existing design process research in the top 
IS journals have focused on the syntheses of new ideas, forms, and functions in the design 
process. The majority of existing design process research examines the analysis and 
evaluation of design requirements from available user groups but designers in software 
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startups tend to move towards synthesis path creation (Henfridsson, Yoo, & Svahn, 2009) 
or recombination (Hylving, Henfridsson, & Selander, 2012). Designers in the early stage 
entrepreneurial context create novel software with new, emergent value propositions and 
ambiguous quality that are undetermined upfront (Antonopoulou et al., 2014). The Lean 
Startup and other flexible approaches appear to partially alleviate the uncertainty but may 
be resource intensive (Fitzgerald, 1997; Berente & Lyytinen, 2007). These flexible design 
approaches also highlight a disregard for architecture and design principles (Sharkey, 
2013). 
2.4 EXAMINING THESE CHALLENGES THROUGH ABV 
In this dissertation, I adopt the attention-based view (ABV) as an organizing 
framework. Adopting an ABV allows researchers to understand how designers allocate 
attention given to the attention structures, environment, and communication and procedural 
channels that exist within and outside of the firm. The plan-based and flexible approaches 
highlighted in the previous section have highlighted different design process practices for 
uncovering the user requirements accurately and efficiently. In the remaining parts of this 
chapter, I provide a summary of the ABV before addressing the value and limitations of 
adopting ABV as an organizational framework.  
2.4.1 Attention-Based View  
In this section, I provide an overview of ABV, a framework that emerged through 
the analysis of my data. The rationale for ABV is that decision-makers can attend to only 
a limited number of issues and answers due to time and cognitive limits (March & Simon, 
1958; Simon, 1947). The ABV describes how attention is funneled through the attention 
structures and communication and procedural channels to focus on the concentration of 
attention and resources of decision makers on a limited set of issues and tasks, thus 
  22 
facilitating the speed and accuracy of decision-makers’ response (Ocasio, 1997). Attention 
is defined as the decision-makers’ noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time 
and effort on issues and answers (i.e., the repertoire of categories for making sense of 
problems, opportunities, and threats in the environments, and an available repertoire of 
action alternatives that could be used to address the issues) (Ocasio, 1997). 
The attention structures comprise four components: players, rules of the game, 
structural positions, and resources (Ocasio, 1997). Players are structurally autonomous 
social actors or groups of actors, who, through their social influence, power, and control, 
influence and regulate the decision and activities of other decision-makers (Ocasio, 1997). 
Rules of the game are formal and informal principles of action, interaction, and 
interpretation that guide and constrain decision-makers in accomplishing the firm’s tasks, 
and in obtaining social status, credits, and rewards. They embody the organizational 
identity and purpose (Barnard, 1938; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Selznick, 1957).  
Structural positions are the roles and social identifications that specify (a) the functions and 
orientations of decision-makers, and (b) their relationships with other structural positions 
internal and external to the firm. They arise from the division of labor both within and 
between organizations. Lastly, resources are tangible and intangible assets that allow the 
firm to perform its activities and to produce its goods and services (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Together, these four components shape the legitimacy of available issues and answers and 
help to funnel the attention of decision makers to the selected set of issues and answers 
(Fiol & O’Connor, 2003; Simon, 1947; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988).    
2.4.1.1 Attention Structures: Players 
Players are “individuals [who] ultimately do the attending” and have considerable 
influence over the attention regulation within the firm (Ocasio, 1997, p. 189). They regulate 
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the firm’s attention through the specific skills, beliefs, and values they bring to the firm 
(March & Olsen, 1975).  Ocasio asserts that any factor that influences “the agenda for the 
meeting” or “the formal structure of the committee” is likely to be very important (1997, 
p. 195). Research has included those in top management teams (Adams, Licht, & Sagiv, 
2011; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Van Doorn, Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2013) 
and board members (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010). 
In the software design literature, examining the players in the process is important 
because players bring different goals and perspectives into the design process, as evidenced 
by the studies in the software implementation process (e.g. Thanasankit, 2002). However, 
existing software design research views software design as grounded in software 
engineering principles, thus is less people centric (Nerur, Mahapatra, & Mangalaraj, 2005). 
2.4.1.2 Structural Positions 
Structural positions refer to “the roles and social identifications that specify (a) the 
functions and orientations of decision-makers, and (b) their interrelationships with other 
structural positions internal and external to the firm” (Ocasio, 1997, p. 197). Structural 
positions create heterogeneity in the interests and identities of decision-makers and thus 
result in “differentiated attention to various aspects of the organization’s environment” 
(Ocasio, 1997, p. 198). Depending on the structural positions and interests associated with 
those positions, decision-makers will weigh some aspects more heavily than others. 
Scholars further propose that differences in roles and responsibilities create differences in 
motives across individuals in different structural positions, which shape attention 
allocation (Barreto & Patient, 2013; McMullen, Shepherd & Patzelt, 2009). These studies 
suggest that the structural positions of the designers and the roles they play can affect 
attention allocation in the design process.  
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2.4.1.3 Rules of the Game 
The rules of the game are “the formal and informal principles of action, interaction, 
and interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers in accomplishing the firm’s 
tasks and in obtaining social status, credits, and rewards in the process” (Ocasio, 1997, p. 
196). The rules include the rules competitors subscribe to, the basis of competition, and 
other socially constructed rules that are espoused by decision makers or other players. In 
the organization sciences research, Cho and Hambrick (2006) found that a change in the 
"rules of the game" (Ocasio, 1997) as a result of deregulation in the airline industry led 
decision makers to shift from an internal orientation towards an external market orientation, 
which led to the noticing of new opportunities for the creation of value. Just as subunits 
within a firm have different goals (e.g., production department focuses on production goals 
and marketing department on marketing goals), it can be imagined that the decision makers 
or subunits within the firm may be sensitized to different attention structures. Thus, further 
insight on the influence of the rules of the game on attention allocation may shed insight 
into how attention and resources become allocated in the design process.  
2.4.1.4 Resources and Firm Performance  
Resources are assets used in the construction of the firm’s action (Ocasio, 1997) 
and can refer to human, physical technology, or financial capital (Ocasio, 1997). Firm 
performance affects resources available to the firm and the alternatives that can be 
considered by the decision-makers (March & Shapira, 1992; Ocasio, 1997).  These include 
competencies and inimitable assets (Rumelt, 1984; Selznick, 1957). With more resources, 
attention can be diverted away from the prioritized issues and distributed among multiple 
issues (Chen & Miller, 2007; Sapienza, De Clercq, & Sandberg, 2005). It can be imagined 
that this becomes particularly salient for startups that are resource-constrained.  
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Startups without slack resources will first allocate attention to actions that allow the 
achievement of urgent issues (George, 2005), such as improvement in financial 
performance. Work that does not contribute to the financial targets is abandoned, though 
less frequently when the firm has resources (Shimizu, 2007). Abundant slack resources 
create a buffer for decision-makers to allocate attention to other non-urgent issues. Slack 
promotes experimentation with new strategies, shapes the consideration of alternatives, and 
influences the repertoire of answers of the decision-makers (Ocasio, 1997). Slack resources 
further influence the attention of decision-makers by including (or excluding) different 
alternatives, as the availability of resources provides the organization with the possibility 
to perform a wide variety of tasks (March & Shapira, 1992), ideas, and projects that 
otherwise would not be approved.   
2.4.1.5 Procedural and Communication Channels  
Procedural and communication channels include in-person or virtual meetings, 
telephone conversations, and email exchanges, etc. They are the conduits that guide the 
attention allocation of decision-makers within the firm (Ocasio, 1997). The interactions 
between decision-makers through these channels allow discussions about specific activity 
or situation knowledge, alternative answers, interests, and identities. These interactions 
shape which issues and answers become more salient and direct decision-makers to attend 
to different components of their environment (Sutton & Hargadon, 1996). 
2.4.2 Attention Dictates Action  
Attention allocation amongst designers within the firm is shaped by attention 
drivers and contextual factors, such as firm performance or time constraints. The attention 
allocated then affects action (Ocasio, 1997). For instance,  in the software design research, 
Abdel-Hamid et al.(1989) studied the association between goals and project actions. The 
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findings suggest that, with attention to a given project goal, team managers make planning 
and resource allocations to meet such a goal. Designers who have to meet cost and schedule 
constraints allocate different attention and resources to designs than those who have to 
deliver on quality and schedule. Lee and Xia (2010) find that when faced with time 
constraints, designers will continue to pay attention and accommodate high impact, 
business-disruptive requirement changes, despite the repercussions for software quality.  
Paying attention to meeting changing user requirements may lead to actions that increase 
the expense of budgets and schedules (Maruping et al., 2009). Overall, these studies show 
that attention to certain aspects of design will lead to allocation of resources towards those 
aspects. 
Attention allocation can affect design actions. If uncertainty is low, designers may 
adopt a plan-based design approach to quickly complete the design. With time constraints, 
a flexible approach will not be faster, as it can result in redesign (Maruping et al., 2009). 
The pressures of user expectations, time, and resource constraints have led to limitation of 
scope (e.g., Siddiqi & Shekaran, 1996) and delivery of the most essential functionalities as 
early as possible (Port & Bui, 2009) that may depart from product market fit (Harris et al., 
2009). Collectively, these studies show that what the designer pays attention to in the 
design process can affect the actions undertaken, though there is little understanding of the 
specific design actions undertaken when the designers’ attention may be driven by different 
attention drivers, particularly under entrepreneurial contexts with high uncertainty and high 
financial and time pressures.  
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2.5 UNDERSTANDING DESIGN IN THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CONTEXT THROUGH ABV  
2.5.1 What ABV Informs us about the Entrepreneurial Context 
  To begin to answer my research question of “How does the entrepreneurial context 
in which the startup operates affect the software design process and product in the early 
years?”, my review highlights that IS research has focused on software design processes 
and practices, such as Waterfall (e.g. Sommerville, 1996), Agile (Abrahamsson, Conboy, 
& Wang, 2009; Conboy, 2009; Highsmith, 2002), and other software design processes. The 
goal of these practices includes control of software design process efficiency (Zmud, 
1980), budget and schedule (e.g. Cao, Ramesh, & Abdel-Hamid, 2010; G. Lee & Xia, 
2010), whilst meeting users’ requirements. The studies have also shown that attention to 
factors, such as budget control or time pressures (e.g., Austin, 2001; Abdel-Hamid et al., 
1989), shape the design process. ABV highlights how players and rules of the game in the 
entrepreneurial context have the potential to change the dynamics in which design 
discussions occur.  
In the software design literature, a software that does not meet user needs is a 
failure, according to software quality definitions (Guinan et al., 1998). The software design 
rules (e.g., design and programming guidelines, security, and assurance guarantees) aim to 
produce a coherent design product (Harris, Collins, & Hevner, 2009) Design practices, 
such as increased designer-user communication, have been adopted to increase user 
satisfaction, quality of software, and greater efficiency for the designers. In the Waterfall 
approach, the rationale is that accurate elicitation of requirements in the early stages will 
reduce any redesign in the latter stages (Royce, 1970). Conversely, the Agile method 
recommends organizing its design processes in rapid prototyping cycles to reduce the need 
  28 
for redesign(e.g., Abrahamsson, Warsta, Siponen, & Ronkainen, 2003; Dybå & Dingsøyr, 
2008). 
 Examining ABV with respect to software design illustrates how designers shape 
the procedural and communications channels within the firm based on the rules of the game 
they are playing. For example, to capture more accurate user requirements, the procedures 
have changed from upfront planning to iterative design in Agile methods to allow for more 
frequent user feedback (Conboy, 2009). The procedures within the Agile methodology and 
requirements engineering literature also focus on increased user participation in the design 
process. The user is the focus of attention in the design process. However, as mentioned in 
the earlier sections, with the emerging digital technologies (Nambisan, 2016; Tiwana et al., 
2010) and increasingly turbulent software design environments (Vidgen & Wang, 2009), 
typified by unpredictable markets, changing user requirements, and time pressures 
(Baskerville et al., 2001), more research is warranted to see how designers, such as those 
in the early stage startups, allocate their attention and design efforts. Additionally, when a 
firm, such as a startup, is resource-constrained, the designers’ attention tends to be 
preoccupied with short-term performance issues, rather than with long-term, innovative 
projects (George, 2005).  
Furthermore, the existing research focuses primarily on users and designers. Many 
scholars have argued for the importance of designer-user interactions and mutual 
understanding between designers and users (Kujala & Väänänen-Vainio-Mattila, 2008; G. 
M. Marakas & Elam, 1998). User-designer interactions can improve the technology’s 
quality by matching the task needs of the user with the technology capabilities (i.e., task-
technology fit) (He & King, 2008). As such, the software design practices often focus on 
communication channels and other procedures that allow the designer to elicit accurate 
information about user requirements to improve software success (Gallivan & Keil, 2003; 
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George M Marakas, Yi, Johnson, & Introduction, 1998; Schonberger, 2010). For example, 
XP (a form of Agile method) insists on having an on-site customer (Beck, 2003) whose 
responsibilities include understanding and representing the needs of multiple customer 
segments and specifying and clarifying the features that need to be implemented. Some IS 
scholars have suggested that users, user representatives, and their intermediaries are less 
influential in the case of enterprise packaged software or novel software (e.g. Sawyer, 
2001; Stacey & Nandhakumar, 2006), such as the one designed in this dissertation. 
The software design literature does not focus as much on client intermediaries (e.g., 
administrative staff from client sites), though the literature questions the extent to which 
the intermediary is acting as reliable representatives of the users (Iivari & Iivari, 2006; 
Majchrzak & Beath, 2001). For instance, systems analysts and designers are the voices of 
the customers, and they communicate their learning to the other designers in the form of 
storyboarding or use cases to inform design. The client intermediaries, such as those who 
are responsible for purchasing the software, are unavoidably intertwined with the politics 
of resource allocation and legitimacy of decision-making within their own firms (Keil & 
Carmel, 1995). For instance, client intermediaries who sought to protect their own careers, 
advocated inefficient designs that seemed to reflect their own self-interests rather than for 
the benefit of other players (Chatterjee, Sarker, & Fuller, 2009). Chatterjee, et al. (2009) 
showed that a powerful union negotiated several conditions, including attractive retirement 
benefits for staff who would retire following the software implementation. As such, the 
input of the existing staff is not incorporated or deemed relevant for the design of software. 
Despite this recognition, the software design literature does not investigate the challenges 
of designing software with client intermediaries as players influencing the design process. 
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2.5.2 Gaps in our Understanding of the Entrepreneurial Context and Attention 
Allocation 
However, in the ABV the interactions between the components of the attention 
structures, channels, and environment are black boxed and thus presents gaps in the 
understanding of the relationships between attention allocation, design actions and product 
in the early stage entrepeneurial context. Currently, the assumption is that the ABV 
integrates the attention of individuals within the firm (Ocasio, 1997). The interactions can 
change in consideration to the entrepreneurial context, due to the presence of different 
players and rules of the game.  
Using the ABV highlights other players, such as designers, clients and, indirectly, 
investors who have influence over attention allocation through their control of the 
resources available to the firm. For instance, a review of the entrepreneurship literature 
suggests that elements of the entrepreneurial context, such as the involvement of investors 
(e.g., Sapienza, Korsgaard, Academy, & Jun, 2007; Shane & Cable, 2002), may affect the 
work of designers in startups. The financial pressures and uncertainty of the entrepreneurial 
context may shape attention allocation and action: given the smaller firm size and dual 
roles of designers as entrepreneurs. 
2.5.1.1 Designers 
Information systems scholars have examined how the designers and their 
perspectives affect the design process. For instance, designers have been found to be 
unwilling to work with user-provided requirements because they think they know what is 
best for the user (Lyytinen & Newman, 2015). Designers may allocate attention differently 
depending on their personal goals. Austin (2001) further suggests that designers who pay 
attention to professional or financial gains fear the career impact of missed deadlines more 
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than quality tradeoffs and may take shortcuts. These shortcuts reflect designers’ 
“tendencies to hope for the best, to leave potential sources of difficulty unexplored, and to 
interpret requirements conveniently when faced with time pressures” (Austin, 2001, p. 
195). Designers take shortcuts without fearing personal consequences because it is difficult 
for others to identify the root of defects or performance issues (e.g. DeMarco, 1995; Iansiti 
& Gill, 1990). Designers are also found to allocate attention to different aspects of design, 
depending on their roles. Designers responsible for writing and testing the code “often have 
different and even divergent goals that are difficult to synthesize” (Sawyer, 2001a, p. 160).  
Less is said about the designer who has to take on multiple roles, such as design 
and business design (Onyemah, Pesquera, & Ali, 2013). Whereas existing software design 
research occurs in large organizations where buffers may exist between business design 
and software design, designers in the entrepreneurial context may have to take on multiple 
roles. Entrepreneurs who take on multiple roles within the firm have to navigate multiple 
identities (Mathias & Williams, 2014), all of which can affect attention allocation.  
2.5.1.2 Other Players 
Several scholars have begun to delve into the social processes and actors involved 
in the design process (e.g. Chakraborty, Sarker, & Sarker, 2010). Players are now more 
distributed across space, stakeholder groups, and time (Hansen & Lyytinen, 2010). 
Research alludes to a presence of players in the market who can affect the design process, 
for example, by influencing the speed at which designs have to be (e.g. Huang et al., 2016). 
Not recognizing these players would result in “overlooking the most critical problems with 
[software design], those of different expectations and reactions of different [players]” 
(Chatterjee et al., 2009, p. 790). Examining software design using the attention-based view 
recognizes the influence of players in attention allocation of the decision makers within the 
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firm. Acknowledgement of these players shapes dynamics among the designers that is 
needed for improved software design performance (Carmel & Sawyer, 1998). 
The organization science and entrepreneurship literature suggest that players 
external to the firm may be involved in attention allocation within the firm. In the 
organization science literature, researchers have examined how players and relationships 
at the industry level (e.g., Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), and at the firm level (e.g., Kaplan, 
2008; Tuggle et al., 2010) can affect attention allocation. Similarly, the entrepreneurship 
researchers have emphasized the role of investors in the running of the startup. Given the 
substantial equity stake that venture capitalists typically take in a firm, the relationship 
between venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs that they fund has been compared to that 
of large block stockholders in leveraged-buyout firms (Jain & Kini, 1995).  Venture 
capitalists observe the firm to track its business potential and monitor the entrepreneurs’ 
actions (Cable & Shane, 1997). Venture capitalists also introduce new constraints for the 
firm and the design process. Venture capitalists face time pressures because their 
constituents expect returns on their investments. Time is an integral component of financial 
returns, as the venture capitalists' performance is measured by total returns over a fixed 
time. Thus, venture capitalists experience pressure to move products to market and grow 
ventures to profitable stages (Cable & Shane, 1997). Given the influence of the investors 
on the running of the business, their involvement cannot be ignored, yet it has not been 
acknowledged in the software design literature, despite the growing phenomenon of 
software entrepreneurship. 
Overall, the research cumulatively highlights the need to examine the broader set 
of players and their influence in the design process. Guinan et al. (1998) describes the need 
for activities to help designers monitor and restrict the external influences in the design 
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process. However, Guinan et al. (1998) only focuses on the requirements elicitation phase, 
not what happens beyond the requirements elicitation process.   
2.5.1.3 Rules of the Game 
As alluded to previously, designers in the startup may adopt distinct design actions 
or create different design products than those in the established software design firms (e.g., 
Nambisan 2016). To better understand the sources of environmental influence experienced 
by startups, a review of the practitioner literature suggests that the designers in startups 
have to play an additional but different “game.” Other than the extant software quality and 
project management rules, startups have to meet funding milestones and growth metrics 
that are different than in software design, as highlighted in Table 2-1. Table 2-1 
summarizes the rules of the game for designers pertaining to software design and digital 
business design. The first two rows highlight software quality and project management 
outcome measures that have been discussed in IS research. The startup growth and funding 
milestones highlight the financial rules by which software startups are evaluated, 
particularly in the early stages. Startup performance is determined based on these financial 
metrics, which do not explicitly consider quality but have implications for resource and 
attention allocation within the startup.  These additional financial metrics highlight a shift 
in rules of the game for the designers. The focus for the startup is therefore firm 
performance and survival, which may or may not be at odds with what designers prioritize 
in large software design teams. Further research is needed to understand how changes in 
these rules affect attention allocation and design in startups.  
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Table 2-1:  Performance Metrics for Designers in Software Startups 
Game  Metrics  
Software Design Game 
Quality  Maintainability, flexibility, testability, correctness, reliability, 
efficiency, integrity, usability, portability, reusability, and 
interoperability (McCall, Richards, & Walters, 1977)  
Project management  Budget, schedule, time to market  
(e.g., Highsmith, 2002; Molnar & Nandhakumar, 2009) 
Digital Business Design Game 
Startup growth  Burn rate, activation rate, daily to monthly active users’ ratio, 
customer churn rate, revenue growth rate, net promoter score 
(e.g., David Ehrenberg, 2014) 
Funding milestones  Seed: Initial market research, product to build, initial market  
Series A: Figure out user base, product  
Series B: Software that can scale, build business  
Series C: More scaling, e.g., international  
(Delventhal, 2017) 
Overall, the interactions between the components of the attention structures, 
channels, and environment are black boxed. There remains little understanding of how the 
different elements of attention structures and contextual factors concurrently influence the 
attention allocation of decision-makers between conflicting organizational goals (Stevens, 
Moray, Bruneel, & Clarysse, 2015). Instead, the ABV assumes that the attention structures 
and procedural and communication channels will lead to the convergence of attention 
allocation within the different units within the firm. Designers may also respond differently 
from the ways in which “a firm’s attention structures and channels distribute attention to 
him or her” (Barnett, 2008, p. 611). How these designers allocate their attention can affect 
the design alternatives they choose.  
2.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I begin with an overview of the entrepreneurial context and how its 
implication for the work designers do. I also briefly describe the existing software design 
research and the attention-based view (ABV). Analysis of the software design research 
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using the ABV highlights gaps in the software design research that have emerged because 
of the entrepreneurial context, particularly with respect to the players and rules of the game. 
Overall, the dynamics of the conflict resulting from the interactions between the 
components of the attention structures, channels, and environment are black boxed. Past 
research treated the processes and outcomes of entrepreneurship as distinct units of analysis 
and either focused on one or the other (process or outcome), whilst ignoring the 
interdependencies between both (Nambisan et al., 2017).  
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Chapter 3:  Site and Methods 
3.1 OVERVIEW  
This study strives to present a richly detailed account of how the entrepreneurial 
context and players affect design decisions and design products. I have adopted a 
qualitative, inductive approach to study the work of the firm’s designers at HealthCom. 
The case study strategy is appropriate for use in research when context must be explored 
to understand a phenomenon (Yin, 1994) and the “dynamics present within the setting” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534). Case study research has often been used in the study of how 
work is done (e.g. Bailey, Leonardi, & Barley, 2012; Tumbas, Seidel, Berente, & Brocke, 
2015; Antonopoulou, Nandhakumar, & Henfridsson, 2016). Entrepreneurship researchers 
have pointed to local context as an essential moderator of how entrepreneurial work is the 
context, the dynamics, and the organizational factors that play into design (Zahra, 2007; 
Zahra et al., 2014). Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the participant–observation 
case study was adopted to be able to understand real-time the effect of context on design 
process and product.  
Multiple data sources exist in the use of the single case study. The methods of data 
collection included: semi structured interviews, ethnographic observation, and document 
review, which allowed for the triangulation of data.  Particularly critical to this analysis 
was the corpus of chat transcripts that held a record of interactions between designers, even 
prior to my entry into the field. Iterative qualitative coding was used in my data analysis. 
With an extensive corpus of data suitable for constructing and confirming a holistic view 
of design decisions and design work, this case study brings together data and analytical 
insights at the levels of individuals and the firm to inform research on design work. In this 
dissertation, I use an interpretive process to construct theory that is grounded in the data 
(Walsham, 1995). At the same time, the analysis conducted is also informed by the existing 
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literature on software design, entrepreneurship, and attention-based view (ABV) literature. 
I started my analysis by adopting the designers’ terms and meanings in the themes that 
emerge from the data. I also attempted to disengage from the existing theoretical work on 
software design in the analysis, keeping in mind only the key practices in software design, 
to facilitate the emergence of meaning from the data.  
Although the data sources are described separately from the procedures for data 
analysis, concurrent data collection and analysis occurred throughout the duration of the 
study, as recommended by grounded theory researchers (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001; 
Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2001; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The insights from early and 
ongoing data analysis have guided my data collection activities, since they suggest areas 
for additional observation and interviews. For example, themes that emerged later 
prompted follow up interviews and conversations for further examination.   
In the remainder of the chapter, I provide background information on the research 
site and software designed and the procedures for data collection and analysis. 
3.2 CASE BACKGROUND 
This section provides a description of HealthCom, the software designed, and the 
design process. I also briefly summarize the industry level initiatives and the clients of the 
firm that prompted the design of this software. 
3.2.1 The Research Site: HealthCom 
HealthCom (a pseudonym), a digital health startup in the southern United States, 
was selected as the case study site. At the point of entry into the firm, the firm was 16 
months old. The study terminated in Month 34. The firm was also acquired in Month 42.  
HealthCom was particularly well-suited for my research question for several 
reasons. HealthCom’s co-founders faced unknown, emergent requirements, as the software 
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and the digital business grew. The healthcare context is particularly challenging to design 
for: knowledge transfer in healthcare involves complex treatment plans and users of 
varying socioeconomic status and physiological conditions (Lim, Jarvenpaa, & Lanham, 
2015). Healthcare clients are also slow adopters of new innovations (Lim & Anderson, 
2016).  Slow adoption and long lead times during contract negotiation were at odds with 
the contracts and revenue needed for startup survival. The entrepreneurs also had no 
background in healthcare. They were entrepreneurs who believed that they could change 
the healthcare industry and design a different software. Therefore, it was intriguing to 
examine how they would approach design differently.  
The firm also provided access to the firm’s design process in the early years that 
was not easily apparent to outsiders. It allowed me to observe the unfolding of the design 
process and product in real time, over a period of 18 months, without ex-poste knowledge 
or biases about the success or failure of the firm. Being able to observe the work of the 
designers in close detail over time, and from multiple perspectives, allowed for a deeper 
understanding and interpretation of the data sources, such as the chat transcripts. Access to 
the chat transcripts also allowed me to capture conversations that occurred when I was not 
at the firm. Access to the phenomenon at such a fine-grained level would not be possible 
in large sample statistical analysis or even through the common method of examining 
letters to shareholders in ABV research. The single case was thus ideal for observing the 
micro-processes in daily work and interactions between the individuals, organization, and 
the environment. 
3.2.2 The HealthCom designers 
In this study, I called all firm employees designers. They all contributed to the 
design of the software and the digital business. All the designers, even the Customer 
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Liaison, had computer programming and design backgrounds and were involved in 
discussions that shaped the design of the software. They also had experience in the 
entrepreneurial setting, either as owners or participants in other startups. All the designers, 
except for the Customer Liaison, were male. In contrast, most of the users and the 
intermediaries they dealt with were female. 
HealthCom was founded by the CEO and Chief Designer (the co-founders) in 2013. 
The co-founders both had previous successful entrepreneurial firms. They started 
HealthCom with a different business model and software idea. They changed their idea 
after participating in an accelerator and meeting their first two clients, who were also 
investors (Clients A and C).  They then recruited the CTO and iOS designer (January 2014) 
in order to create the first version of the software. During this time, they also hired contract 
staff to assist with the design of components of the software, e.g., the web dashboard. 
They later hired a designer to work on the web dashboard and database architecture 
(i.e., Designer P), since working with contractors on a part time basis meant less 
consistency in the design process. In July 2014, they hired an Android designer and an 
intern (myself). A Customer Liaison was added in November 2014 to manage the users’ 
requests and help with training. In 2015, they hired another designer (Platform Designer 
L) and replaced designers within the firm who left. At the termination of my study, they 
had a total of nine employees. There was also staff turnover during this period, whose input 
was included in my analysis. Thus, the data corpus includes quotes from more than nine 
designers. To protect my participants, I used pseudonyms or roles for the designers, clients, 
and the firm. An overview of the HealthCom designers is provided in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1: Overview of HealthCom Designers  








s CEO  Acquired previous startups. Designed other consumer apps. First time in healthcare. 
Trained in computer science and business. 
Mar. 
2013- end 
of study  
Started by creating the prototype and coding. Moved to 




Worked and held leadership position in 
several startups, some of which were acquired. 
Focus on product design. Trained in business. 
Mar. 
2013- end 
of study  




 CTO  Involved with previous startups. Acquired 









Worked with other startups in account 
management, with customer facing role. Has 
an MBA. Also founded own startup. 
Nov. 
2014- end 
of study  
Interacted with users (limited) and intermediaries at the 








 iOS Designer 
Previous employee of CEO. Involved in 
previous startups. Computer Science major.  
Jan. 2014- 
Oct. 2015 
Designed the initial Android app and entire iOS app. 
Designed APIs for the mobile and web interfaces. 




Previous employee of CEO. Computer 
Science major.  
Jul. 2014- 
Oct. 2015 
Responsible for the Android app. Liaised with the Chief 
Designer for the UI related decisions. Liaised with the 
















Software developer for several companies. 
Previous involvement with six startups.  
Nov.2014- 
Apr. 2015 
Member of the software design team, responsible for 
API design and integration with other tools used in 





Replaced Platform Designer L. Computer 
science major - worked in several startups as 
programmer. 
June 2015 Responsible for platform and API development and 










r Designer P  
Worked on web/ database technologies May 2014- 
Oct. 2014 
Continued design of web dashboard. Supported database 





Part of same startup accelerator as HealthCom 
co-founders.   
Jan. 2014 - 
end of 
study  
Took over the design of web dashboard from Designer 
P.  
1356 
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The first column in Table 3-1 highlights individual’s roles throughout the duration 
of the study. For instance, Web Designer O took over from Designer P on the design of the 
web dashboard. Conversely, Platform Designer C took over Platform Designer L’s design 
work.  
3.2.3 The HealthCom software 
HealthCom created the software to facilitate communication and knowledge 
transfer between nurses and patients in the pre-or post-treatment phases. The HealthCom 
software included a backend database on the server, iOS and Android mobile applications, 
and web portals that must be coordinated in the design process.  
Figure 3-1: Simplified Representation of Software Design 
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Figure 3-1 is a simplified representation of the software design. The iOS, Android, 
Web, and Platform Designer and the CTO worked together to create the different 
components of the software. For example, an appointment setting feature had to be made 
available on the iOS, Android, and web platforms. There were also interdependencies 
between features. For example, if the patient had surgery on January 1st, care instructions 
would be populated on the software for pre-and post-surgery on January 1st. Thus, the tasks 
and the care plan (general list of tasks) were dependent on the functioning of the 
appointment (labeled appt in Figure 3-1) feature. Coordination between designers was, 
therefore, important for the creation of any feature.  
Table 3-2: List of Features Designed  
  Features Description 
1 Share my care Patients can give their family and friends permission to view the care plan 
assigned by the provider and completion of tasks. 
2 SecuredMessaging Gives patients the ability to send their providers a secured message from the 
mobile app or patient web portal. 
3 Gamification Incorporates elements of game playing into the care plan (such as stars for 
completing tasks) 
4 SDK Software development kit (SDK): tools that allow the creation of 
applications from the HealthCom infrastructure. 
5 Medication 
Adherence 
Allows patients to manage their list of medications. 
6 Clinical content (1) Education content that patients can reference on the infrastructure about 
their medical condition and (2) care plan tasks 
7 Reporting  Summary of all tasks completed.  
8 GPS-enabled 
login  
Nurses/aides can log their visit through the app for reimbursement from 
insurance payors or state funding. Relevant for certain clients 
 
9 Data analytics The ability for patients and caregivers to view trends about their care plan 
task completion rates, most commonly reported items, etc.  
10 Web portal 
(nurse)  
 Allows nurses to create a care plan, upload educational content and monitor 
patients.  
11 Web portal 
(patient) 
 Permits patients to complete the tasks assigned and to track their progress.  
12 Patient 
Onboarding 
Started with manual uploading of patient data and the creation of patient 
accounts. Kiosks were then used to help the onboarding process. 
13 Appointment Allows patients to log their appointment date so that the tasks can be 
automatically populated. The appointment feature would ideally integrate 
with the client's scheduling software. 
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Table 3-2: List of features designed (continued) 
  Features Description 
14 Care Center Hosts educational content and clinic information. Expansion into different content 
types (e.g. videos)  
15 Survey  Questionnaire to allow for clinical decision support or more complex reporting of 
health status  
16 Tasks /Care 
Plan 
Tasks that patients received. Expansion into different tasks types. The Care Plan 
comprises a list of tasks that the patients had to complete.  
17 Sounds Sound notification to alert the user about a specific task / completion of a task  
18 Alerts  To alert the nurse or provider when a patient is non-compliant with the task or not 
performing as expected 
19 Signature Capture signature on care plan, either by nurse or by patient (receipt of services) 
20 Payment 
checkout 
To allow patients to pay for the app services (only for Prospective Client K) 
The list of features designed by HealthCom during the three-year period are 
summarized in Table 3-2. These features will be referenced throughout the dissertation. 
They were either designed as separate features or were extensions of existing features. 
Figure 3-2: Co-Evolution of Business Opportunities and Features Designed 
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Figure 3-2 summarizes how the features designed were a result of HealthCom 
trying to capture emerging business opportunities. Instead of working with a product vision 
and road map of features that was designer directed, the features to be designed were 
dictated by the business opportunities that emerged for the firm. The left axis refers to time. 
The boxes on the left indicate the business opportunities that were pursued by the 
HealthCom co-founders. The HealthCom software was not a disease specific software. 
Therefore, the co-founders were exploratory in their search for clients. Every client that the 
firm signed on also requested for new features to be added to the software. As a result, the 
software design evolution was dictated by the requirements of the prospective clients. The 
features that were designed would then be made available to all clients of the firm, since 
the software was on the cloud. The software was implemented at its first client site in 2014. 
HealthCom then released updated versions of the software every four to six weeks. These 
versions included new features or solutions for defects that would be available to all clients. 
3.2.4 HealthCom’s Clients 
HealthCom licensed the health IT software to clients (hereafter referred to as 
“contract”), such as a home health agency and a population health management company. 
While these clients were all in the healthcare industry, they had very different use cases 
and feature requests (see Table 3-3). Note that Clients M, T, and H were “pending,” since 
they were still in negotiation and were not confirmed as clients at the end of the study. 
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Table 3-3: List of HealthCom’s Clients 
Client 
Name Area  Use for software 
Client C  Infusion services Used for treatment monitoring  
Client A  Home Health Used by nurse aides as a to-do list when visiting patients’ homes 
Client B Employee Benefits  Used by case managers   
Client D Dialysis (terminated) Used for treatment monitoring  
Client E Health IT  Used as a communication tool with users 
Pending at the termination of study:  
Client P Specialty Pharmacy  Used for treatment monitoring  
Client K Disease management Used for treatment monitoring  
Client M  Academic medical hospital Communication between case managers and patients  
Client T Pharmaceutical company Used as a tool for recording treatment administration 
Client H Patient Education Communication between case managers and patients  
The reasons for adopting the software varied by client. Some clients, such as Client 
A and Client T, used the HealthCom software as a to-do list for the nurses providing 
treatment to patients in their homes. The HealthCom software was, therefore, viewed as a 
business process improvement tool. In another case, Client C was a small specialty 
treatment center that sought to use the software to improve patient satisfaction. In all of the 
cases, the client paid for the licensing of the software and had intermediaries involved in 
the negotiation process for the requirement design. The designers, therefore, had to manage 
the different requests and revenue targets.  
Business opportunities also arose because of macro-level policy initiatives. The 
Affordable Care Act and other reimbursement policies implemented by the United States 
government and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, respectively, created incentives for 
healthcare providers in the United States to reduce patient readmissions and improve 
patient satisfaction. There was a need for increased communication and supporting 
software between patients and nurses to reduce complications that patients encountered 
post treatment. These incentives, that were created prior to and over the duration of the 
study, motivated clients to license a software like HealthCom.  
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3.2.5 HealthCom’s Design Process 
Request for features were informed by prospective or existing clients, such as 
through marketing presentations, Requests were received by the CEO, Chief Designer, or 
Customer Liaison who interacted with client intermediaries on a regular basis. The Chief 
Designer would then create the overall user interface and supporting graphics for the 
software. The other designers would execute the code necessary to operationalize the 
feature. For example, the iOS designer would create the iOS mobile application, the Web 
Designer was responsible for the web portal, and the platform designer and CTO developed 
the supporting database and APIs for the feature to function across all the platforms. The 
Customer Liaison would then manage the clients by addressing the clients’ ongoing 
requests in weekly calls or by providing training to users.  
The designers interacted through emails, in-person conversations, online project 
management boards, and most commonly, an online chatroom. The Android and iOS 
designers were located offsite for most of the study. Twice a week, there would be a video 
conference call to coordinate the requirements and deadlines for the design product and to 
seek feedback on designs.  
At each client site, access to end users (such as nurses or patients) was also limited. 
HealthCom’s designers provided training prior to the deployment of the software at each 
client site. In some of the sites, the HealthCom designers could interact with users. 
However, such opportunities were rare. The designers (co-founders, Customer Liaison) 
mostly interacted with client intermediaries. Feedback about software use was also not 
collected nor analyzed. Any client feedback in the design occurred early in the design 
process, when the Chief Designer or Customer Liaison circulated screenshots of planned 
designs to new clients. Otherwise, feedback came through the reporting of defects or 
complaints after the feature had been implemented during the weekly calls between the 
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Customer Liaison and client intermediaries. Clients intermediaries also did not always 
provide detailed requirements for the design. The prospective client dictated the 
requirements, albeit at an abstract level, even though the feature designed would be made 
available to all clients.  
3.3 PREPARING FOR THE FIELD 
One of the challenges of starting a qualitative project is developing the base 
knowledge necessary to understand what the participants are doing. Software design occurs 
in a collaborative fashion involving multiple players that have a claim on the desired 
features (Lyytinen, 1988). To understand the work of the HealthCom designers meant to 
understand not only the software design but also the broader context within which 
requirements are navigated.  
Keeping these findings in mind, I believed that it was important for me to develop 
a basic familiarity with this world before entering the field. To understand the 
entrepreneurial context, I sought to understand the constraints of HealthCom and other 
health IT firms by attending professional conferences and talking to entrepreneurs, clients, 
investors, and industry experts. My goal was to better understand the challenges that these 
startups could face in order to triangulate my understanding of the health IT entrepreneurial 
environment. Through conversations with the different players, I developed an 
appreciation for the challenges and decisions that entrepreneurs had to deal with as they 
designed the software. I also read books recommended by entrepreneurs, such as Lean 
Startup, to understand the practices entrepreneurs were likely to adopt.  
The biggest missing piece of my knowledge was software design. I asked the CTO 
for primer books to understand basic design heuristics often employed in software design. 
My lack of software design knowledge was the my most daunting barrier. While it was 
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impossible to learn software design prior to field entry, my goal was to develop an initial 
level of what Collins and Evans (2007) call “interactional expertise,” defined as “expertise 
in the language of a specialism in the absence of expertise in its practice” (p. 28). 
Familiarity with software design was critical for understanding the nature of the field work. 
With a rudimentary understanding of software, I felt prepared to engage with HealthCom. 
I also continuously learned throughout my observations, by relying on the Internet to look 
up technical terms that were used in conversations.  Not only did the preparation provide 
me with a basic understanding of the world that I was entering, but I also soon discovered 
that my demonstrated interest and perceived ignorance, led designers to be more thorough 
in explaining the rationale behind their design decisions. 
3.3.1 Identifying a Site 
Beginning in the summer of 2014, I initiated contact with founders of digital health 
startups all around the United States, especially those in my professional network. I 
corresponded with these firms to express my interest in learning about their design process 
and let them know about my interest in conducting dissertation research. I talked to many 
organizations across the United States.  
My initial contact with HealthCom occurred in May 2014 during discussions about 
another research project. As I talked to the client, it became clear that HealthCom was an 
ideal research site to examine process of design. It would provide me the ability to observe 
the design process in real time. I pitched the possibility of using HealthCom as my field 
site, and my contact was open to facilitating my access.  
In exchange for access to the site, I was to be a paid intern responsible for 
generating user reports for the clients and providing insight into possible client 
requirements for the analytics feature. The CEO initially wanted me to do marketing 
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presentations. I declined because it would lead me to become too involved in the design or 
strategic process. Generating reports was an isolated task that allowed me access to the 
office and to the internal communications, while not affecting design or strategic decisions. 
As a startup, they were resource constrained and needed help with the mundane work that 
was taking time away from design. I was an easy sell, since all I needed was a space to 
work and had healthcare knowledge that they could potentially leverage. I had been a 
hospital administrator for a major academic center and had been on the client end, licensing 
software from vendors. I had also been involved in the design of physician order software 
and had over 1000 hours of nurse and patient observations. I was, therefore, very familiar 
with the healthcare context, even more than the HealthCom founders, who had no prior 
healthcare experience. They ultimately did not leverage my healthcare knowledge because 
the designers were often inattentive to the needs of the users, as the findings later would 
show.  
During my time at HealthCom, I had a dedicated work space in the open office. 
Having this space permitted me to listen to many different conversations. Because of my 
work, I was allowed access to chatrooms, internal emails, and meetings, without having to 
provide input into the discussion process. Since I was collocated with the other participants, 
I was able to be continuously aware of their activity.  
The designers were aware of my dual identity as an intern and researcher. It also 
gave me access to the clients (e.g., client visits) and connections to clients and industry 
experts. My role as a PhD student also afforded confidentiality, as the informants were 
candid in their evaluations of the HealthCom software. Being a member of the staff and 
chat room also helped fill in the gaps for the times when I was not on site, since I could 
review the history for events discussed.  
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3.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
My data collection involved three techniques: review of the archive of digital 
communication records, ethnographic observations, and semi-structured interviews. My 
data collection strategy focused on understanding the designers’ interactions, design 
rationales, and actions. Data collection was informed by my greater interest: to understand 
how they responded to demands of the entrepreneurial context at the firm and individual 
levels and the impact on the design product.  
Data collection occurred over an 18-month period from July 2014 to December 
2015. The primary set of data included: (1) chat transcripts, 1956 pages, among the 
designers in an online chat room, stemming from the firm’s early months (nine months 
old), (2) design tasks, totaling 2,370, from an online project management tool, (3) emails, 
1412, exchanged, and (4) access to the founders’ calendars. The archive of digital 
communication was triangulated by (a) semi-structured interviews, 21 in number, with the 
employees and founders, its clients, investors, and industry experts, (b) field notes, and (c) 
internal documents and public information about the firm. Later, as the firm design process 
changed, they also started including more user stories on the project management board 
that could be used to understand design rationales. Table 3-4 and Table 3-5 summarize the 
data sources. 
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Table 3-4: Data Sources  
Data source Quantity 
Interviews   See Table 3-5 
Internal Emails  1,412 (17 months) All employees 
Chat transcripts  1,956 pages (24 
months) 
All employees 
Observational data  
 
17 months (3–6 
hours per week) 
Notes from weekly product meetings and 
standup meetings; discussions of 
conversations in the office  
Project management board  2,371 tasks listed  All employees 
Client site visit: interactions with 
nurses, administration, and 
patients 
1 site visit Author’s notes from visit to HealthCom’s 
first client  
Presentations (e.g., marketing 
presentations) 
3 Author’s notes from attendance at 
presentations  
Strategic report to board and 
investors 
2 CEO 
CEO’s calendar  Record of every meeting since the founding of the firm 
Use of data from several sources and hierarchies within and outside of the firm provided 
me with a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. 
3.4.1 Archival Data: Chat Transcripts and Emails 
The first and most critical method in my corpus of data was the chat room 
transcripts and other archival records of digital communication. The online chat room was 
the key form of communication for the designers. The availability of chat transcripts 
preceded the start of this study.  
Discussions between designers often occurred in the online chat room. When I first 
entered the firm, I spent my first three hours familiarizing myself with the software and 
realizing that no one was speaking to each other. Other than an occasional laugh or brief 
conversation, there was not a lot of in-person conversations. I was not sure what I would 
or could be observing in the startup. After mentioning my confusion to the Chief Designer, 
he clarified that most discussions occurred in an online chat room, which he then gave me 
access to.  
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The designers worked in a work-sharing open office setting in the initial months of 
the study. Because of health information privacy concerns, the firm’s designers were 
cautious about discussing user information in the open setting. Any team discussion would 
occur in a meeting room. Two months later, the firm moved into a private office that gave 
them more space to hire designers. Conversations also became more candid. However, due 
to the openness of the office space, the co-founders cautioned that discussions should be 
held in private rooms or on the online chatroom. The chat room continued to be an 
invaluable archive of digital communication within the firm, although I did not have access 
to private messages, private emails, or all in-person discussions.  
Analysis of conversations allows researchers to generate insights that may 
otherwise be unobservable and neglected (Kyprianou, Graebner & Rindova, 2015). The 
ability to use archival communication data thus allowed for convenient recursive iteration 
between theory and data for process theory building or emerging ideas in the theorized 
process (Levina & Vaast, 2016) 
Other forms of document reviews included internal emails (on which I was 
included), project management boards, access marketing material, publicly available 
information, such as blog posts on websites, or twitter feeds, etc. My awareness of these 
documents occurred mostly through ethnographic observation and/or availability through 
the chatroom or emails. I had access to most of these, although there were some things, 
such as business plans, that the co-founders were reluctant to provide me access to. They 
were also wary of giving me too much access because I was not an employee of the firm 
and felt that there was no reason to share the information.  
I also collected screenshots and supplemented the description of specific activities 
within the field notes from ethnographic observation and discussions around the 
screenshots. Links to screenshots were often embedded within the chatroom transcript. I, 
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therefore, made notes next to related data when they appeared in the transcripts. The ability 
to analyze the data after the study was also subject to my ability to export the archive of 
communication: for instance, I could not export the comments from tasks on the project 
management board online, and data collection was limited to my notes from my earlier 
readings of the comments. I included all of these documents in my ATLAS.ti project. I also 
maintained them separately from field notes and interview transcripts in my file 
management. 
3.4.2 Ethnographic Observations 
 My second source of data was ethnographic observation. For the duration of my 
time at HealthCom, I spent three to six hours each week (depending on my class schedule), 
visiting on different days, if possible. Other activities, such as visits to client sites or 
meeting with industry experts, also required some data collection outside of the established 
schedule.  
Ethnographic observation was important because it helped me make sense of the 
chat transcripts or observe first-hand the concurrent online/offline discussions that may 
occur. For instance, because the iOS designer was working offsite, heated debates between 
the Chief Designer and iOS designer could be occurring concurrently online, with 
additional comments from the Chief Designer offline. The structured interviews and 
document review was greatly augmented by numerous informal interactions afforded me 
due to my co-location with the designers. For example, as I wrote up my field notes in the 
days following an observation, I was able to approach the designers for clarifying 
questions. As I got to know the designers, I was invited to many informal events, such as 
coffee, meals, or happy hours. Even though I was not taking field notes during these 
moments, the conversations that occurred in these spaces helped me to develop a more 
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nuanced understanding of the designers’ perspectives that, in turn, helped me interpret my 
data in a situated manner.  
Because the designers were busy during the workday, I would take the chance to 
speak with them individually at lunch or for short periods throughout the day. Following 
up frequently also ensured that the event was more salient in their mind. Most of these 
informal conversations were not recorded, though for longer interviews oral consent was 
obtained per the IRB. The informal conversations were typed up as part of my field notes 
after returning to my desk. I summarized my recollection of the interaction and my thoughts 
about why it was relevant to my research question. There were also times when I would 
tell the informant that I need to record the information on the notes application of my 
cellphone because it was a very interesting or insightful point. Due to the time constraints 
and open office layout of the firm, it was difficult to ask participants to maintain a running 
monologue of their actions. Therefore, I often asked questions about design decisions or 
behaviors after reading about conversations in chatrooms (while getting coffee) to clarify 
my understanding.  
On some days, observations were limited. There were few in-person conversations 
and designers were hunched over their computers. At other times, observations were richer, 
such as when I attended meetings or overheard conversations between designers. 
Following each observation, I summarized that day’s activity into a running account of 
participant work activity. I typed up my field notes integrating my observations of the firm.  
3.4.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 Semi structured interviews first occurred with the co-founders at the start of the 
study, and then with the other designers throughout the study and at the end of the study. 
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Several interviews were also conducted with individuals when new insights or themes were 
identified in my data (see Table 3-5). 
Table 3-5: Informants  
 Informant Date interviewed Pages  
Designers  
1-2 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) March 2015, April 2016 1.5 hours total 
3-4 Chief designer May 2014, October 2015 1.5 hours total 
5-6 Chief Technical Officer (CTO) October 2015, Mar 2017 1 hour total 
7 Customer Liaison December 2015 45 minutes 
8 Platform Designer L October 2015 45 minutes 
9 iOS designer October 2015 45 minutes 
10 Android designer January 2017 45 minutes  
11 Group interview (engineers, Chief 
Designer, Customer Liaison) 
April 2015 1 hour  
Non-designers  
1-2 Interviews with prospective clients 
that did not materialize: Client V and 
Client Y 
Feb 2016, May 2016 2 hours 
3 Liaison at the business accelerator  March 2016 30 minutes 
4-6 Business consultants hired: Consultant 
W, Consultant N, Consultant M 
Feb 2016, April 2016, May 2016 2.5 hours  
7 Industry expert Feb 2016 1.5 hours 
8-
10 
Investors: Investor S, Investor R, 
Investor L 
May 2016, June 2016  1.75 hours 
I collected 11 interviews from the designers and 10 interviews from non-designers 
(See Table 3-5). Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and 1.5 hours. The average 
length of each interview was approximately 46 minutes. These counts reflect limitations 
on the number of informants who could speak with me about the design process, given the 
small size of the firm. Because I wished to understand the views of a broad variety of 
players in the design process to answer my research questions, I selected semi-structured 
qualitative interviewing as a data collection technique. Semi-structured interviewing refers 
to the use of guiding instead of strict protocol for the interview.  
I developed the questions in the semi-structured interview protocol to prompt 
informants to speak about their experiences in detail during interviews. I asked the 
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designers to reflect in detail about their work and particularly their designs, their rationale, 
and the challenges of the design. I chose a semi-structured format because it permitted a 
dialog with my participants that would allow me the freedom to probe topics as they 
emerged and because it afforded my participants the choice of identifying potential topics 
that I, as an outsider, would not have known to ask about (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) In 
other interviews, such as with the CEO, I focused more on the strategy business and how 
that influenced the design. I adjusted the interview protocols based on the role of the 
individual designer. For instance, I asked the Android designer about decisions about 
medication adherence but also the interdependencies between the designers. I asked the 
Customer Liaison about the design requests from clients and how they were prioritized. 
Although the general structure of the protocol was consistent across the interviews, I 
continually modified my questions based on my observations and analysis of the data. 
Modification of questions is consistent with an iterative and inductive development of 
grounded theory (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).   
Due to the designer’s time constraints, my interviews lasted between 30 to 45 
minutes. During the interviews, I took limited notes to inspire probing questions and record 
major points of interest. I then integrated my interview notes with the actual transcripts to 
develop expanded transcripts (Spradley, 1979).  
As a newcomer to software design, I used the interviews to develop a basic 
understanding of the software design process. In each interview, I asked a series of 
questions focused on the processes, rationales, and challenges. Informants frequently 
referred me to resources from websites, books, or online forums. To get participants to 
speak less generally, I probed for specific recent examples from their work. As I performed 
more observations, I brought examples observed into the discussion as a means of 
obtaining my participants’ perceptions of their interactions. For instance, in my earlier 
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interviews, I asked questions about how design in a business to business or healthcare 
context differed from their previous experiences in consumer-based applications. I asked 
participants to describe situations where they faced tensions or disagreements and how they 
were reconciled. In addition to addressing these specific questions, some of these follow-
up discussions also served to broaden my understanding of aspects of design process, 
obtaining a final narrative of how the design occurred.  
It was also difficult to keep the interviews structured, since they started to feel 
unnatural to both the designers and myself over time, as I was interacting with these 
designers regularly and at social events. I kept broadly to the protocol by trying to include 
some of these questions into other questions as clarification to check my understanding. 
For example, I would reference certain events with informants or start with my question 
about the software design, beginning with my basic understanding as a catalyst for the 
conversation. This approach allowed me to elicit specific examples from informants.  
My frequent interactions with the designers sometimes posed challenges in the 
interview process. Even though my intention was to elicit the designers’ response in their 
own words, the designers would look confused and say, “as you already know.” In 
response, I would briefly describe my understanding but not provide my personal views of 
the events. The designers did not hesitate to correct me if they disagreed with my 
understanding. I always tried to play the ignorant observer and ask why they chose to do 
what they did if it contradicted the practices espoused by the practitioner or academic 
literature. One limitation was that I could guide informants down certain paths that were 
not intended. To mitigate this, I would often follow up my questions with “what else” 
questions.  
I began talking to other clients, industry experts, etc., based on the snowballing 
technique and personal connections. In some cases, the co-founders directed me to other 
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individuals they thought could provide additional insight into the work they did. I also 
sought out informants from personal connections to get their insights about HealthCom. 
For instance, I realized after a marketing presentation that they were trying to sell the 
software to my ex-colleague. I followed up with my ex-colleague and got candid feedback 
about the software and HealthCom. My prior healthcare experience thus facilitated many 
of these interviews. My strategy was to try to talk to other players mentioned by HealthCom 
to get their perspectives. For the other informants (non-designers), I adhered more strictly 
to the protocol. 
 The goal of generating an extensive corpus was to capture enough information that 
the data reached theoretical saturation  (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Nonetheless, the case 
had problems of left and right censoring (Miles & Huberman, 1994). While I have 
information about the early months (prior to the start of the study) through chat transcripts, 
I was not there to observe the interactions. I tried to follow up through informal 
conversations with designers. The actual design of the HealthCom software begun about 
seven months prior to my arrival. In terms of right censoring, during the study the data I 
collected reached a point where additional observation failed to reveal new perspectives. I 
was not getting information that would have substantially affected the results of analysis. 
At the same time, the co-founders wanted me to be more involved in the operations of the 
firm, which I could not.  I, therefore, decided to terminate my intern relationship, while 
agreeing to continue attending weekly meetings. A week later, they removed my access to 
all internal communication records, as the firm’s lawyer was concerned about access to 
information without any employment relationship.  I did not know that things would 
change, since the firm was acquired eight months after the termination of my study. The 
termination of my study prior to acquisition has implications for the boundary conditions 
of my findings.  
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3.5 PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS’ IDENTITIES AND RIGHTS 
As notified by the University of Texas at Austin’s IRB, all designers and clients 
were notified about my role as a researcher through an email from the Chief Designer to 
the firm and clients. Verbal consent was obtained from all my participants. I was open with 
my participants about the level of anonymity that I would use in the write-up of this 
dissertation. I used pseudonyms for the firm and their identities.  I anonymized all interview 
transcripts and field notes from observations to ensure that identifying information 
(primarily names) of informants did not appear in the data for analysis. Anonymization 
was impossible for email or other public documents for which identifying information was 
available on the document or if I could only export the data in a PDF format. All documents 
were stored in a password protected folder on my computer.  
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS  
Data collection and analysis are iterative steps in fieldwork. Ongoing analysis 
provided additional insights about how to proceed with the study. For example, I wrote up 
interim case reports, produced data displays, and kept records of my interpretations of 
events (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I also wrote several case summaries of individual 
designers and features (Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
In this section, I refer primarily to the analysis activities that I conducted that 
culminated in the two findings chapters. I analyzed my data using techniques inspired by 
grounded theory (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). My analysis began in an iterative 
fashion that started while I was in the field. Throughout my time in the field, I constantly 
reflected on the themes that emerged. These were written up in the form of conference 
submissions, class papers, or departmental presentations that helped me articulate my 
thoughts about the emerging themes.  
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These analyses were performed primarily using the ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis 
software.  I also revisited the raw data frequently to refresh my memory and to reinterpret 
the data in terms of emerging themes. The first analysis, presented in Chapter 4, sought to 
understand how the environmental context affected the design action and priorities of the 
firm. The analysis highlighted the other players (client intermediaries and investors) that 
were the drivers in the discussion. Delving deeper, I looked at the rationales and 
considerations in each design discussion and emerged with the attention-based view (ABV) 
as an organizing framework. In Chapter 5, the findings highlighted different design actions 
and the impact on the design product. I will describe the analysis in greater detail in the 
following sections.  
A preliminary round of reading interview transcripts and observation field notes 
sensitized me to the notion that minimality of effort in design figured heavily in the data 
and merited further investigation. As I performed my observations, read and re-read the 
chat transcripts, and collected additional interviews, I was consistently reflecting upon the 
initial patterns that emerged. For example, my observation that designers were often 
arguing about the minimum requirements for design led me to pursue various lines of 
inquiry that served as the basis for the analysis in the initial stages of open coding. Codes 
included codes on design actions (e.g., “limit scope of design,” “extending function”), 
actors (who was in the conversation), the designers’ goals for the design (“good design 
practice,” “user satisfaction”), etc. The idea of prioritization emerged in my line-by-line 
reading. In a subsequent pass of coding, I flagged mentions and instances of prioritization 
(e.g., “do it right now,” “postpone,” “postpone although easy fix”) in design discussions, 
which led me to identify the determinants of acceptable performance levels (such as 
lowered quality thresholds) in the process.  
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With these preliminary analyses, insights emerged on the players whom designers 
were focused on and the influence of the entrepreneurial context in each design discussion. 
As a preliminary analysis, I wrote case summaries for each feature designed, isolated all 
related design discussions, and identified the origins of design, considerations, and sources 
of tension in the design. I also began redefining, conflating codes or splitting up codes to 
become more granular.  
With these insights, I proceeded to examine more deeply the differences and 
similarities in the design process and the implications for the design product. Subsequent 
analyses returned to the research question identified to investigate how the environmental 
factors influenced the design process and product. I focused first on interactions that 
occurred within the firm and how they were driven by environmental factors (such as the 
players and the firm performance). I also examined the impact of attention to financial-
focused design alternatives on the collective design actions and the design product.  
To follow up on the preliminary analyses, I proceeded to look closely at instances 
of particular themes in the data. These included notions of minimality and prioritization as 
described earlier. In each design decision, I coded for what the designers focused on and 
advocated for (the “who,” “what,” “when,” and “how”) in the discussions and what the 
decision was. I returned to the corpus in search of more concrete examples of the design 
discussions, in which disagreements occurred. I started coding for players (including 
investors, clients, and users) and the perspectives the designers were taking (such as user 
satisfaction, software quality, speed of design, business focused) to determine their focus 
in design. I constantly compared across instances of coding to ensure that new instances of 
the code matched that of the previous use (Glaser, 1965). Examples that did not fit were 
marked and reexamined at the end of the coding exercise to see if it warranted an expansion 
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of the definition or the creation of a new code. The definitions were also summarized in a 
codebook that provides a definition of each code and when they were applied.  
I used the multiple data sources to triangulate the factors that influenced design 
decisions. At this point, the attention-based view emerged as a potential theoretical 
framework, since the analysis was directed at: (1) what the designers were focused on in 
the discussion (issues, concerns, who), (2) the design alternatives considered, and (3) 
triggers that prompted the focus on those issues and alternatives. Driven by my theoretical 
framework, my analysis for Chapter 4 began by developing a structured understanding of 
how the attention drivers originating from the entrepreneurial context affected the 
designers’ attention allocation. This resulted in the identification of two distinct attention 
drivers: financially focused versus quality focused that led to attention to different design 
alternatives. The salience of the financial-focused attention driver increased with pressure 
from investors and poor firm performance. 
Driven by this distinction, I coded the conversations for the differences in 
perspective that were directed by the two attention drivers. I then mapped the design 
actions, focusing on the design attributes and design product that resulted under the two 
attention paths. I grouped the content of the design discussion into recurrent themes which 
directed attention to different attributes of quality. The tension between financial and 
quality focused attention drivers emerged as the driver of design decisions. I isolated three 
key tensions of inhibiting, compromising, and over-optimizing that designers had to 
balance in the design process, which often led to disagreements in design discussions. 
Inhibiting referred to the case in which the design decisions inhibited financial performance 
or future changes to the design. Attention to the creation of financial-focused designs 
amidst time constraints meant compromising quality of the software. Designers who 
focused on quality were viewed as over-optimizing quality unnecessarily. The chat 
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transcripts provided examples of the distinct perspectives of designers towards design, 
while interviews and field notes verified these perspectives and tensions and allowed me 
to understand in the designers’ own words their interpretation of interactions. 
One thing that stood out was how the design product differed from what is 
commonly understood to be quality software in software design. The second analysis, 
presented in Chapter 5, sought to provide insight into the design actions and how they 
culminated in the design product. I began by isolating every design action undertaken by 
the designer and categorizing these design actions. I also looked for evidence of design 
outcomes (such as redesign, defects, limited in scope minimal and speed) and categorized 
them into five key characteristics of the design product. I typically located such statements 
in the chat transcripts, field notes, and interview transcripts.  
In these rounds of coding, I marked statements describing the design process, 
rationales for their decisions, and their design actions. I sorted the responses and created 
new categories of designers. I also conflated ones that had significant overlaps.  I utilized 
coding logs and memos (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) in the process of developing and refining 
categories. In coding logs, I recorded my reflections for each coding session, including the 
codes I had worked with, their definitions at the time of the coding session, as well as 
puzzles that arose while I coded and directions for the next coding session.  
3.7 VALIDITY 
To improve the validity of the analysis (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Davis, Yin, & 
Davis, 2014; LeCompte & Goetz, 1982), I adopted the following steps: triangulation of 
data sources, use of thick, rich description, and ongoing documentation of emerging themes 
and reflections.   
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Firstly, I constantly reminded myself to triangulate my findings across my data 
sources. As mentioned previously, my key data sources included archives of digital 
communication, observations and interviews. Triangulating across these sources allowed 
internal validity of the case study (Yin, 1994). Interviews could be subjected to post-hoc 
rationalization, and by comparing against the chat transcripts or my observations, I was 
able to examine consistencies and discrepancies in the behavior of informants. By speaking 
to several designers, I was able to get a variety of perspectives of the same phenomenon, 
thus allowing me to understand the phenomenon holistically. Having multiple data sources 
for the same phenomenon increases the chances of finding disconfirming evidence and 
alternative explanations (Fetterman, 1998).  It also allows for the possibility of follow-up 
questions. For example, in my initial conversations with the Chief Designer, he often 
provided accounts of how he was a strong advocate for the user. It was not until 
conversations with the other designers and with other players and observations, did I realize 
that he was less open to ideas from the users than he described.  
I also often engaged in fact checking to clarify my understanding of the 
phenomenon as well as the themes that were emerging from my data. Fact checking 
allowed me to present my interpretation of the phenomenon to the participants in my study. 
Fact checking was done on a one-on-one basis, as the findings may not always reflect 
positively on the firm or certain team members. I asked the informants most directly 
involved to confirm interpretations and discuss my interpretations of events. Prior to the 
sessions, I would prepare a one-page summary, figure, or table that highlighted my early 
analytical insights and asked informants to help me fill in the gaps in my records. These 
fact-checking sessions lasted about 45 minutes to an hour and often sparked later 
conversations and correspondence with informants. Fact checking improved the validity of 
constructs and other theoretical devices used to analyze data (Yin, 1994; Creswell & Miller, 
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2000). I also presented some results of my analysis at various conferences with researchers 
and practitioners for feedback.  
Secondly, I tried to incorporate thick description and detail in my field notes 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000). As mentioned previously, this was sometimes difficult, given 
the lack of activity going on in the office. I tried to include more detail about the tone of 
voice, gestures of the participant offline, and during heated online debates, to provide detail 
to make the setting and events plausible in the mind of the reader (Creswell & Miller, 
2000). Being there helped me to witness how the response (such as a sigh, yelling, or 
laughter offline) can lead to different interpretations of the conversations in the chat 
transcripts. My frequent interactions with the designers helped me to understand the office 
culture, politics, and dynamics so that I could interpret the archival data appropriately and 
detect nuances in the meaning of the responses observed.  
Finally, I constantly coded, wrote memos, and recorded thoughts to create an audit 
trail of my analysis and reflections. I kept a collection of short notes and figures that 
mapped how my views changed about the process. I also reflected upon biases that may 
have emerged in the process. All of these documents are kept in a folder to facilitate the 
review of the evolution of the analysis. I also went back to the raw data often to make sure 
that the initial codes were still representative of the meaning, as my interpretation of the 
phenomenon might have changed over time.  
3.8 SUMMARY 
The research methodology used in this dissertation was presented in this chapter. I 
adopted a qualitative, inductive approach to study the work of the firm’s designers at 
HealthCom. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the case study was adopted to 
understand in real-time the effect of the entrepreneurial context on the design process and 
  66 
product. Data sources included semi-structured interviews, ethnographic observation, and 
archives of digital communication. Particularly critical to this analysis was the corpus of 
chat transcripts that held a record of daily interactions between designers. Iterative 
qualitative coding was used in my data analysis. Finally, to validate the results of the 
analyses, I adopted the following steps: triangulation of data sources, use of thick, rich 
description, and ongoing documentation of emerging themes and reflections. 
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Chapter 4: Early Stage Entrepreneurial Context and Attention in 
Design  
In this chapter, I highlight how the early stage entrepreneurial context introduces 
new players and rules of the game for HealthCom designers. There is a pull for the 
designers’ limited attention and resources between financial and quality-focused decisions 
designs. I further introduce tensions the designers face, specifically among design 
alternatives that may inhibit future growth, compromise quality standards, or over-optimize 
quality unnecessarily.  
4.1 ATTENTION DRIVERS RESULTING FROM THE EARLY STAGE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
CONTEXT  
While attention drivers were not mentioned explicitly as a construct, designers 
justified their design decisions based on demands of certain players or in attempts to abide 
by certain rules of the game (i.e. for software or digital business design). When talking 
with each other, and with me, HealthCom designers frequently cited two key attention 
drivers that influenced their perspectives in the design process. I named the attention 
drivers that emerged from my analysis: financial-focused and software-quality focused 
attention drivers, as summarized in Table 4.1. I distinguish between these two attention 
drivers by looking at the rationale explicated in the conversations. While higher quality 
software design could be related to financial-focused attention drivers in the long-run, they 
were not viewed as complementary in the short-term in the discussions analyzed.  
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Table 4.1: Overview of the attention drivers evident in design discussions  
Attention 
drivers 
Rules of the 
game 




















Focused on user 
interface and user 
experience, 
Limited scope of 
design to what is 
necessary for the 
client 
1. I can confirm that [Prospective 
Client K] has expressed a need for 
this [feature] as well. 
2. The medication adherence feature 
comes from [prospective client L], 
which has 60 clinics, 90k new 
patients a year.  
3. I agree it looks dumb but remember 






































1. I'd prefer we leave it as-is and turn 
this into a feature request to make 
search deeper. ... I don't think the 
right decision is to remove 
functionality that mirrors how search 
works on every other page. 
2. Version 2.1 has a good amount of 
stuff in it, and assuming we sign 
[Client P] we need to carve out a 
bunch of time for security work. I 
recommend you prioritize things 
within the release, and we will attack 
in that order.  
3.  It would be better to build choice 
lists with variable image support. I 
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Table 4.1 highlights representative quotes for financial-focused and software quality-
focused (thereafter, termed quality-focused) attention drivers. For example, financial-
focused quotes illustrate how the designers paid attention to clients with big revenue 
opportunities associated and let the clients dictate the design, even if it contradicted quality. 
The quality-focused attention driver was grounded in user requirements and designers’ 
knowledge of software quality best practices (e.g. former training, experience, or 
knowledge from online software design forums). The software quality-focused quotes 
highlight the designers’ preference for software designs with improved functionality. For 
instance, in the last quote, the iOS Designer’s preference was to build the design the right 
way, even if it would take more time, instead of doing one-offs. Quality-focused attention 
drivers led designers to invest more resources (i.e. time) in design upfront. To illustrate the 
tension in attention allocation, I begin with a deeper examination of the two attention 
drivers. 
4.1.1 Financial-Focused Attention Drivers  
The financial-focused attention driver was driven by client requirements and 
investors’ expectations for funding milestones. Clients refer to the healthcare facilities that 
licensed the software from HealthCom. Client intermediaries refer to administrators and 
managers who participated in the purchase of the software at the client sites, with whom 
the HealthCom designers maintained contact throughout the licensing agreement. They 
may or may not be user representatives, depending on whether they used the software. The 
intermediaries’ interest in the HealthCom software provided opportunities for increased 
revenue for the startup, as they dictated the renewal of contracts with HealthCom. The 
designers at HealthCom thus felt the pressure to satisfy these clients, particularly if they 
were introduced by HealthCom’s investors. 
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4.1.1.1 Players and Rules of the Game 
I define the players and rules that direct the attention of designers towards financial-
focused design decisions as financial-focused attention drivers. As explained above, the 
designs were created with investors’ requests, revenue targets, deadlines set by clients, or 
marketability in mind. The investors, client intermediaries, and the startup growth and 
funding rules of the game direct the attention of designers to design alternatives that could 
improve the financial performance of the firm. For instance, delays in getting a contract 
signed with the client intermediaries increased financial pressures.  
The Customer Liaison also explained how clients’ requirements were associated 
with revenue opportunities, even with existing clients. New requirements were 
communicated during her weekly client calls, or quarterly client meetings, to renegotiate 
contracts and were thus tied closely to revenue opportunities: 
 
Sometimes you [design] because you know the client is going to be able to enroll 
hundreds more patients on the software more easily. Therefore, the client will pay 
you more money. ... or ‘if we build these things for you, you have to start paying 
us a little bit more now to fund that front-end design, and you commit that once 
we build these things, and you’re going to go all in and get this thing deployed.’  
 
HealthCom would agree to deliver a feature in the software by the deadline for the client 
in exchange for promised revenue or contract signing. Features had to be designed as 
quickly as possible to allow designers to capture the business opportunities. These 
negotiations with clients hence affected prioritization of designs. The software evolved 
based on these design requirements: features designed would then be available in the 
software that was marketed to other prospective clients.  
The relationship between the clients and the investors also led HealthCom designers 
to focus on these players during the design process. For instance, one of the investors began 
to introduce the CEO to other opportunities outside of the market segments he had been 
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exploring. She said, “[the HealthCom founders] have this one strategy line... . When I look 
at [their software], and I see its capabilities... I see [different] kinds of possibilities.” In this 
case, the investor was not focused on the digital business design but on leveraging the 
software to ensure continued revenue. She saw a potential match between the HealthCom 
software and the requirements of a employee benefits management company, Client B. The 
investor believed that HealthCom should leverage its software capabilities to capture new 
business opportunities instead of trying to only pursue big clients in a certain market 
segment. She also emphasized that continued revenue was critical to the survival of an 
early stage entrepreneurial firm. For instance, as one of the investors said:  
I introduced [Client B] to [CEO of HealthCom], they met, and [CEO of 
HealthCom] was able to build the software... and, go live within three months. 
That’s the speed in which you need to be able to operate. The point of being 
startup is that you've got to be able to sustain yourself from a revenue perspective. 
You’re supposed to be fast and nimble among other things and deliver the goods. 
In response the investor’s introduction, the designers had to quickly design a ShareMyCare 
feature and web dashboard in three months for Client B, which creating time pressures for 
the designers. The investor expected HealthCom to be able to generate designs quickly to 
capture these opportunities. The criticality of satisfying this client was intensified because 
the investor made these client introductions. The designers had to direct their attention to 
these investor-introduced clients, even if it meant deviating from their software or business 
plans. The investor explained that startups needed to “make these pivots because they need 
the capital, and they need the credibility in the client list.” The investors and the clients 
thus became players that directed the attention of the designers through the financial 
(revenue and funding) opportunities they provided. Designers’ attention to financial-
focused attention drivers meant designing in ways that enabled HealthCom to capture 
emerging business opportunities.  
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 The pressures from investors were also felt even though they did not participate 
directly in discussions within the firm. Frequent updates from the HealthCom co-founders 
kept them accountable to the investors and sustained attention to the investors and their 
expectations for the firm. For instance, in emails to investors, the CEO often updated the 
investors on HealthCom’s financing strategies and their financial performance, e.g. “the 
last 90 days has been very strong for us. We've been focusing on building relationships in 
pharmacy while leveraging our [software capabilities], and we're finding win after win.” 
In this email, the CEO then went on to discuss the expected revenue and sizes of contracts, 
number of partnerships, and recent publicity. Conversations with the investors were then 
shared with the other designers in weekly meetings.  
4.1.1.2 Firm Performance 
Poor financial performance throughout the duration of this study motivated 
attention to financial-focused attention drivers. HealthCom experienced immense 
constraints and pressure to generate revenue. As the Chief Designer announced in an email: 
“we are still on the track to run out of cash [at Month 26] … [Months 18-21] was 
exceptionally slow for new business. We fumbled on deals that we anticipated would get 
us to cash flow positive. … [but] the sales cycle is 9-12 months on average.” HealthCom’s 
poor financial performance thus increased the salience of the financial-focused attention 
drivers and redirected attention making design decisions that could increase revenue. The 
designers, particularly the co-founders who were directly accountable to investors, were 
sensitive to business opportunities and even allowed clients to dictate and influence design 
decisions.  
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4.1.2 Pressures for Funding in the Early Stages Led to Urgency in Design 
The HealthCom co-founders faced pressures from the investors, who felt that they 
had yet to demonstrate repeated contracts with clients in specific market segments. The 
HealthCom co-founders had wanted to start the next round of fundraising (Series A) and 
was working closely with the investors to get the process started to ensure continued 
funding for firm operations. The investors, however, did not allow HealthCom to seek 
Series A funding, and instead, suggested that HealthCom seek bridge financing, which is 
an interim financing option used by companies and other entities to solidify their short-
term position until a long-term financing option can be arranged. Platform Designer L 
explained, “I left was because I didn't feel that the company was going to succeed… The 
investors did not allow [the CEO] and [Chief Designer] to seek Series A funding because 
they did not think that HealthCom has demonstrated product market fit.” The investors’ 
lack of belief in the readiness of HealthCom to seek further funding during my period in 
the field further intensified the pressures to capture business opportunities to convince the 
investors that HealthCom was ready for the next milestone. 
The scarcity of clients and long lead times in the contract negotiations also 
intensified financial pressures, urgency of capturing emerging opportunities, and desire to 
accommodate the client’s requests. At the start of my study, HealthCom had two clients 
who were also investors (i.e. Clients A and C). During the period of my study (18 months), 
HealthCom only managed to secure three more clients (Client B, D, E), one of whom 
terminated the pilot study due to low use of the software. Clients T and P signed the contract 
shortly after the end of my study. At the meetings, the CEO would share positive news, 
such as, “Client W is generally excited as an organization, there’s a lot of momentum 
behind that…”, but despite the optimism, these contract negotiations took at least nine 
months to a year before they were finalized, or they would be canceled months into 
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negotiations or after due diligence evaluation. Clients who did not choose to license the 
software from HealthCom would end up designing their own versions of the software, as I 
will elaborate further in Chapter 5. The time taken for clients to sign the contracts increased 
the challenges of HealthCom in the pursuit of business opportunities. As such, HealthCom 
co-founders were often attentive to the requirements of prospective clients and would 
devote resources to accommodating their requests to increase the likelihood of the contracts 
solidifying to ensure continued funding.   
4.1.3 Quality-Focused Attention Drivers  
The quality-focused attention drivers directed the attention of the designers to the 
operationalization of design requirements. I observed several meetings where the designers 
gathered to review the preliminary design of features. During these meetings, I was 
surprised by the lack of user-centeredness or evaluation in the design. For instance, in 
response to another designer’s suggestion for improving the ShareMyCare feature given 
low use, the CTO said, “The feature sells well. Leave it alone”. It did not matter to the CTO 
or CEO that the feature was not used by the patients. Instead, it was a marketable feature 
in which prospective clients expressed interest. Thus, the design was adequate.  
The design discussions often revolved around design attributes. Design attributes 
discussed could be categorized into functional and non-functional design attributes. 
Functional design attributes affected the visible behavior of the software. These design 
attributes, such as user interface, specified what a software should do in terms of inputs, 
processes, and outputs. Non-functional design attributes referred to non-visible 
characteristics of the software such as performance, security, and reliability. Given that this 
study was based in a healthcare setting, legality and security were of concern. 
  75 
There were a few designers, such as Platform Designer C, Web Designer O, and 
iOS Designer, who were the most attentive to the quality of the software. For instance, the 
Platform Designer C was not afraid to question design decisions, particularly when 
interdependencies were involved. When he first started at HealthCom, he acknowledged 
apologetically “#newguyproblems” to the group for all his questions on how features were 
supposed to function, e.g. “It’s a bit of a spitball as I'm still trying to wrap my brain around 
what mechanisms can cause an alert.” The alerts feature was complex: nurses could set 
alerts when patients did not complete tasks or when the patients reported an abnormal 
clinical result. It was thus tricky to troubleshoot, as erroneous alerts could result from user 
error or algorithm error. Understanding of the interdependencies between components in 
the software and how the feature would be used often guided Platform Designer C’s design 
decisions. For instance, the CTO, Platform Designer C, and Web Designer O were in an 
intense hour-long discussion about the survey feature. They were trying to figure out how 
best to organize the questions and how to store the data for incomplete surveys. Platform 
Designer C went on a rant about design decisions of poor quality that were making him 
anxious:   
 
I'm concerned that the authoring [user interface] is really broke and that that's 
going to reveal itself almost immediately when actual patients try to do something 
with it. My second thing is that the broken [user interface] is forcing us to a 
conceptual model of surveys that may not be a very good model. … I've never 
seen things like that ever become anything other than a source of suffering in the 
end... I've gone to great lengths to make that never a problem, never the thing 
where you have to go on a giant fishing expedition [to retrieve your data].  
 
Having thought through the negative repercussions of the earlier design decisions, he 
invested additional effort to make sure that it would not be a problem for the user. This is 
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an example of the designer directing attention to quality (i.e. reliability and architecture) in 
design.  
Designers paying attention to quality were willing to put in extra work to improve 
design attributes, such as the user experience, particularly if it inhibited use of the software. 
For instance, the iOS Designer was providing feedback on the design of the education 
content page on the iOS mobile application and said to the Chief Designer, “I feel like 
sliding boxes open as images load is going to be a poor user experience. I would love to 
keep this simple, but I do think the only way forward is to have the platform return image 
sizes to us. Otherwise, the entire user interface is going to slide open and jump around like 
crazy.” In this case, the iOS Designer argued that the original design, while simpler, would 
result in a poor user experience, which was unacceptable to him. He recognized that that 
redesigning the page require more work, but he felt that the extra work was inevitable to 
ensure usability of the design for the patient. 
4.1.3.1 Ambiguity around Quality and Novelty of Design 
Ambiguity around quality led to challenges in making design decisions. The 
designers did not have healthcare experience, and the clients had limited understanding of 
the software’s capabilities. For example, in the design of a signature upload function, the 
designers were confused how to proceed due to a lack of specificity in the requirements 
provided. As the CTO was creating the database and APIs to support the feature, he asked 
the other designers:  
 
CTO:  What kind of images am I likely to get for this signature 
business - png and...? 
Android Designer:  Whatever you want. something I would like to know is how 
big you want them 
CTO:  WHATEVER YOU WANT! 
Android Designer:  Should they have a background? 
CTO: Err 
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Android Designer:  But yeah, png is a good format 
IOS Designer:  I like PNG for this 
CTO:  I like PNG.. 
IOS Designer:  JPEG seems silly 
Senior Engineer- O:  PNG seems ideal 
CTO: I feel unqualified to comment on this background thing. I 
guess transparent images are the most flexible... 
As long as the signature was visible, the nurses may not be concerned with the specific file 
format. This was an example of ambiguity in requirements and quality that arose in 
discussions. When the CTO initiated the conversation, instead of answering the CTO’s 
question, the Android Designer responded with another question. The Android Designer 
was tasked to decide the specifications of the signature upload function, but the Android 
designer, who had no prior interactions with the nurses, was unsure of what exactly the 
nurse needed. In the end, the decision was made haphazardly based on what made sense to 
the designers for the software performance (size of file) and personal preference (file type) 
that was deemed to be adequate for the designers. In a later discussion about this again, the 
CTO asserted, “I feel like anything we do here is only going to be 70% right at best, so I'm 
comfortable with whatever seems best to people.” There was no one best decision for image 
format in the CTO’s perspective. Thus, what was adequate as a design decision was 
whatever would be acceptable.  
Debates about what constituted designs of quality were catalyzed by varying 
expectations of the designers. In the above scenario, the designers had a lot of liberty to 
decide how the designs should be operationalized. These design conversations helped the 
designers proactively identify possible defects, security flaws, and quality compromises. 
A pursuit of quality designs was associated with spending more time in discussion and 
design. It also meant thinking about the implications for design in the long-run.  
Another example with more severe repercussions was a discussion regarding the 
protection of patient confidentiality in design. HealthCom would be liable for any 
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confidentiality compromises. However, this was difficult as there were no objective 
benchmarks for patient confidentiality in design. The following conversation about the 
ShareMyCare feature highlighted how the iOS Designer was focused on the quality (legal 
implications) of the design, whereas the Chief Designer was focused on what was adequate 
for the client for now. In addition to the Web Dashboard, Client B had requested for a 
ShareMyCare feature, so that their patients could share their care plans with their family 
or friends. The iOS Designer was uncomfortable with the existing modeling of patient 
relationships in the software, as he felt that it had privacy and legal implications:    
 
iOS Designer:  The more I think about it the more it seems like "ShareMyCare" 
needs to be "divorced" from “Relationships”. We tried to 
shoehorn two features into one. And they are nuanced enough that 
there are some strange edge cases occurring because of it 
Chief Designer: I think you have fair points, but I don't think the edge case is 
worth a rewrite at this moment.  
 
Although the Chief Designer agreed with the legal implications, he questioned the need to 
change the design. He did not agree with the probability of the hypothetical scenarios 
proposed by the iOS Designer. More importantly, the existing design met the design 
requirements provided by Client B, which was the immediate priority. The iOS Designer 
continued to provide examples to justify the need for redesign. The Chief Designer told 
him that the existing relationship was set up only so that the user could get through the 
enrollment flow, i.e., creating a user account, which was a growth metric tracked by the 
client and the investors. 
The Chief Designer argued that a simplified representation of the relationships 
would suffice for Client B’s use and asserted that the redesign would lead to them missing 
deadline. The Chief Designer’s attention was thus on the financial implications of 
redesigning the permissions model. To support his point, he referred to the Android 
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Designer’s design as adequate. The Chief Designer did not see any value in making the 
improvement to the design.  
Chief Designer: But we're not rewriting at this junction, that's my point. The way 
Android Designer implemented it in the Android app is perfect. It 
exposes the feature, without violating privacy and it throws a 
simple popup if they don't have permission. The business case for 
[Client B] is solved as-is and the "share my care" feature is unique 
to our software. If we need to better support the idea of 
relationship down the road, we can. [Client B] won't be 
jeopardized and we still have our share care feature intact 
iOS Designer: I disagree. these are two different features and they don't fit well 
together 
Chief Designer: And you're proposing what exactly? that we miss our [Client B] 
400 employee roll out and 8000 employee roll out Oct. 15th, to 
rewrite a problem that doesn't really exist at this junction? 
 
Additionally, he believed that this was a feature that only HealthCom had, There was no 
comparable design in the market upon which quality could be judged. It was also difficult 
to determine if the relationships were modeled effectively, as relationships in real life were 
complex. He thus tried to direct the iOS Designer’s attention towards design requirements 
critical for meeting the client’s deadline, and the financial implications of design choices.  
4.2 TENSION BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND QUALITY-FOCUSED ATTENTION DRIVERS 
Every designer in HealthCom was exposed to both attention drivers. The designers 
who did not interact with the investors were made aware of the firm’s poor financial 
performance and the need to increase revenue. Furthermore, the relationships between 
HealthCom, its investors and clients were complicated because some clients were also 
investors. For instance, the CEO of Client C, who was also the first investor of HealthCom 
said, “As a client, I would rate HealthCom a A-, but as an investor, B+, as I have yet to see 
my returns on investment.” The quote highlights the challenges that could result with 
individual taking dual roles. The same individual had different expectations for HealthCom 
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depending on the rules of the game against which he was evaluating HealthCom. As a 
client, he was looking for software that would improve his patients’ health and satisfaction. 
A higher quality software that met the users’ requirements would better achieve this 
objective. However, as an investor, his attention was on his returns on investment and the 
ability of HealthCom to demonstrate sales quickly. Sales would be achieved through 
designing features quickly to capture emerging business opportunities. Given the limited 
attention and resources of the firm, the tension between quality and financial-focused 
design alternatives created disagreements amongst the designers.  
To integrate the attention of the designers, the co-founders set up communication 
channels to ensure that the designers were kept updated on the deadlines and revenue 
targets. For instance, the CEO would conclude the weekly meetings with a segment called 
“shaking the money tree,” during which he would provide updates on the status of his 
contract negotiations and anticipated deadlines for designs. Understanding of the 
relationship between design and revenue was important for making sure that designers 
were “on the same page” about design deadlines and requirements. The Customer Liaison 
expressed her frustration with the iOS and Android Designers who were worked remotely 
and sometimes could not understand the rationales for design:  
 
[The iOS and Android Designers] didn’t feel like being part of team. On a daily 
basis, it made it difficult to get things done. The reason is that they didn’t see the 
marketing and the client activities. Like I’d come out from a call with a 
prospective client and complain about their requests. And I’m pulling people in to 
make things happen and they didn’t get to see that. So, they will ask things like, 
“why do I have to do things this way?” 
The designers believed that if they created designs for the prospective clients’ 
requirements, they could increase the likelihood of a successful contract. As such, the 
designers were often asked to create features quickly to motivate prospective clients to sign 
the contract. Absence of the iOS and Android Designers from this communication resulted 
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in lower salience of the financial-focused attention drivers in directing their attention 
towards financial-focused designs.  
Attention to financial-focused opportunities often resulted in quality compromises. 
In response to an opportunity with Client B, HealthCom had to design a web portal for 
patients’ use. The designers had assumed that the clients of HealthCom would be large 
enterprises that would require integration of the HealthCom software into the clients’ 
existing health IT software. As a result, they had not intended to design web portals for 
patients or nurses to use. Because of Client B, the designers quickly put together a web 
portal for patients to close the deal. The Chief Designer explained, “The client conveyed it 
[as a deal breaker] ... We really wanted [the client] We made it pretty quick... That 
continually haunts us ... the [web] dashboard was never really intended to be patient 
facing”. To capture the revenue, they had to reallocate resources within the firm to design 
the web portal within the deadline. To design the web portal quickly, they took an existing 
web dashboard that was meant for nurses and created workarounds to accommodate the 
needs of users.  
Deference to the clients’ requests was critical, in HealthCom’s opinion, to getting 
the deal signed. Just as the above example showed how a client’s request can lead to 
reallocation of attention within the firm, the interactions with the client intermediaries 
affected how designers chose to design. The desire to satisfy the client could be at the 
expense of quality. For instance, in the following conversation, even though the 
conversations offline demonstrated how the designers vehemently disagreed with and 
mocked the design of the user interface proposed by the intermediary, they proceeded as 
directed by the intermediary because they did not want to defy him:  
CEO:  Also, this is [Client A’s] logo and they were pretty set on having 
[a particular tagline] showing. If you want to deviate from that, 
you'll have to explain to them why. 
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Chief Designer: Don’t really feel like "coaching" them at this point. It just looks 
pretty amateur. The logo looks nice, but the tagline looks slapped 
on there in Arial [font].  
 
[The co-founders continue to criticize the design] 
CEO:  I agree it looks dumb but remember - [the intermediary] is 
[Client A’s] CEO's kid 
 
The conversation highlights how the designers were so focused on the contract with the 
client that they did not want to risk upsetting the intermediary, particularly because he 
was the son of Client A’s CEO and proceeded with a design that looked “dumb.” 
The CEO prioritized designs associated with revenue increases and the possible 
entry to new market segments. In the pursuit of financial-focused designs, the designers’ 
attention was often on functional design attributes, and specifically, creating more 
features to meet clients’ requirements. As the CEO said, features such as these that were 
“important from the executive perspective” were pushed to the top of the priority list. 
Because of the opportunity that arose, they had to move the web portal to the top of the 
priority list. The need to capture the client’s business meant rethinking how to design a 
dashboard quickly and re-examining their product vision. The Client B opportunity came 
to the firm after Clients A and C, when the HealthCom designers still had a tentative 
product vision in mind. However, Client B was introduced by the investor, who had 
advised them to adapt their software quickly to meet the needs of their user. These 
financial-focused design alternatives directed the designers’ attention to functional design 
attributes, such as scope of function, the user interface, and to a less degree, user 
experience. 
Further examples illustrated the tension between making design decisions that were 
financial or quality-focused. In the following example, the iOS Designer asked the CTO 
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whether the existing API design should support icons for recording patients’ moods or pain 
level. The norm in healthcare was to provide a scale with smiley faces that patients could 
press to indicate their pain level or moods. There was a disagreement about whether they 
should support this client request in the upcoming version of the design, given the deadline. 
The Chief Designer argued that the icons were not necessary for version 1.0, as they could 
meet the client requirements without having to put in effort to support icons: 
 
iOS Designer: [To the Chief Designer] this came up during the [Client C] meeting 
I was at. Specifically recording pain levels and happy / smiley 
faces. Or mood. If we need to support either "pain level" or 
"mood" tasks for version 1, we will need to show images for each 
choice. 
Chief Designer: I heard that too, but I don't think it's a high priority for version 
1.0. What if you just did it on the [mobile application] side and 
assumed that mood is one of those universal tasks that gets its own 
modal kind of like blood pressure or weight? 
 
The iOS Designer had thought that it was a nurse who requested the icons for 
version 1.0, as he was simply responding to the request he heard at the meeting with Client 
C. He was thus thinking about fulfilling the user requirement to improve the software 
functionality. Even though the Chief Designer heard the requirement, he interpreted it as 
non-urgent for this version. His focus was on meeting the deadline, so he suggested a 
workaround the iOS Designer could adopt. The iOS Designer resisted because he felt that 
it had repercussions for the future designs:  
iOS Designer:  It would be better to build choice lists with variable image 
support. I don't like one-offs 
Chief Designer: My concern is the extra engineering effort to add/pass image 
icons from the platform side (for version 1.0). Both for CTO and 
[our contractor]. I do think it will be a nice feature though and 
should take priority in the version 1.1 release 
iOS Designer:  We have to be careful about minor point releases "breaking" the 
JSON returned by the server 
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CTO:  [proposes a workaround solution] It would be nice, but we're 
really at the point where holding the line of scope is a Good 
Thing (to me) 
Chief Designer: We have 10 days until the date we're targeting to launch and be 
prepared for [the major health IT conference]. I feel like this is a 
version 1.1 feature and you all are spinning cycles on stuff where 
there are more important things that need attention. My opinion 
is, if the app is done and tested before the 19th, then I think you 
should add it in because it will help usability and presenting 
better. I think it’s a good feature, just very cautious about adding 
more overhead until we're rock solid for the pilot. 
CTO:  I'm fine with doing nothing with this for now unless we think 
doing something saves us time today. [The Chief Designer] 
raises good points. 
Notice the difference in what the iOS Designer, CTO, and Chief Designer deemed to be 
important and needing attention. The iOS Designer argued that he did not like one-offs that 
would affect quality. The CTO and Chief Designer were focused on the deadline for the 
upcoming Health IT conference during which they would market their software and acquire 
clients. It became a question of investing attention and resources to designing the feature 
properly and immediately, or to postpone the investment of resources, to meet the client’s 
deadline. The iOS designer continued his argument:  
 
iOS Designer:  If it doesn't take much time, I’d prefer we get the JSON format for 
this stuff setup before launch. Otherwise we will need to version 
the API or something for v1.1 But that's all up to [the CTO] 
CTO:  Well, I'm not sure that's necessarily true - I assume that adding 
elements to json will not break the iOS app. If it does, that's 
probably a bigger concern. 
Chief Designer: If you're just adding additional data to the JSON response, how 
does it break the app? I thought it just ignores the stuff it doesn't 
use. 
iOS Designer: Its changing a string to a dictionary. I could parse this one structure 
assuming it could change in the future. But I can’t do that to every 
structure the API returns. It’s one thing to add a new key/value 
pair to a dictionary. It’s another to change something's type 
completely 
CTO:  Fair enough 
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Chief Designer: Yeah, I understand 
CTO:  It will take me 15 minutes to do something with that, although, I 
must say that...uh 
Chief Designer: You guys have my opinion on it so yeah. I think it will improve 
user experience, but I think we need to be really mindful of the 
next 10 days, that’s all. 
iOS Designer:  I'm happy to do whatever. I just want us all to be aware of how 
disruptive changing the server's response format can be if it is a 
bigger change. Especially when users don't have to update their 
apps and one server has to support all versions of the app. 
 
While the iOS Designer was willing to concede, he wanted to make sure that the designers 
were aware of the repercussions. The Chief Designer tried to redirect the iOS Designer’s 
attention to designs that were needed for the upcoming deadline. The CTO, similarly, 
preferred not to invest the resources, unless needed. He was willing to allocate attention to 
investigating the problem after being educated on the repercussions by the iOS Designer. 
It was ironic that the entire conversation lasted more than fifteen minutes when the CTO 
stated that the code would only take fifteen minutes to fix.  
The tension between financial and quality-focused attention drivers further drove 
tensions in design. Three key categories of tensions emerged. Creating designs to capture 
business opportunities quickly meant making design decisions that compromised the 
quality of the software.  Designers in HealthCom who focused on quality were viewed by 
the co-founders and CTO as over-optimizing quality unnecessarily. The cumulative impact 
of these decisions may also inhibit financial performance or future changes to the design. 
The tensions hence created disagreements within the designers between the value and cost 
of the extra work necessary to “do it right” versus the value and cost of creating designs 
quickly. Given that HealthCom was focusing on increasing revenue and contracts, the 
limited attention and resources of the designers meant that they had to choose to focus their 
attention on either financial or quality-focused designs.  
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4.2.1 Compromising Quality to Meet Immediate Deliverable  
Attention to financial-focused designs, amidst time pressures and ambiguity around 
quality, meant opportunities for compromising quality in the design. One of the most 
common themes in the discussion was “adequate” design. As the CTO explained, as a 
startup (i.e. rules of the game for startups):  
  
You're willing to ship with things and the lack of things that no large company 
would ever be able to tolerate. Basically, you cut corners. The corner cutting 
hopefully is larger on features, but it can also be on things like quality. A startup 
might say: "You know what? If the app just explodes for 5% of people, then 
maybe we don't care about that..." Whereas a more mature company might think 
that was ... Even at a startup probably ultimately will think that's not acceptable, 
but in the initial stages you might make all kinds of compromise. 
 
As the CTO explained, compromises were made with respect to the scope of the feature 
and quality. As a startup, the rule is to deliver a software quickly and seek feedback and 
iterate as needed. Although client requirements typically informed the design of user 
interface or user experience, the clients typically did not provide the specifics of how the 
design is operationalized on the backend. As the CTO justified the decision to limit the 
scope of the design and constrain disease states and care plan to a 1:1 relationship in his 
design of care plans, he said, “[it] may turn out to be an overall weakness of the design. 
There are some things here we don't know.” Although the designers could clarify the 
requirements with the clients, they did not, as they believed that more attention and 
resources allocated to improving the quality of designs would not necessarily correspond 
to higher value to the firm in the immediate future.  
Instead, the designers made design decisions that was just adequate for meeting the 
client’s requirements and for delivery by the client-imposed deadline. Any improvements 
or changes could be postponed until the client requested for it or when they had more 
resources. As exemplified in the arguments in the ShareMyCare feature discussions, the 
  87 
Chief Designer said, “If we need to better support the idea of relationships down the road, 
we can.” These statements indicated the lack of desire to improve quality of the designs 
now, despite knowledge of the shortcomings of the design. Doing so allowed the designers 
to capture the business opportunity, while deferring investment in design work. Thus, the 
disagreements often revolved around whether a design investment that would go towards 
designing a more robust software could be postponed. As the Chief Designer said in 
response to a proposed improvement, “If [the client] needs more, we can give it more 
thought for second release. but I still think this is sufficient for [the client].” The CEO has 
also made similar decisions, “I think the user experience is OK for version 1.0. This isn't a 
super important part of the app.” The focus was on meeting the mandatory requirements 
from the client led to the postponement of investments in other designs until the firm had 
more resources or when requested by the client. As the Android Designer concluded, “I 
really think the time constraint is much more the problem than the money or expertise 
constraint.” In HealthCom, the designers with contact to the clients and investors often 
dictated the design and the deadlines.  
Given the need for high reliability in healthcare, it was revelatory to see the lack of 
focus on reliability, security, and other quality of the software. Instead, it was acceptable 
to the clients and investors to have lower quality software. Design work was often rushed 
before a deadline for existing or prospective clients. When things could not be fixed, 
workarounds were always created to cover up defects. These workarounds were adequate 
for the CEO’s presentations to the financial-focused players. For instance, the CTO 
informed the CEO that when he updated the code on the server, the patient account creation 
function stopped working as intended. The CEO’s response was not one of concern for the 
existing clients, but instead, “I do have another marketing presentation at 1pm. I can hack 
together as I did this morning.” Even though he would be presenting a defective software, 
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it was easily resolved by reassuring the prospective clients that his designers were working 
on a solution. As the CEO smiled and said, “Luckily I'm pretty good ah hand waving.” 
Time constraints led to accepting quality compromises as long as the designs were still 
adequate for marketing purposes. 
The CEO and Chief Designer’s attention to financial-focused designs led to the 
focus on deadlines instead of quality. For instance, for the first version of the Android 
mobile application, the iOS Designer was tasked to design the Android application to meet 
the client’s deadline. He had limited experience in designing Android applications.  
Thereafter, the pressure was on the iOS Designer to complete the Android application 
quickly, “Since the press release is going out today and if you feel ready, then we should 
submit the Android app. If we find other big bugs, no big deal. we're not going to have any 
patients using it on day 1. It’s really just optics.” The Chief Designer’s comment provided 
an initial glimpse of how client-imposed deadlines shaped attention allocation in design. A 
to the Chief Designer, it did not matter that the Android application was not functioning 
up to standard, as it was simply “optics” (i.e. for publicity). As the Chief Designer 
anticipated, no patient would be using it on the first day. At this point in the study, 
HealthCom had only licensed the software to two clients-investors. Designing for optics 
was representative of the desire to satisfy the investors and the clients of their ability to 
deliver on the product in a timely manner.  
Similarly, questions about non-functional design attributes, such as the logic behind 
algorithms, became evident when the designers started designing based on the 
requirements. The designers often worked without specifics of how the feature would be 
operationalized. For example, the designers did not know what sorts of surveys would be 
administered and how complex the algorithms had to be. As the Chief Designer said about 
a design decision, “I feel like in the short term it’s not a major problem. And the only 
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implication is on the mobile side. To this many organizations, they may have a degraded 
experience cover until we solve it.” In this example, the Chief Designer was willing to have 
a lower quality software to ensure that they met deadlines. The Chief Designer felt that the 
compromise was acceptable for the design product to be submitted to the client and would 
affect only users of the mobile application. As such, his decision was to postpone 
investment in this refining the design until they had the resources to build it robustly.  
The alerts feature was another example of a feature that had quality compromises. 
The CTO explained that the design was just not “thought through all that cleanly and at 
times it just gives people the appearance that the whole thing is just not working that 
cleanly... Which is really, fundamentally a product problem because you designed 
something that did not work well.” The lack of attention to the interdependencies and how 
the different components of the web dashboard should work with the alerts algorithm meant 
that the feature often did not work well. Alerts were being activated for things that did not 
warrant attention by the nurse. The erroneous alerts were interpreted by nurses as software 
defects. What was needed to rectify the design was an understanding of the nurses 
workflows and use of the feature. Unfortunately, the financial-focused attention drivers 
directed designers towards the design of the alerts feature, but not necessarily improving 
the feature to make sure it worked for the users. 
Given the limited attention and time of the designers, the cofounders and CTO 
constantly questioned the likelihood of the negative repercussions materializing. There 
were multiple instances in which the designers wrestled with the cost and benefits of 
selecting a workaround solution versus a quality design. For example, in the survey 
discussion, Platform Designer C went on to say: 
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That makes me anxious, but there are things about this particular case that I think 
vindicate my anxiety a little bit... I don't think those are the kind of things patients 
are going to encounter all the time. I think most of these things are going to be 
really simple. 
 
 In the end, the designers chose to not worry about the hypothetical cases they initially 
brainstormed, as they did not believe that they would happen often enough to affect the 
software quality or to warrant further attention.  
The CTO sometimes deliberated between costs of investing in the design now 
versus redesigning the software in the future. While he advocated for the most minimal 
approach, he understood the tradeoffs with respect to quality.   
Do we make [the design investment] now or make those changes in 4 weeks? I 
think that the degree to which we have conflict is often around, you know, when 
do we tackle the direction we are going to make? Do we have a contract? Or an 
advance [payment]? Do we stop what we are doing on this release and do 
something different? It is less about what to do but when to do it.  
 
Time constraints resulting from the client-imposed deadlines often led to disagreements 
about whether investment in design work was warranted for the client’s requirement. If 
they made design decisions that compromised the design quality now, it would inhibit the 
scalability and growth of the software in the long-run. Yet, if they did not make this 
tradeoff, they could invest resources in the design unnecessarily and fail to meet the client-
imposed deadline. The decision was sometimes a difficult decision; taking the time to 
design the software correctly in the present before the software became too complex might 
be the efficient approach in the long-run, but they did not have the resources to do so. Yet, 
he must look at the short-term and decide if this feature was adding value. If it could be 
postponed and the resources could be directed to another design that yielded revenue 
returns, that would be considered attention and resources well invested. In a response to 
the Chief Designer about his request to get patient counts for the clinic, he said: 
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[Getting patient counts] is not going to be something that we can do at the 
moment. I can get into why that is what you want, but the bottom line won't 
change. I think at some point down the road we can do that. The issue is that 
while we can do that in a reasonable amount of time right now, once we get 
bigger it will start to either be brittle or a time consuming in a system time sense. I 
think when we do our next iteration... that will be easier to get at, but for now 
hopefully you can live without those #s. 
The conflict for the CTO was whether to invest the resources of his designers towards 
improving a design now or to direct their attention towards other features.  
4.2.2 Over-Optimizing Software for Quality Unnecessarily 
Designers’ attention to quality and non-functional design attributes, such as 
scalability of software, was often viewed as over- optimization.  Designers in key decision-
making positions (e.g. CEO, Chief Designer) often viewed this attention as unnecessary. 
The tension was partly driven by the optimism of the CEO, who often reported at weekly 
meetings about upcoming contracts that could potentially “drive a couple million dollars”. 
However, to earn a couple million dollars, the software would have to be able to support a 
much larger user base than the current size. This would require the designers to focus on 
the non-functional attributes of design. The uncertainty about when such a need would 
materialize made it challenging for designers to allocate attention and resources towards 
building a quality, scalable software. As the Platform Designer L described: 
 
At HealthCom, we really have super small sets of data. We think at scale, but if 
you don’t see the patients [using the software], it is hard to design. You want to 
design for scalability, but how optimized do you have to be, if you only have 100 
users using your software? It really requires a change in mental model – you want 
to see 10,000 users, but really everything is a pilot. And so, you have to act like 
you are designing for many pilots. 
 
The Platform Designer L’s interpretation of the design process in the early stage of the 
startup was that designing features to support the capturing of multiple business 
opportunities was akin to designing for multiple pilots.  
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Despite the known defects in the software, attention to quality was still viewed as 
over-optimizing that was a waste of time. For instance, when the iOS Designer 
recommended simple changes to the user interface to improve navigation of the app, the 
Chief Designer interrupted, “You’re optimizing for speed, which is not the right decision 
for this app.... You’re overthinking this a lot. This is not an app that’s going to be always 
on or with a high volume of activity.” While the HealthCom software may not have had 
many users at this point, they had intended to grow to tens of thousands of users in the near 
future. As such, the iOS designer recognized that the current design approach would not 
be suitable for growth. Though these opportunities were associated with tens of thousands 
of users, they never materialized in the duration of this study.  
Similarly, in the example of the ShareMyCare permissions design in Section 4.4.1, 
the debate between the Chief Designer and the iOS designer occurred because the Chief 
Designer felt that the iOS Designer was over-optimizing the design:  
 
Chief Designer: You are complicating a feature that should be simple 
iOS Designer:  No, it's not, it's a privacy issue. 
Chief Designer: SIMPLE. The feature as it stands is needlessly complicated 
The Chief Designer did not believe that the extra design resources and time invested to 
ensure that the design of the permissions model on the ShareMyCare feature to mirror 
reality was worthwhile, as he did not see the threats to the firm. Hence, he felt that the iOS 
Designer was over-optimizing by directing too much of his attention to the quality. The 
iOS Designer felt this was not a status update on a social media application, but instead, a 
healthcare use in which there could be negative repercussions for the patient to poor design. 
Secondly, he believed that the designers would not revisit this issue and correct it in the 
future; to his point, he stated in a separate interview that the designers often deferred design 
investments and never came back to improve the designs unless they were marked as a 
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defect or associated with revenue increases. As such, he called the designers out on this 
promise. The CTO did not agree with the significance of the problem but proposed a 
workaround solution to distinguish between relationships in ShareMyCare. Undeterred, the 
Chief Designer continued:  
Chief Designer: Look, everything I saw in Android Designer's android app... the 
implementation in the Dashboard... and the goals for [Client B] – 
they are all satisfactory for a 1.0 release. There is some polish, 
but I think you're creating a lot more issues than are there. I'm 
not saying that we should ignore them... I think we can 
thoughtfully improve the feature over time. 
iOS Designer:  If we don't fix these now, I highly doubt we are going to fix them 
later. 
 
[The CTO and iOS Designer continued to debate about what the problem is and what 
needed to be done to resolve the problem] 
iOS Designer:  Eh, I disagree that the current implementation is satisfactory for 
version 1.0. 
Chief Designer: To assume we're never going to fix things is a short-term concern 
and a reflection of resources. You interviewed another backend 
engineer this week! 
 
The designers frequently disagreed on their interpretations of the criticality of the design 
changes. Note that throughout the problem, the Chief Designer’s attention was directed by 
the financial-focused attention drivers. He did not try to understand the problem the iOS 
Designer was alluding to. Instead, he iterated multiple times that the changes were: (1) not 
urgent, (2) not a real problem, and (3) reasonably fixable with more resources in the future. 
In the end, the CTO concluded that changes would not be made:  
CTO:  I think that making changes on the backend are not realistic at this 
juncture, but I also don't think anything iOS Designer proposes 
from the mobile UI perspective requires that. 
Chief Designer: I just ate lunch and you're giving me indigestion. 
iOS Designer:  GOOD. Aww, I thought he stormed off 
Chief Designer: I DON’T RAGE QUIT! 
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The above concluded the heated debate verbatim from the chat transcript. It highlighted 
the difference in the designers’ attention allocations: the CTO focused on what needed to 
be done to operationalize the design with minimal effort. He concurred with the Chief 
Designer that the problem raised was not a big, show-stopping one, and was fixable in the 
long-run. The Chief Designer repeatedly used the argument of immediate value to convince 
the iOS Designer that such an investment would be unwarranted. The iOS Designer, on the 
other hand, was focused on the interdependencies in the design and the bigger implications 
for software quality.  
The use of hypothetical use cases in the discussion often drove these disagreements. 
For example, in another disagreement about the relationships model on the ShareMyCare 
feature, the iOS Designer was advocating for a closer examination of the current design. 
Specifically, if patients and their spouses got divorced and no longer wanted to let their 
spouses access their care information, how long would the software take to update and 
reflect that change in permissions? The iOS Designer was arguing that fifteen minutes was 
too long and should instead be real-time due to security issues. The CTO responded:  
 
So, HIPAA [the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act] is a 
slippery beast; but if that change effectuates in a reasonable period of time, then 
there's no problem there...Implementing this so that it is immediate is actually 
pretty easy... We pay the price by having to go look that up on every request. And 
we couldn't cache that because, well, because of [this problem]. 
 
It was difficult to determine if the iOS Designer was over-optimizing due to the ambiguity 
in quality, due to the lack of objective guidance in the HIPAA law. The CTO was conflicted 
between making the permissions update real time and the possible software performance 
issues that could result from this update: 
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iOS Designer:  I worry about security issues and the situation above where we 
have two devices open and my mom changes access and then I 
can’t see that change for 15 minutes. To a patient, that will be a 
bug. 
CTO:  [CTO suggests a workaround] That personally doesn't concern me, 
but I don't feel terribly strongly about it. It's a sort of unusual case, 
in that even noticing it requires a fairly concerted effort. But, if the 
consensus is we need to change it, it won't be hard to do. 
The iOS Designer was arguing that the longer time between updates would lead to security 
concerns. The CTO’s question was, if the fifteen minutes would be a reasonable enough 
time period for the law? The difficulty with these decisions faced while operationalizing 
the design was that oftentimes, there was no clear benchmark for what constituted secure 
or of high quality. Additionally, while it would be easy to fix for an immediate refresh of 
the software, it had implications for technical performance of the software, as the server 
would have to constantly check for updates and would thus compromise software 
performance in other ways. After some offline discussion between CTO and Designer P, 
the CTO agreed to make the change: “It only takes a couple of lines of code to do the check, 
and it's in a very fast part of the software. It happens to be that we can just look up fresh 
the thing we derive from the token. So, the underlying authentication code stays precisely 
the same.” The CTO realized that making the change was easy and would also concurrently 
resolve other design issues they have with other features. Upon further investigation, the 
iOS Designer realized that the update would occur only after six hours, instead of the fifteen 
minute he thought initially, which made it a bigger concern. There could have been a 
security breach that has now been averted because of the persistence of the iOS Designer 
in the discussion. The additional work associated with reducing the token refresh time was 
viewed by the CTO as redundant. As usual, the debate was about the value of the additional 
effort for design versus the probability of the event happening.  
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4.2.2.1 Changing Procedural and Communication Channels to Reduce Attention to 
Quality 
The HealthCom CTO and Chief Designer had initially asked designers to work 
together to define the scope of requirements for features. The goal was to help designers 
understand the rationale for designs. It was hoped that this collaboration would direct the 
attention of the other designers (with no client interaction) towards understanding the 
urgency of financial-focused designs. These features and ideas were initially discussed 
during weekly meetings with all eight designers.  
However, the influx of client requests resulted in these meetings being 
characterized as too “distracting” and “time consuming” with “too many cooks in the 
kitchen.” Decision-making was then shifted to a four-person prioritization committee, 
comprising the Chief Designer, CTO, Customer liaison, and occasionally the CEO. 
Together, the committee members would decide what features should be prioritized for 
meeting client requirements and how these requirements should be designed. 
As a result, the designers’ input in design discussions was reduced. The CEO and 
Chief Designer saw little value in the designers’ input towards designing the features to 
meet revenue targets. Instead, they wanted to direct the designers’ attention towards 
designs that were adequate for the client. While the individual designers still had some 
flexibility over how they designed components of the software, they did not have a say in 
what features were designed. Some designers, such as the iOS Designer, were disappointed 
that they were excluded from the discussions that shaped the design. Although they 
recognized the need for efficiency, they feared that this would result in an inferior software. 
Desire to reduce discussions about optimizing the software quality led to reduction in 
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designers’ involvement in the design discussions, and the movement towards a more top-
down design process.  
4.2.3 Inhibiting Future Growth of the Business and Software 
The earlier focus on financial-focused designs meant compromising software 
quality to deliver the designs within the deadline. The unsustainability of focusing on 
financial-focused designs over quality-focused designs also became evident, as poor 
quality would inhibit the ability of the software to serve as an enabler of funding over time. 
In the following conversation, the CEO was updating the Chief Designer about his contract 
negotiation progress with clients P, T, E and H. In response, the Chief Designer said: 
 
Chief Designer: I am feeling anxious. We have trouble [getting users to use our 
application] one month after launch - only 8% are using the 
application. That is bad engagement. No number of buttons I’m 
designing will make people click.  
CEO:  I don’t think you are wrong. But solving this should not be a 
problem. My observation of Client B – with Customer Liaison 
being more involved in marketing… I think we can run 
campaigns to increase use of the application. [He goes on to 
propose other possible solutions] We spend a whole release: 
testing / organization to increase confidence that it will be better.  
 
Here, unlike in the previous section, the poor software performance was becoming salient 
to the Chief Designer. He could see how the inferior quality was going to affect their ability 
to reach revenue targets, if not addressed in a timely manner. They were experiencing poor 
use levels with Client D and Client B. His attention was thus directed towards software 
quality. Conversely, the CEO was arguing that the resources should be directed towards 
financial-focused designs, such as developing interoperability capability for prospective 
client H. The CEO felt that with the new clients, there would be gains in financial resources, 
which would allow them to direct attention towards these software performance issues in 
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the future. By then, with the influx of resources, solving the quality issues would not be a 
problem. He felt that there were manual workarounds that would not take time away from 
financial-focused designs.  
The co-founders differed on their perception of the urgency of the deficient 
performance, however. The Chief Designer asserted that if the quality issues were not 
resolved, the design of other features, such as data analytic capabilities, or ability of the 
software to handle hundreds of thousands of users, would be a waste of effort, as no one 
was using the application.  
Chief Designer: Throwing care managers at it is not a solution. It is not reflective 
of long term use case. I’d be interested to see how they settle 
patient invites [to get them enrolled on the software].  
  
CEO:  Sure. All I’m saying is that it’s a process and is simple. We just 
have to bring people in - we do as much as we can ... we know 
engagement level is not 50%. [Client B] is aware of actual 
engagement rates. So, what should we do? … My fear is more 
about reliability. I think it’s worth probing to see how easy it is 
to crash with so many patients on. My concern is that this is not 
robust. We broke Client B- we need to do better. From what I’ve 
observed, getting data out of this is important.  
The CEO continued to argue for manual workarounds to the problem they faced. He 
separated the problem of poor use from bad design and did not believe that the bad decision 
would be inhibit marketability of the software. In fact, he saw attention allocated to 
addressing these concerns as a distraction from making progress on financial targets. He 
needed the designers to design the new features instead of improving the old: 
Chief Designer: You are not listening to my experience. The client’s data sucks. 
How do you prevent a Client B [failure]?  
  
CEO:  So do we take ownership marketing plan? What I am saying is 
we have 60-90 days to do whatever we want. We are smart 
people we can fix it. Here is the hot deal. We need to do what we 
can - we are doing what we can to generate enrollment for a 
week then deal with the integration of software.  
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The CEO once again downplayed the criticality of improving the software quality. He was 
optimistic that with manpower and financial resources, they could resolve the issue, for 
instance, through marketing and education. In response to the Chief Designer’s question 
about how to prevent a similar failure, he was unable to articulate a solution because he 
never really understood the problem.  
The co-founders typically paid more attention to the financial-focused designs, but 
here, the Chief Designer recognized the problems of continued allocation of attention and 
resources on financial-focused designs. Conversely, the CEO had moved on to what was 
more important in his perspective, i.e. new features supporting data analytics: 
 
Chief Designer: Well that’s not going to help me if at the product meeting: 
prioritizing everything to do with integration? this deal 
influences how we are prioritizing this. I’m communicating to 
you the resource needs: sometimes it’s all about the customers. 
but let’s also be reflective about Client B. Customer Liaison is 
marketing it but I don’t think there is a silver bullet  
CEO:  Sure. Let’s be smart this time. Let’s do everything we need to do 
— be smarter about our mechanism.  
Chief Designer: No. With Client H, you came in and started telling us what we 
need to do. Stop letting sales dictate our resource allocation. You 
sales guys do not have any idea of what we are building and, yet 
you come back to the product meeting and start changing our 
priorities?  
CEO:  I understand. We have [a large deal] coming up. I would like to 
think that we are smart enough to solve this.  
 
The above conversation illustrated differences between the co-founders in attention to poor 
software performance. These two co-founders should be expected to be in greater 
alignment in attention allocation than the other designers, given their interactions with the 
investors. Yet, they disagreed about how attention and resources should be allocated among 
design alternatives. The CEO’s recommendation was “to be smart this time,” which 
  100 
provided little guidance on how to resolve the problem with the software quality. The CEO, 
who was no longer directly involved in the design process, instead looked to the next design 
request dictated by the prospective client.  
 As this chapter has shown, the financial-focused attention drivers can direct 
attention of the designers away from quality-focused designs alternatives. However, 
continued attention to financial-focused designs was not sustainable. The need to design 
the software with increased attention to quality resurfaced when HealthCom eventually 
managed to sign a few major clients. The CEO announced, “Our value to them will be 
based on both our ability to enroll those people and demonstrate our value by 
demonstrating stickiness and engagement. So, we’re really going to be putting the software 
to the road.” As the earlier conversation highlighted, the use of the software was low. In 
the design of the features, the users were often absent from the discussion. Thus, it was 
difficult for the HealthCom designers to know what and how to design for patients’ use. 
As such, the lack of attention to software quality-focused designs resulted in a poor 
performing software. The signing of contracts with the major clients meant that the 
software now had to catch up with the business models, i.e. the design had to be able to 
serve the thousands of users to demonstrate value.  
Anything that the CEO deemed to be inhibiting the negotiation of contracts with 
clients would be prioritized for design. For instance, the CEO and Chief Designer attributed 
the failure in Client D’s use of the software to poor content created by the client. In the 
following conversation, he and the Chief Designer disagreed about how to improve the 
content quality:  
Chief Designer:  Content should drive experience. I didn’t expect us to get into 
content business, but I guess we have to. If we are going to be 
on the hook, we might as well do the whole thing [i.e. software 
and content]. 
  101 
CEO:  So, I think we are getting into the content business whether we 
like it or not. At least through [working with] partners. The 
doctor is doing a good job, isn’t he? 
Chief Designer: Well…… What’ s the content we are doing right now? What’s 
the goal? Is there a client driving all this?  
Here, the Chief Designer was reluctant to spend money on developing content, even though 
he recognized that the poor content Client D used was one of the key factors for the low 
use of the software by Client D. If the education content provided on the software was not 
engaging or informative, the nurses would not be likely to share it with the patients, and 
the patients would not read it. In response, the CEO hired a doctor to develop personalized 
content in diabetes for HealthCom’s marketing purposes because the CEO and his business 
consultant believed that chronic disease management (specifically diabetes management) 
was a market to target. The CEO believed that the lack of clinically validated content in 
the software hindered his ability to sell it.  
Without really understanding if the lack of clinical content was a deal breaker, he 
proceeded to invest in the doctor’s time. His justification was that: “not having content 
delays revenue. Makes it harder for someone to say yes [to a deal]” and thus his solution 
was to “go find some content partners, license that s**t…We will pass [the cost of the 
content] through as a software fee.” The Chief Designer recognized that investment of 
resources in content design would not generate immediate value if it had not been requested 
by a specific client. For instance, the CEO spent money on diabetes education content, but 
if the client were a surgery center, it would require investment in another set of content.  
The disagreement here showed how even though both co-founders were focused on 
allocating resources to financial-focused designs, they disagreed on what feature should be 
prioritized. While the Chief Designer agreed with the problem, his proposed solutions were 
different. The Chief Designer continued, “I struggle with this decision [to invest resources 
in licensing the clinical content]. Where you are going makes a lot of sense, but until we 
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remap our product, there is no point licensing the content.” He proposes an alternative 
design feature, called alerts, that “could provide value to begin with, without licensing.” 
He felt that they could digitize and improve the client’s current content without paying for 
it, by referencing information available online, without paying for it. Instead, the designers 
should direct their attention and resources to designing better algorithms and smarter 
features. The Chief Designer believed having more features, such as alerts, could improve 
marketability of the HealthCom software.  
The CEO was not giving up. He suggested postponing the decision. Later in the 
day, the CEO received positive feedback from a major client interested in licensing the 
HealthCom software. He found out that the client’s “business model [did] not [require us 
to have content]. So, [they did not] have to worry about content anymore.” Notice how 
quickly the CEO changed his mind. In a couple of hours, a major client validated the value 
of the HealthCom software even in the absence of content. The conversation exemplified 
how the CEO’s attention to design shifted according to the cues he was receiving from the 
players. 
4.3 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I introduced the key attention drivers and the tension between these 
two key attention drivers. I highlighted how the tensions between financial and quality-
focused attention drivers led to design disagreements about design decisions that 
compromised the quality of the design, over-optimized quality unnecessarily, or inhibited 
growth of the firm. The financial-focused and quality-focused designs did not appear to be 
complementary in the short-run due to the deadlines imposed by the clients Ambiguity in 
quality also offered designers the opportunities to take shortcuts in designs to conserve 
their effort. In the next chapter, I focus on the design actions and impact on design product. 
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Chapter 5: From Design Action to Design Product  
In the previous chapter, how the attention of the designers was directed to the 
various design alternatives. In this chapter, I focus on the design actions and design 
product. Overall, the following design actions were because of the financial and time 
pressures. These design actions included: (1) reframing, (2) simplifying and (3) coupling, 
all with the effect of (4) postponing investment of attention and resources in software 
design. These design actions meant that designers were choosing design alternatives that 
minimize the upfront investment in design without consideration of the costs of possible 
redesign work in the future. The design actions are summarized in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1:  Design Actions, Description and Empirical Observations 
Design action Description Empirical Observations 
Reframing Taking the requirements of the clients 





Simplifying Creating simpler software design, such 
as by limiting the scope of existing 
design 
Limiting the scope of the 
feature, keeping designs 
generic instead of customized  
Coupling Creating more tightly coupled software 
design 
Workarounds, enhancing 
existing modules instead of 
creating new modules 
Postponing Postponing the investment in software 
design  
Postponing until needed, 
postponing discussion, 
postponing until able to do it 
right 
 
 Table 5-2 highlights the key design characteristics of the digital product that differ from 
the typical product. As indicated in the previous section, the designs developed in the 
entrepreneurial context that are financial-focused need to be quick to build to enable the 
firm to capture the business opportunities.  
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Table 5-2:  Characteristics of the Digital Product 
Characteristic Definition 
Disposable The product was short lived and meant to be discarded 
and redesigned in the future 
Speed The product was quick to design and deploy to clients 
Limited in adaptability  The product could accommodate incremental changes 
but was limited in the flexibility to accommodate more 
changes or to scale.  
Spartan The product’s functionality was limited in scope and 
sophistication.  
Vulnerable The product had high technical debt  
 
Because of the design actions undertaken to help meet the clients’ deadlines, the result is 
compromising quality, which results in designs that are disposable and spartan (with 
limited scope). Because of the compromises in quality, the design actions resulted in a 
digital product that was vulnerable. Figure 5-1 further summarizes how the design actions 
illustrated in the previous section contributed to these characteristics.  
 
 
Figure 5-1:  Design Actions and Impact on the Design Product Characteristics 
 
 
It is important to note that the actions occurred in a linear fashion. When client 
requirements were received, the designers would first reframe the requirement based on 
their existing priorities, resources, and attention allocation. Thereafter, designers simplified 
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the design requirements to create a design product was just adequate for meeting the 
client’s request.  The designers also adopted coupling actions using workarounds, shortcuts 
and created more tightly coupled designs. These actions were undertaken to postpone 
investment of attention and resources to the future when needed. 
5.1 REFRAMING SOFTWARE AS AN ENABLER OF FUNDING  
Because of the salience of financial-focused attention drivers, designers often 
reframed requirements in terms of designs critical for meeting revenue targets. By 
reframing, I refer to the action of taking the requirements of the clients and users and 
reinterpreting them in different ways (different forms of operationalization of design, 
different relationships between design components, etc.). Reframing was often the first step 
in the design process, as the designers isolated the mandatory components in the design 
requirements.  
Reframing of the design feature was best exemplified in the design of the 
medication adherence feature. At the beginning of HealthCom’s second year, the designers 
had just delivered the first version of the HealthCom software to the first two clients-
investors. Shortly after, the designers’ focus for the subsequent period, as determined by 
the investors, was to figure out how to grow the firm and identify the product market fit. 
As such, software was viewed as an enabler of funding. During this stage, HealthCom 
began to explore specialty pharmacy as a market segment to enter. After a discussion with 
prospective Client L, a specialty pharmacy client, the CEO ordered: “We will have to figure 
out how to do the medication adherence feature. This one comes from [prospective new 
client L], which has 60 clinics, 90k new patients a year.” In view of the potential revenue 
from Client L, the Chief Designer rallied the designers to brainstorm ideas for the 
medication adherence feature. The CEO emphasized the potential revenue opportunity and 
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growth opportunities (i.e. the number of new patients) associated with this client. Thus, he 
believed that the designers should allocate attention and resources to design the medication 
adherence feature to capture this client.   
 Due to the investors’ pressure to get more clients, the focus was, therefore, on 
designing software features that increased HealthCom’s chances of a successful contract. 
The CEO suggested designing the medication adherence feature as a separate mobile 
application and expanding it to include a whole ecosystem of complementary mobile 
applications that he could then market to other clients. The iOS Designer was concerned 
with the interdependencies and extra work that would be needed. He responded, 
“Interesting idea. I need to give it some more thought... We already have so many apps that 
we have to maintain, and that number will rise with almost every new customer.” Here, the 
iOS Designer was concerned with the resources needed to maintain a separate white-
labeled app for each client to access the software. His concerns for quality was downplayed 
by the CEO’s optimism for the opportunities the creation of a separate medication 
adherence mobile application could offer.  
Interest in the design of the medication adherence was tied to the magnitude of the 
potential funding (i.e. a financial-focused design). Eventually, Client L did not sign a 
contract with HealthCom. The financial impetus for designing a medication adherence 
feature was removed. A few months before the completion of the study, discussions about 
the medication adherence feature resurfaced, as there was interest from another specialty 
pharmacy company. The resurgence of attention to the medication adherence feature 
highlighted the interdependencies between business opportunity and attention to design 
alternatives. Instead of designing a new mobile application for medication adherence, the 
Chief Designer decided to expand the scope of the existing task feature to accommodate 
medication adherence. The decision was prompted by a new designer who questioned why 
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the team would not consider, “enhancing the core infrastructure we have instead of building 
something entirely new.” The Chief Designer and CEO reflected on this statement. They 
decided to reframe the medication adherence feature with respect to existing features in the 
HealthCom software. Designing the medication adherence feature as an extension of an 
existing feature would allow HealthCom to reuse code and reduced maintenance effort. 
Even though the prospective client was a big client, HealthCom’s approach towards 
designing the medication adherence feature was less ambitious and resource-intensive. The 
designers reframed their conceptualization of a medication adherence feature as a type of 
task, which is already part of the design product.  
The pressures to get the contracts thus became the impetus for design. It led to 
significant reframing of how designers viewed design requirements. Requirements were 
reinterpreted in terms of what would be necessary to achieve the design product promised 
to the client with minimal resources, instead of what the users wanted. For instance, the 
Chief Designer and iOS Designer had a debate about the design of the tasks feature, which 
was a core feature of the software. The iOS Designer heard from the users in Client-
Investor C in his meeting, that they wanted a feature that allowed them to capture 
mood/side effects and a feature to administer surveys. Given that the current design product 
was the first version of the HealthCom software, the designers faced time constraints. They 
had to complete the design product on or before the deadline to prove that the HealthCom 
software was viable. Chief Designer decided to support these requests by leveraging 
existing designs to accommodate the new features. He created the appropriate user 
interface and reduced the scope of the requirements to support only a limited instance of 
the requirement. In response to a client request for the ability to track patient side effects 
(specifically mood) associated with their treatments, the Chief Designer reminded the iOS 
Designer:  
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IOS Designer: [after looking at the screenshot] I thought we didn’t need side 
effects for v1? And the survey is undefined, too. Is it a checklist 
item? How do we get them to the website? 
Chief Designer: Look, the ball is in our court on how to achieve certain 
functionality and prove value based on what our software will have 
available. If we're logging mood, we can effectively log patient 
satisfaction at the clinic. It's the same "task" with a different name. 
If we decided multiple choice checkbox is not going to be 
supported in 1.0, then we should remove symptom logger and 
postpone for version 1.0. 
IOS Designer: I was under the impression that the survey would be a big web 
survey. 
Chief Designer: No, I don't think it should be. I think Survey can be whatever the 
clinic wants, which is most often a 5-star like rating or something 
of the sort. 
IOS Designer: Ah, ok. I just want to make sure we really iron out the version 1 
requirements. We got 9 days, which means all those tasks need 
well-defined user interfaces in the app. 
Here, the iOS Designer wanted to finalize the scope of requirements for the Care plan 
feature, since they had to release the software to Client C in nine days. He was, therefore, 
careful to make sure that all the design requirements were accounted for. In the screenshot 
the Chief Designer provided of the care plan feature, the iOS Designer saw that the Chief 
Designer had included an extra functionality (the ability to track side effects) that the iOS 
Designer thought was not required for this version of the software. The expansion of scope 
contrasted with previous examples in which the iOS Designer was faulted by the Chief 
Designer for trying to improve the designs. The iOS Designer believed that a survey feature 
would require a lot of design effort: he envisioned it to be a complex survey administration 
tool. The Chief Designer disagreed. He argued, “If we're logging mood, we can effectively 
log patient satisfaction at the clinic. It's the same "task" with a different name.” The spartan 
nature of the survey feature contrasted with the software offerings of large patient 
satisfaction survey vendors that created software solutions for recording and disseminating 
patient satisfaction results.  
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By viewing the survey as a task type, designers could reduce the resources allocated 
to the design of the survey feature. Designers had the flexibility to decide how to design 
this feature because of the novelty of the feature: without explicit requirements from the 
clients about how the survey feature should work, designers could reframe how the feature 
should be designed. Any feature that could be adapted to include existing features was 
preferred. The ability to log patient satisfaction was constrained to the functionality 
provided by the task feature. The Chief Designer thus reframed the client requirement in 
terms of the design resources available in HealthCom, instead of imagining or 
understanding about how the user would use the feature. As the CTO explained, the 
ambiguity of the requirements of the novel feature led to the ability to reframe how the 
features were supposed to function. He said, “The conversation becomes one of "Is 
medication a version of this thing? Is it an extension of that or is it something different?" 
It's a reasonable question, right?” The CTO explained that new features could be reframed 
features and designed into existing features, by first conceptualizing the interdependencies 
that exist between the features to be designed.  
Reframing also directed prioritization of designs in the process. In the discussion 
between the CTO and customer liaison, the CTO initially pushed back on the design request 
to create a “delete task” feature as not feasible. The intermediary at prospective Client K 
had provided feedback to the client intermediaries about the lack of organization in the task 
lists that the nurses had to manage. There were existing interdependencies that had to be 
cleanly resolved as an existing task would have existing data and interdependencies with 
care plans that would have to be severed if deleted. When the customer liaison articulated 
that it was a client request, the customer liaison and CTO worked together to examine the 
requirements and think differently about how they could achieve the requirements: 
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Customer Liaison: [To the CTO] This was a request from [our contact at 
prospective Client K]. It is a scale issue for any customer with a 
large population of patients. If you look at [Client A]'s task 
library, they could definitely use a delete feature. I think it's fair 
to propose we de-prioritize this. I'm guessing from your 
comment that this is a large undertaking. 
CTO: [proposes an alternative of hiding the tasks instead of deleting] 
Customer Liaison: I think that sounds like a reasonable solution! The issue 
currently is that the deactivated tasks stay in the task library 
making it not great to navigate when you have a large library of 
tasks. How about treating deactivated tasks the same way that 
we treat deactivated patients or archived messages? Just put 
them in a separate section of the dashboard? 
 
In the above discussion, the Customer Liaison and CTO reached a compromise because 
she articulated quickly the reason for the design request, the problem it was posing, and 
value it could provide to prospective Client K and existing client A. The Customer Liaison 
reframed the problem into one was not simply a matter of improving quality and user 
experience, but one that had financial implications. She then worked with the CTO to 
devise alternative solutions, such as hiding the task to mimic the effect of deleting a task. 
By reframing the requirement in terms of the real need (i.e. to make the interface less 
cluttered for the user), they were able to devise workaround solutions that met the client’s 
request. In determining “how” something should be built, the CTO often chose the least 
resource-intensive method. The CTO reminded the Customer Liaison, “Unless the [design 
requests] yields a bunch of money, you should kill it off.” The financial returns associated 
with designs thus directed attention and resource allocation in design. 
The CEO’s emphasis on financial-focused design alternatives led to a different 
evaluation of alternatives. Rather than focusing on designs that improved the quality of the 
software or the user experience, his focus was on the ability of the software to help him 
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pursue business opportunities (i.e. “it would demo better”). It also meant directing the 
designers’ attention to design alternatives that may not be relevant to the firm’s existing 
clients. The CEO often recommending adding new features that made HealthCom appear 
technically savvy to prospective clients:  
CEO:  [To the iOS Designer] This list of features is more salesy/future-y, 
but is it in the realm of technical possibility? 
iOS Designer:  Health Kit maybe. 
CEO:  We should remove any aspect where we're talking out of our ass, 
but these seem like reasonable things our SDK should do. I'd like 
to leave Health Kit in if there's a shot it would work. It’s a nice 
value. 
iOS Designer:  User interface is doable but I’m not sure if it is worthwhile. 
Recall that the demographics of the HealthCom software was the chronically ill, elderly 
population. It is not expected that their clients would have any use for HealthKit 
integration, which allowed manufacturers of smart fitness and health devices, and health 
and fitness apps, to share health data though the iOS mobile application. Throughout the 
observations, it became clear that the co-founders, especially the CEO, placed a high value 
on designs that improved the marketability of the HealthCom software to future clients, 
regardless of whether they would be used.  
To conclude this section, the following illustrates how reframing of a design in 
terms of funding opportunities led to compromises in quality. HealthCom was designing 
the software development kits (SDK) for a major health IT client who wanted their IT 
software to be interoperable with the HealthCom software. The co-founders recognized 
that signing a deal with this client would open opportunities to other clients in the health 
IT market. Because of they were in the process of contract negotiation with this client, the 
co-founders only sought feedback from this client in the design process. The Chief 
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Designer argued with the iOS Designer to let the client choose from a list of SDK design 
alternatives, instead of deciding, as a firm, what was right for the HealthCom software. The 
iOS Designer was adamant about not doing so:  
iOS Designer:  I don't want them thinking they have a choice to pick from all 
my options. 
Chief Designer:  Their first pilot is 35,000 patients and they manage 9,000,000 
patients. They can have all the choices they want. 
IOS Designer:  It’s our job to lead the [client] into making the right choice. Not 
letting them have so many choices that they can shoot 
themselves in the foot. 
 
The belief of the co-founders was that designing the SDK according to how this client 
wanted it would increase the likelihood of a successful contract. Thus, the Chief Designer 
paid more attention to the client over the quality implications for the software. 
Additionally, the Chief Designer believed that because this prospective client, being a 
health IT vendor, was technologically savvy enough to make the appropriate design 
decision for HealthCom. As such, he did not see any threats to quality. He asserted, “We're 
going to be working with like-minded people. If they think like you do, then whether or 
not they have 3 options or 10 -- they should naturally agree.”  
The example highlighted the tension between the financial and quality-focused 
attention drivers that shaped ongoing design discussions. The decisions made in the design 
discussions were indications of the underlying attention driver for that designer. In the 
above conversation, the Chief Designer was focused on creating an SDK but how it was 
created did not matter to him. Conversely, the iOS Designer was focused on the quality 
implications of the design decisions. He asserted, “I just want to make sure we do what 
makes the most sense for us right now. This isn’t a decision we should make lightly as it 
will have long-term effects on the company. Some of the SDK options we discussed require 
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massive amounts of short-term and long-term work.” Instead of listening to the iOS 
Designer, the Chief Designer downplayed the concerns of the iOS Designer. 
In the end, the client did not proceed with the contract. The designers later realized 
that leaving the decision to the client would have led to a less optimal design. For the 
HealthCom software to communicate with the client’s dated software, the designers would 
have had to design plug-ins and code, which the CTO had thought to be a bad idea “n years 
ago.” The client was not as technologically savvy as the Chief Designer had initially 
anticipated. If the designers had let the client choose the SDK design in view of the revenue 
opportunities, they would have been left with an inferior design. Even worse, the revenue 
never materialized but yet the designers would have to live with the repercussions of their 
decision.  
5.2 SIMPLIFYING CLIENT REQUIREMENTS 
The goal of the software design, in the co-founders’ perspective, was to be a version 
of the software that was adequate for meeting the client’s requirements. They often 
believed that improvements to software design and quality could be made later. These 
improvements could be associated with additional revenue opportunities, as the CEO 
explained, “we will be spending a month or two that will be paying for our consulting time 
to help them make a really nice program. We might need to build a feature or two to make 
that better, but we will do that as we get there.” Hence, attention to financial-focused design 
meant focusing on the elements of design that would be adequate for the client’s 
requirements. The goal was to meet the deadline set by the client.  
The CEO’s dogma of creating designs that were just adequate for the client was 
echoed by the CTO. The CTO’s role was to oversee the design work and allocate resources 
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among the designers on the various design tasks. As the following quote summarizes, his 
focus was on creating designs that could immediately demonstrate value for the firm:   
 
The idea is not to have waste, but I think about a lot in terms of always delivering 
things that are immediately of value at a level of business. ... if it is not, don’t do 
that thing, whatever that thing is. ... if you are going to build something that is not 
going to deliver value right now, that is when you start going into these judgments 
about when it will deliver some kind of value. 
The focus of the CEO and CTO on immediate value of design led to the drive for 
simplification in design. 
Simplification of requirements increased with financial pressures. When 
HealthCom designed the very first version of the software for Clients-Investors A and C, 
instead of simplifying the requirements received, the designers sought to understand the 
needs of the users and clients. They sought frequent feedback from Clients A and C and 
their end users using mockups (screen shots) “to help [the client’s] executive team visualize 
the solution and open up discussion” and to clarify any questions the other designers had 
with how a feature should be designed. The Chief Designer and CEO made frequent visits 
to the client sites, held user focus groups, and observed user workflows to understand issues 
pertaining to clinical workflow. The co-founders also encouraged their designers to take 
time to engage with the users.  
As the financial pressures grew and HealthCom embarked on a search for product 
market fit, HealthCom’s designers’ attention became directed to creating a disease-agnostic 
software. They chose to create a disease-agnostic software so as to be more exploratory in 
their search for clients and increase the likelihood of successful contracts, given the long 
sales cycle in healthcare. Viewing software as an enabler of funding led to a simplification 
of the design requirements. The simplifying of requirements occurred in two main ways: 
(1) limiting of the scope in design and (2) the decision of generic instead of customized 
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design. As HealthCom’s attention was directed to creating a disease-agnostic software, the 
co-founders began to raise concerns about the software being too customized to specific 
users. This was at odds with HealthCom’s need to grow the startup quickly. When 
discussing the specifics of the feature design, the Chief Designer iterated the need to not 
be too concerned about these details requested by specific clients.  
An example of simplification is the operationalization of a permissions model of 
who gets access to what patient information or user interface (formats, colors) that may be 
client specific. Instead of designing a permissions model that mirrored the organizational 
chart of a client, the designers chose a generic permissions model with nurse, nurse 
manager, and client intermediaries. The Chief Designer cautioned, The HealthCom mobile 
designs... aren't really supposed to be for one client or another. They are supposed to be 
reflective of a generic app unique to our software capabilities ... to service as many needs 
as possible.” It was thus common for the Chief Designer to question his designers: “Is it a 
software-wide feature or client specific feature? If it's not supported on the backend, it's 
probably not a version 1.0 feature.” As emphasized in the quote, attention and resources 
should be allocated to features that contributed to the software core designs that could be 
relevant to most, if not all the clients. Anything that was customized for specific clients 
that could not be marketed in the future to a more generic client was not to be included in 
this first version. For instance, in the previous discussion about adopting the tasks feature 
to accommodate side effects for Client C, the Chief designer reminded the iOS Designer, 
“Look, the ball is in our court on how to achieve certain functionality and prove value 
based on what our software will have available. If we're logging mood, we can effectively 
log patient satisfaction at the clinic. It's the same "task" with a different name.” The 
argument was that this functionality could be performed by the existing task feature, and 
their expectations of a survey feature could be simplified (limited in scope). 
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These quotes highlight how the designers were cognizant that they should not be 
locked into the initial customer and should focus their efforts on what impacted the core 
software capabilities to ensure that the software would continue to function as an enabler 
of funding. The attention on generic aspects of the design requirements led to the design 
action of simplifying, primarily by only designing parts of the feature that would be generic 
and by limiting the scope of the design requirements.  
Simplification also occurred when the designers chose to design for a subset of 
scenarios and use cases instead of all possible use cases. Instead of designing the software 
to mirror the complex relationships between diseases and therapies, between patients and 
their caregivers, or between types of nurses and administrators at the client sites, the 
designers often resorted to a simplification of requirements. The simplification of 
relationships in design also highlighted the difference in attention allocation among the 
designers, since they disagreed about how to model the initial relationships among the care 
plan, the patient’s disease type, and therapy (drug treatment) received. 
 
iOS Designer:  Is a Care plan linked to 1 Disease State and 1 therapy? The 
[existing data structure] coming back looks like it could have more 
than 1 of each since they come back as arrays. 
CTO:   [To the iOS Designer] At present, it supports the possibility of 
being associated with multiple disease states and therapies. I 
haven't thought very deeply about that; I believe the consideration 
would be trying to get reuse out of care plans, so they don't have to 
be completely copied. 
 In this situation, it was easy for the CTO to create a more complex data table, since it 
involved creating extra columns and links in the supporting tables. The iOS Designer was, 
therefore, confused about what needed to be designed, since his understanding of the client 
needs, the CTO’s design, and the screenshot provided by the Chief Designer for the user 
interface design did not match. The CTO explained that he did not think deeply about 
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exactly what the interdependencies would be. Although he had designed it to possibly 
support multiple disease states and therapies, it would not be needed for this first version 
of the software. He, therefore, advised the iOS Designer to simplify the relationships.  
 
CTO:  [To the iOS Designer] I wouldn't read too much into the 
relationships between disease states and therapies, which may turn 
out to be an overall weakness of the design. There are some things 
here we don't know. 
iOS Designer:  Well, I’m just trying to figure out how to model the app for version 
1. We can change it later, but the more you change the model later 
the more than sucks since you have to write a bunch of upgrade 
code. 
CTO:  I think for the immediate future, it is reasonable to assume that the 
patient has one care plan. There is no constraint on the number of 
care plans associated to a patient. It is possible that there could be 
an unlimited number of care plans associated to a disease state. So, 
there might be 5 plans associated to [a particular disease state]. 
That is in scope for this release. 
The iOS Designer questioned how the iOS application should be designed to support the 
looking up of a care plan for the patient. He explained that simply focusing on the present 
needs would lead to unnecessary redesign in the future. He pushed for the CTO to be more 
specific about the relationship between a care plan (the set of care instructions), the disease 
state of the patient, and the specific therapy prescribed for the patient. The iOS Designer 
argued:  
 
iOS Designer:  So what’s confusing to me is the app has to have a reference to 
the patient, the "active" care plan, the "active" disease state, and 
the "active" therapy. 
CTO:   Yeah.... The backend has been designed for a more realistic 
world, where a patient might have multiple comorbidities, be in 
multiple treatment plans, etc. But, I think in the 1.0 release we're 
not really enabling any of that to be set up. The backend has no 
concept of "active" care plan, disease state, or therapy. The app 
and dashboard UI combine to constrain those things to "you can 
only choose one." 
iOS Designer:  Well, it kind of does, doesn’t it? 
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CTO:  But that's an artificial constraint. Only in the sense that you can only 
choose 1. That's initial state. 
The Chief Designer and iOS Designer both disagreed with the CTO’s simplification of the 
relationship and continued to question the decision. The CTO replied, “That gives me some 
anxiety, but they are sort of free floating now. What needs to happen, as I understand it, is 
that we need to build a cross walk between "disease" and the relevant care plans for the 
disease.” The CTO’s solution was to build a workaround that would enable the design to 
support multiple care plans, if needed, in the future. The CTO’s recommendation was fo 
focus on what was necessary, i.e. to design the app and the web dashboard to support a 
constrained version to meet the client’s deadline. The CTO thus advocated for a 
simplification of the design.  
The simplification of requirements occurred, even if it could have implications for 
the reliability of the software. For example, the iOS Designer raised the issue of the mobile 
application crashing (failing to work) after a user tried to log in. He identified the issue as 
resulting from the nurse trying to enter a fractional "GoalNumber" (0.5 in this case). He 
then clarified with the Chief Designer about the client’s design requirements for the task 
feature. Specifically, for every task assigned to a patient, the nurse has the option to 
prescribe a goal (such as drink 8 cups of water throughout the day). The existing mobile 
application only supported integers.  
 
iOS Designer:  Should the mobile application support fractional goal numbers? 
Chief Designer: In the long-run, yes. For water, probably doesn't make sense but 
since the goal isn't unique to water, then should probably just 
make the water logger handle it on the client side. 
iOS Designer:  iOS currently truncates to integer 
Chief Designer: I think you should probably stick with that for the water logger 
but I think that assumption could be dangerous if goal is used on 
other tasks, i,e. 'drink 3.5 oz of X medicine' and we decide to 
round up or down :) AAHH F*** IT, JUST DRINK 4 OZ - IT 
WON’T KILL YOU. 
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iOS Designer:  Maybe. I hate GoalNumber tasks anyway. That would be a 
checklist task. Goalnumber is only important for long-running 
tasks that require multiple attempts to finish. 
In the above conversation, the designers decided to ignore the complexities or requirements 
of healthcare and focus on what was adequate to deliver to the client by the deadline. They 
had no control over the types of tasks that nurses would prescribe through the HealthCom 
software, since the task editor was set up to be generic and open-ended. The nurses could 
potentially prescribe tasks for all disease types. Simplifying the design to only support 
integers limited the functionality of the task feature and also had dangerous repercussions 
for the patient. Even though the designers realized that the rounding up/down of the 
numbers could have detrimental consequences, such as in the case of medication 
administration, they chose to only focus on supporting integers in the first version of the 
task feature design.  
In a final example of simplification, simplification could occur because of the novel 
nature of the feature. In the ShareMyCare feature design, the iOS Designer was wrestling 
with the idea of how permissions would be granted in this feature, in which patients can 
share their care information with a family member or friend:  
 
iOS Designer:  So, with the ShareMyCare feature, are the family members all 
granted the ability to complete tasks on behalf of the patient? or is 
that an extra permission that must be granted? [proceeds to clarify 
with Designer P how it is currently designed] 
Designer P:  I think the idea was that we have a requirement from Client B to 
support family relationships in general -- but that might not imply 
that they've agreed to share their personal health information with 
the family members. I know that's a separate step in a lot of health 
scenarios but I’m not sure to be honest -- CTO will probably chime 
in when he wakes up :) 
While Designer P was aware that the situation might be more complex than imagined, he 
did not bother trying to understand the situation. The iOS Designer, on the other hand, 
questioned, and hypothesized alternative use cases. The iOS Designer sought to figure out 
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what exactly a family member would do with that read access to the HealthCom software. 
Would they try to input the task completion data on behalf of the patient on the software? 
For example, a son who helped his father with the medications may try to enter that 
information on the software on behalf of his father. The CTO, Chief Designer, and 
Designer P discussed, briefly, different hypothetical use cases. Because HealthCom was 
going to be the first among similar software to offer this feature, simplification was 
possible:  
 
CTO:  Anyway, it's just to model that; may come up in future 
functionality. I think that's a good question. I might imagine that a 
family member would just see a list of the patients they can see, 
rather than doing a search, or something. 
iOS Designer:  Yeah, it’s a pretty different overall UI paradigm though 
CTO:  Yeah. I think the general line of thinking is that "friends and 
family" might open some interesting new experiences on the 
mobile side. What those experiences are, I don't know how much 
anyone has thought about it. 
iOS Designer:  Yeah, sounds like we might need a brainstorming session :) 
In the initial stages of designing the ShareMyCare feature, the designers recognized that 
there was ambiguity and unknowns about how to operationalize the feature. Instead of 
engaging with the unknowns by brainstorming possibilities or questioning decisions, the 
attention was on the ability of the design to meet existing use cases, as opposed to imagined 
use cases or use cases with lower probabilities.  
Overall, the exchanges above demonstrated the designers’ use of simplification and 
their lack of desire to know what to design. Instead of being constrained by the unknowns, 
the iOS Designer embraced it and took it as an opportunity to brainstorm how to design a 
better feature. The CTO agreed with the need to understand how patients anticipated using 
the ShareMyCare feature but believed that this discussion could be postponed with no 
repercussions for the design.  
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In a less severe scenario, the designers also limited the scope of functionality 
delivered for each feature to minimize the effort required to create the feature, while 
meeting the overall requirements of the clients. For instance, in the design of the 
SecuredMessaging app, while the feature was supposed to allow patients and nurses to send 
file attachments and messages to each other, the iOS Designer suggested to the Chief 
Designer to simplify the requirements for version 1.0 of the SecuredMessaging feature:  
 
iOS Designer:  For 1.0, I am leaving out file attachments. This includes audio and 
photos. Is that ok? Seems like we can add photos in an update. 
Chief Designer: I think it’s okay, but we should definitely plan for it as a potential 
near-term feature 
iOS Designer:  Sure. It feels like we need to find the smallest Minimum Viable 
Product we can, as this feature is super-complex. 
Chief Designer: I agree, 
iOS Designer:  Ship quick and iterate 
This is a typical discussion in which the designers, in attempts to meet the client’s deadline, 
chose to reduce the scope of the functionality for the design product. Simplifying would 
give them more time to meet the deadline and allow them to learn more about the 
requirements for that feature over time, while limiting the upfront investment of attention 
and allocation. The typical conclusion to these design discussions was often that “we can 
revisit this later, if we find out that patients or users have the need for this.” The decision 
was to reduce their upfront investment in the design process.  
5.3 COUPLING DESIGNS  
Coupling refers to the tightening of interdependencies between design components 
(such as modules and subsystems). Coupling actions meant a departure from designing the 
components as loosely coupled software (a best practice in software design). The 
HealthCom software comprised features, such as secured messaging or task editors, that 
were had to be accessible through organization-branded iOS or Android applications or 
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web portals. The features that are designed had to be supported on multiple platforms (e.g. 
iOS, Android, web), and thus, warranted the creation of modules and subsystems to support 
the features. The findings indicated that loose coupling was not always desirable among 
the designers, given their constraints. Instead, the findings suggest that designers adopted 
coupling in the design process to reduce the upfront investment of attention and resources 
in the design of specific features.  
The tightening of interdependencies is best illustrated through the following two 
examples. In the first example, which deals with the medication adherence feature design 
in Section 5.1, the designers chose to design a feature not as a separate feature, but to 
expand an existing feature to include the new functionality. They decided to alter the 
existing task feature to accommodate a medication task type that could better support 
dosage complexities and enhanced (local) reminders on smartphones. While it required the 
rewriting of code in the software, the designers believed that this would improve the user 
experience for complex medication regimens and establish the foundation for alternative 
care plans in the future. Integrating the medication adherence feature into the existing task 
feature, would also reduce the design resources needed to create a separate medication 
adherence feature. It also had limitations for the future adaptability of the medication 
adherence feature, since it became constrained by the capabilities of the task feature.  
In the second example, the designers were concurrently developing the 
SecuredMessaging feature and the ShareMyCare feature. The SecuredMessaging feature 
allowed nurses and patients to communicate through the HealthCom software, whereas the 
ShareMyCare feature allowed patients to invite other caregivers, such as family members, 
to view the tasks prescribed. In trying to figure out how to administer the user invitations 
functionality in the ShareMyCare feature, the CEO offered suggestions for a sufficient 
design for version 1.0 of the feature. He asserted, “Recall that we attacked this feature 
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because it was deemed to be low hanging fruit. Let's keep scope trimmed so our 
engineering ROI doesn't get lopsided. There's always time to make things better, especially 
when we have customer requirements driving it down the road. [Asks more questions about 
the feature] Perhaps [additional functionality] is something we postpone until version 1.0 
is delivered.” The Chief Designer concurred: 
 
Good feedback. I think your comment around Invitations may mean we should 
consider an Inbox-based approach like LinkedIn – which can be expanded upon 
later for other important messages or alerts… ..  
[Provides his feedback about the design alternatives] 
 
Separately, a conversation with [the CTO] about alerts and other software- level 
feedback drives me toward the Inbox pattern. Inboxes are familiar to almost every 
human being. It can allow someone to accept an invite or just let it linger - giving 
them more flexibility. … and can be expanded down the road as we support 
things like threshold alerts, messaging, etc.  
 
The example showed how the designers saw ways in which SecuredMessaging and 
ShareMyCare features could be tightly coupled. By creating the inbox to support user 
invitations, the designers are, in effect, creating the architecture for an inbox for secured 
messages and other forms of notifications that could be designed later. The coupling of the 
features was a result of the designers’ reframing and simplification of the design 
requirements.  
The coupling of features together was often the simplified and quicker way of 
creating the features, while allowing the designers to meet the clients’ requirements. 
However, by coupling the features, it limited the adaptability of the feature in the future. 
The CTO described: 
 
We built [the invitations in the ShareMyCare feature] in a way that was really a 
very traditional, [Create, Update, Delete] application. Just simple database calls, 
like really simple. We reached a point where, when we were working with [Client 
E] where they wanted the patient invitation feature to do a lot more stuff. The 
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architecture we had for it, the design we had for it, however you want to think 
about it, was just not going to work.  
Recall that the ShareMyCare feature was first designed for Client B. A later client, Client 
E, had different demands for the ShareMyCare feature that led to the need to rewrite the 
code. Consequently, the coupling that occurred upfront resulted in path dependencies in 
design decisions and limitations in combinations of modules in the future, since the 
functions of user invitations and secured messages became more tightly linked than 
necessary.  
In an earlier example, simplifying the relationships in the design of care plans 
meant creating more tightly coupled software. The CTO’s decision was to not “read too 
much into the relationships between disease states and therapies. Which may turn out to be 
an overall weakness of the design. There are some things here we don't know.” Even though 
the designers made the relationships more tightly coupled than required, the CTO did not 
view the decision as problematic. The iOS Designer replied, “Well, I’m just trying to figure 
out how to model the app for [version 1]. We can change it later, but the more you change 
the model later the more than sucks since you have to write a bunch of upgrade code.” 
Instead of discussing the potential typologies of care plans and disease states, the CTO 
viewed the consideration of the interdependencies as redundant and postponed it. The iOS 
Designer conversely recognized that coupling these relationships would limit the 
adaptability of the software in the future. It would create difficulty in separating the 
components or changing the designs in the future. 
One of the key reasons why coupling was possible in this context was because of 
the malleable nature of interdependencies, given the novel design. The novel software 
requirements had ambiguous requirements and users. The interdependencies between the 
features was, therefore, subject to the interpretation and imagination of the designers. The 
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malleable interdependencies create opportunities for design, such as the ability to transfer 
costs across modules to allow the designers to overcome the constraints faced or to engage 
in coupling. For example, in the design of secured messaging and the management of user 
invites for ShareMyCare, the malleable interdependencies and ambiguous nature of the 
novel software enabled the designers to combine these two functionalities and to reuse code 
in the design process.  
5.4 POSTPONING INVESTMENT OF TIME AND RESOURCES IN DESIGN 
Postponing referred to the delaying of attention and resource allocation to design 
alternatives upfront. Postponing was frequently used in the HealthCom due to the time 
constraints, pressures to design features to meet revenue targets. The ambiguity in quality 
of product and novelty of the software also provided opportunities to postpone design, as 
the designers could deliver a product with lower quality and conserve design resources. 
Postponing also occurred, as the designers faced uncertainty regarding the future client 
characteristics in the search for a product market fit and thus did not want to over-customize 
their designs unnecessarily for any specific client type.   
5.4.1 Postponing Until the Client Needed the Design 
The first key form of postponing resulted from postponing investment until the 
design was needed to execute a contract with the client. For example, in the design of 
patient notes, which allowed patients to journal and record comments about the tasks in the 
software, the CEO suggested that they remove the function from the user interface for 
version 1.0. He justified, “Patient note is not actually a customer requirement at this point 
in time, and furthermore, we're not doing anything with that data for another 1-2 months 
because the dashboard isn't yet built.” Even though the functionality could be helpful to 
patients or nurses, there was no value to HealthCom in offering the feature. Therefore, they 
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chose not to invest resources in its design. The iOS Designer agreed, “Sounds fine to me, 
but in the end, this is the kind of thing that a client might demand, but until they do demand 
it, kill it.” The iOS Designer recognized the time constraints they faced with creating a 
working software for Clients-Investors C and A and agreed that the notes function would 
be of lower priority.  
The postponement was often decided by the CEO, CTO, Chief Designer, or the 
Customer Liaison, who had frequent interactions with client intermediaries. They helped 
the designers with the prioritization which features to design now or in the future. For 
instance, she responded to the CTO and the Chief Designer, “Yeah, entering a name was 
not part of the [Business Requirements Document] nor the prototype [Client A] reviewed. 
I can see the argument for a checkbox. Otherwise, agree we punt until future.” Client A 
had signed a business requirements document stating that in exchange for increased 
revenue, the HealthCom software had to be able to capture the signature of a nurse making 
changes to a care plan, and/or confirm administration of treatment. In the design 
specifications, the Customer Liaison stated that having a field for the name of the nurse 
was not part of the agreed upon list, nor was it on the prototype (screenshot) that Client A 
reviewed and approved. As a result, it was acceptable to use a workaround solution for the 
time being, since it would allow them to postpone investment in design. 
5.4.2 Postponing and Iterating in the Future 
The second form of postponing was to delay the investment of design resources for 
now, with the expectation of reviewing the design and iterating in the future. For instance, 
in the following conversation, the designers were discussing the problems with the 
appointments and tasks features. Because the tasks were tied to the appointment date, these 
two features were tightly coupled. Patients often had to complete certain tasks pre-or post-
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surgery or treatment (such as the appointment date). Even though in the testing stage, the 
designers were not consistently getting the right tasks, the designers decided to postpone 
attention and resource allocation to this problem:  
 
CEO:  We'll sort this after version 1.0 is fully feature complete & stable. 
Chief Designer: Cool, the wormhole opened, and my future tasks came through. 
CTO:  That's a much bigger discussion. Contemplate the reliability and 
maintainability implications of a client that can create the past or 
the future on its own. 
Even though the design decisions had consequences for reliability and clinical implications 
for the users, the designers accepted a compromised quality of the feature for now, with 
the expectation that they would return to fix it after the first version of the software was 
fully completed. Even though the defect could require redesign in the future, the designer's 
attention was on the client’s deadline and promised design product, while postponing 
allocation of resources to the design.  
Postponement occurred even though there were threats to security, as well as legal 
ramifications. As highlighted in the earlier example regarding ShareMyCare permissions, 
the iOS Designer felt that the existing design of permissions was inadequate and exposed 
the firm to legal threats. The Chief Designer responded, “But we're not rewriting at this 
junction, that's my point..” He further challenged the iOS Designer, “and you're proposing 
what exactly? That we miss our [Client I’s] 400 employee rollout and 8000 employee 
rollout Oct. 15th, to rewrite a problem that doesn’t really exist at this junction?” The Chief 
Designer elaborated that the problems in the design were inconsequential at that point and 
would be best addressed at a future (unidentified) time. The Chief Designer, CEO, and 
CTO often talked about “starting with [something] and iterating” from there. For example, 
in response to the debate about the ‘Share my Care’ feature, the Chief Designer said, “If 
we need to better support the idea of relationship down the road, we can.” Although the 
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Chief Designer was unwilling to make the modification, he acknowledged the iOS 
Designer’s concerns and suggested postponing the change.  
However, there was often little iteration. The lack of iteration was best articulated 
by the iOS Designer at the firm who said, “[The goal is to] get things out quickly, learn 
more about the feature and go back later and reiterate. But we never ended up going back 
to do things differently. The idea is that we potentially could.” When I talked to the team 
about measuring use of the ShareMyCare feature, the CTO asserted that they did not think 
that use of the feature was high. There was thus no need to waste time analyzing use since 
it was a marketable feature. Therefore, the designers did not invest resources to better 
understand their users’ requirements for the feature. With the financial pressures, there was 
a shift in the design approach to focus on minimal investments that generated revenue from 
emerging opportunities.  
5.5 THE DESIGN PRODUCT 
5.5.1 Disposability of the Design Product 
Disposability referred to the short-lived nature of the product. The product was 
meant to be discarded and redesigned in the future. Because designs were viewed as 
disposable, designers often adopted coupling and postponing actions in the design process. 
The designers thus postponed investments in quality by using workarounds that did not 
resolve the problem and further shortened the longevity of the design. As the designers 
have described, they viewed the product as temporary software that enabled the startup to 
capture clients and grow its digital business. There resulted in a feedback loop.  
The disposability of the software was also demonstrated by the example regarding 
the ShareMyCare user invitations that the designers created in conjunction with the 
SecuredMessaging feature. The designers chose to couple these features together. After 
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securing Client E, who eventually acquired HealthCom, they had to adapt the user 
invitation inbox to cater to Client E’s requirements. As the CTO described: 
 
The existing design just wasn't very flexible. It would have taken a ton of work to 
make it work... Basically we would have had to rebuild a whole bunch of stuff we 
already had, features that actually existed [that] we would have had to build into 
the patient invitation functionality. It was easier to basically throw all the existing 
code away and redesign invitations as sort of an aspect of creating a patient. 
Many similar examples reinforced the idea that the design product would be disposable 
since an investment of design resources could be redundant. If they had initially designed 
the user invites component with a more loosely coupled approach, it would have increased 
the flexibility of the code and reduced the need to redesign the software in the future. The 
problem was that this need may not have materialized. The previous design might have 
sufficed, and the investment of time and resources would have been wasted. Therefore, 
given the novelty of the design and the constraints faced by the designers, the decision was 
to create the product in a more disposable fashion.  
While the design was adequate for the client, it was not intended to be robust or to 
scalable. In the case of HealthCom, it was expected that the design would be improved, or 
completely redesigned in the future. It was necessary for the HealthCom designers to 
design what the client wanted in the design product. As the Chief Designer contended, 
“Build it as cheaply as possible, put it out there. If it is bad, put it down. If it does work but 
maybe if you know that the reason is not working is for these reasons, fix it.” The belief 
among the designers was that the design would not be long-lasting. The designers often 
actively lowered the software quality levels to what they felt was adequate for the clients. 
In this way, they did not have to commit more resources to existing requirements, in case 
they changed in the future. As the CTO described in an interview:  
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Probably just with some boards, you can probably put together a room with a roof 
pretty quickly. It may be pretty hard to add another room…The cost is basically 
the upfront cost and the benefit is that down the road, you can move more 
quickly. The problem for a startup in particular is that you want to see that first 
room as fast as humanly possible. In some cases, you're willing to ... just throw 
the whole room away and start over again rather than spend the time to really plan 
out the room. Because maybe it turns out that your fundamental conception of the 
room was just totally wrong. If you don't know where you're going, it's really hard 
to build the right thing to get you there  
As mentioned previously, the rules of the game for a startup dictate having to produce 
software quickly and to increase revenue. It was acceptable for designs to be thrown out 
and rewritten. If the conceptualization of the requirements by the clients or the designers 
were initially incorrect, this would avoid wasted upfront design cost. As the CTO 
explained, “[H]ow do we know when we are done? How do we know when this feature is 
right?” Ambiguity of requirements made it hard to evaluate quality, which could result in 
resources allocated to improving quality being wasted. 
5.5.2 Speed in the Design Product  
Speed referred to the ability of HealthCom to quickly design and deploy updated 
versions of the software to clients. Particularly, during the search for a product-market fit, 
HealthCom was in the exploratory stage. The flexibility and speed in responding to these 
opportunities was important, as opportunities, such as government reimbursement 
initiatives, emerged based on initiatives in the larger healthcare industry over the three 
years. The designers departed from designing customized solutions for specific client needs 
and instead viewed customization as inhibiting HealthCom’s ability to market to different 
client types.  
For instance, as the earlier example of the web dashboard for Client B showed, 
because the dashboard was conveyed as a deal breaker, the designers resorted to 
simplifying the requirements. They adopted a workaround to enable the designers to 
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leverage the existing nurse dashboard for the patient use case. For HealthCom, in the early 
stages, the alternative was to not design the feature and: 1) lose the revenue, 2) miss the 
opportunity to grow in this market segment in the future, and 3) lose credibility in front of 
the investor who introduced them to Client B. Being able to capture this new opportunity 
would increase revenue, which would reduce the uncertainty for HealthCom. It also 
increased the likelihood of HealthCom raising additional funding, since it made progress 
towards meeting investors’ targets for sales and contracts. As a result, the designers chose 
to design the features quickly to capture the opportunity.  
 Because of the need for speed to capture emerging business opportunities, the 
designers adopted simplifying, coupling, and postponing actions that allowed the 
HealthCom designers to achieve speed in creating the design product. Simplifying 
requirements meant not having to design for the complex relationships that really existed, 
which increased the speed of creating the design. Coupling allowed for the reuse of codes 
as designs were more tightly coupled, which further increased the speed. The additional 
investment of design resources was also postponed until needed. These design actions led 
to a conservation of design effort and time and increased the speed in delivery of software 
to clients:  
 
The velocity for that is awesome, because any feature you're building can just 
reach in and touch any data and reuse any code and do anything from anywhere 
else. You get big ball of mud, spaghetti code, whatever. It has this advantage of 
huge velocity, but at some point, you realize that it actually hurts your velocity 
because you've reached the point where any change essentially is changing 
everything by implication…  
 
For a startup, it's probably closer to the big ball of mud. You don't really want to 
do that. You want to have it structured such that you can back out in the other 
direction as you get more time and resources, but you don't want to be so far over 
towards the highly abstracted curve that you can't onboard new people quickly, 
make changes quickly. Both of them get you to the exact same place, where you 
can't have velocity, but they happen for different reasons at different times. 
  132 
The designers implemented processes that enabled the faster delivery of software. There 
was a preference for reduced discussions among the designers because greater participation 
meant lower efficiency. There was also a preference for fast, but a more tightly coupled 
and reduced scope, approach to design. As the CTO explained above, the tradeoff was 
velocity gains in the short-term versus velocity losses in the long-run due to redesign. 
However, the designers’ focus was on firm performance in the immediate future, and often 
believed that the future redesign could be easily done with additional resources that could 
be hired from the funding received. 
The preference for quick design solutions was illustrated by the designers’ 
responses to defects or clients’ requests. For instance, there was a last-minute workaround 
among the designers to meet an eleventh-hour requirement from Client A. Client A wanted 
their nurses to be able to retrieve the record of a patient without any categories or care plan 
assigned, so that they could assign them categories. The CTO checked with the iOS 
Designer about the existing implementation on the mobile application and the error that 
would result:  
 
CTO:  [explains the workaround solution] That's currently not allowed 
in the software but is an 11th hour [Client A] requirement for 
Monday. Designer P is working on it. 
Chief Designer: I added a quick and dirty way we can change patient care plans 
and categories. this is on an individual basis and obviously not 
meant for changing groups of patients around 
Because Client A wanted this requirement prior to their implementation for Monday, the 
designers were trying to figure out a solution on Thursday evening. Designer P was trying 
to figure out how to incorporate this requirement and create a reasonable user experience 
for the patient. The Chief Designer added a quick fix to the design to allow nurses to change 
patients’ care plans individually, which would not work if the nurse had to manage a 
considerable number of patients, which would be the case for Client A. The function as 
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designed would cause inconvenience. On the surface, the quick workaround solution was 
adequate for being able to claim that it was possible for the nurse to make changes as 
requested, albeit only for one patient at a time.  
5.5.3 Limited Adaptability of the Design Product 
The cumulative design actions led to a design product that had limited adaptability. 
By limited adaptability, the product could accommodate incremental changes but was 
limited in the flexibility to accommodate more changes or to scale. The design products 
must allow the firm to be adaptable because of the emergent requests from clients as the 
digital business grows. As a HealthCom investor described: 
 
The CEO pivoted from their initial design because [of my feedback]. I’ve also 
brought him opportunities to talk with people that have ended up buying his 
product, and he’s had to pivot again to meet the needs of that customer... they 
need the capital, and they need the credibility in the customer list. 
To keep up with the clients’ requirements and the investors’ expectations for growth, 
designers had to constantly create new features or adapt the existing features to 
accommodate the requirements of new clients. The adaptable nature of software designs is 
an affordance of the general modular architecture of software. The designs can be expanded 
upon and coupled together to create new functions. The designers reused existing code and 
coupled to achieve other unintended functionalities. In the case of HealthCom, they 
leveraged the existing designs to expand the scope of features. For instance, in the case of 
the medication adherence feature discussed early, the designers chose to expand the 
existing task feature to include medication adherence. The existing code, to a certain extent, 
was adaptable and could help the designers meet client requests promptly. As the 
requirements grew with new clients, the decision to couple features together, as in the case 
of the medication adherence feature, could become limited. For instance, the Android 
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Designer said in response to the emergent nature of requirements in the design of the 
medication adherence feature: 
 
Even if you start out with a really nice medication adherence module, right? I 
mean the problem is inevitably you say, "Oh, great. Take one pill every two 
days." So, you just do one and two and that's the data you store: one pill, two 
days, every 24 hours or whatever. Oh, but this is an injection and then you say, 
"Well 300 milliliters every two days." And then someone says, "Oh but then you 
run out of needles every week and half."  
While the initial interpretation of the designs might suffice, as the software becomes 
marketed to heterogeneous clients’ new requirements may be received. The software 
becomes more tightly coupled as designers start to include new functionality in the existing 
software. As a result, it is not very modularized anymore because of the need for 
HealthCom to quickly meet client requirements. 
 Therefore, even though the design should remain adaptable to facilitate the 
capturing of business opportunities, in reality, the adaptability of the HealthCom software 
was limited. The software had been constructed in tightly coupled ways. Incremental 
changes to adapt to requirements were possible. Over time, changes, particularly bigger 
design changes, could become increasingly difficult because of the design actions 
undertaken when viewing the design as disposable. As the Android Designer described: 
 
I could write a fancy thing, or I could just jump in straight away. You always just 
go with the jump in straight away because you don't even know what's better at 
the time. But, inevitably what happens is that happens 25 times and all of the 
sudden you can't pull these two things apart.  
Because design actions enabling speed were preferred, the result was for the designer to 
jump into the design, instead of thinking it through and creating a design that was more 
holistic and modularized. The decision to design more tightly coupled software meant that 
the design was hard to untangle. It was similar to the “ball of spaghetti” described by the 
CTO.  
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The following is another example that highlighted the limitations of the existing 
software design over time. When the iOS Designer, Android Designer, Web Designer O, 
and CTO were in discussion about the changes to the API and the possibility of breaking 
it into more manageable code, the designers varied in their responses. The Web Designer 
questioned how the APIs would be used and suggested that perhaps some of the existing 
code could be removed. The designers at this point found the patient end points to be 
complex and difficult to manage. It would be ideal to get rid of it. It would require major 
redesign on the part of all the designers given the existing design.  
 
CTO:  At this point, we're probably stuck. If we could all agree that 
you must make a separate API call for anything that's different 
about a user versus a patient, we could make a transition...the 
problem I had was that they are so different you must do 
something ugly somewhere. 
Web Designer O: Ahh. That explains this pattern 
CTO:  I'm open to proposals...truly. I chose to push the ugliness into 
someone else's code. I understand why this is not popular. 
Hence the openness to proposals. 
Web Designer O: [He evaluates the situation and concludes] So unless there is 
work yet to be done, I’d say leave it 
CTO:  [Explains changes that would need to be done] If we could unify 
around a usable base concept for a "user" I'm pretty open to 
revision…sometime. Yeah... there are a bunch of things I wish 
were different. Unfortunately, none of them are the kinds of 
things the fixing of which will yield a nicer car for any of us. 
iOS Designer:  Warm fuzzies > nicer car 
CTO:  You say that now, when you can't smell the new car smell. 
Despite recognizing that this current design was limited in adaptability and would not be 
sustainable (i.e. difficult to maintain) in the long-run, it was not something they had the 
resources to resolve at this present moment. Thus, the CTO postponed investment of design 
effort in fixing this code until a real need arose. As he said, fixing the code would not 
translate to any financial returns for him nor the designers, and was thus, not worth the 
time. To make sure that he and his designers did not waste time building things that did not 
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solve a real problem or lead to “a nicer car,” the CTO acknowledged his constraints with 
the existing design and the resulting helplessness.  
5.5.4 Spartan Nature of the Design Product 
The design product was spartan in functionality, which meant that the product’s 
functionality was limited in scope and sophistication. In HealthCom, the design product 
was always a simplified interpretation of the requirements. They captured the essence of 
the functionality required by the client but were limited in scope because they did not 
reflect the complex use cases that occurred. For instance, because of constraints (such as 
the availability of the designer), the designers could end up designing the feature only on 
the iOS and Android platforms but not on the web platform. For instance, the designers 
would limit the options on the feature, such that the design would work only for a limited 
use case, or if the patient clicked on the right keys. 
 
Chief Designer: So, what you propose is... if a patient suffers from Disease X and 
takes [Therapy Y], they should see the same [Therapy Y] 
treatment plan as the a [Disease Z] patient? 
CTO:  My original proposal was that a patient with [Disease X] and 
[Therapy Y] *could* have a different care plan than a patient with 
[Disease Z] and [Therapy Y]. With the constraint that for now 
there is only one care plan for [Disease X] and [Therapy Y]. … At 
present, it supports the possibility of being associated with 
multiple disease states and therapies. I haven't thought very 
deeply about that; I believe the consideration would be trying to 
get reuse out of care plans, so they don't have to be completely 
copied. 
These were artificial constraints imposed in the design, such as “one care plan for each 
combination for disease and therapy” that was not reflective of the reality of healthcare. 
However, designers often argued that limited options in the early versions of the design 
product would suffice. The design could be rewritten when the need for more complex use 
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cases arose. Simplifying and reframing the requirements led to a software that failed to 
meet the requirements of the user over time.  
The consequences of the spartan nature of the design became evident when 
HealthCom managed to sign on three major clients, all of whom required the Chief 
Designer to rethink the software design. Existing use of the software was poor. By 
designing the features in a spartan manner without paying attention to the users and their 
requirements for the features, use of the software has been low. As a result, the spartan 
software design would inhibit the ability to sustain financial performance over time. The 
Chief Designer announced at the product meeting:  
 
[T]he next 3 customers are banner accounts for us. This is our cue to not screw 
things up. What is more concerning being that the whole thing is emphasizing 
patient engagement, which as you know is one of the hardest things and one of the 
things that we undermine it the most, given that we are a sales-oriented 
organization ... And so, moving forward, 100% of my time will be dedicated to 
product management and understanding utilization of features and trying to do 
better at just specifying features in general. 
 The Chief Designer acknowledged that to date, as an organization, the focus had been on 
meeting the funding-related goals. Now that they had signed on three major clients, the 
problems related to the quality of the software and the actual design flaws needed to be 
addressed for the funding to materialize. As seen in the earlier sections, the focus was on 
increasing the number of features, as opposed to attention on how the features are supposed 
to function, as the designers often reframed and simplified the requirements to minimize 
the attention and resource allocation upfront. HealthCom’s focus on designing a plethora 
of features reflected the intention to quickly capture revenue-generating opportunities and 
to gain access to more funding with the caveat that in the future the software would be 
improved. 
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The attention of the designers was not on eliciting accurate user requirements for 
software, but in creating many features with spartan functionality that did not work as well. 
The cofounders recognized that the poor use levels of Client D and B would not be able to 
withstand the scrutiny of the bigger clients once they began using the software. The feature 
needed to produce real-life improvements in healthcare delivery and changes in patient 
engagement. These major clients would be evaluating the HealthCom software on quality-
related metrics. Given the reputation of these clients, performing well on these metrics 
would improve the marketability of the HealthCom software. Their lack of desire to invest 
resources and attention upfront to these elements of design meant that they were now faced 
with spartan designs that did not really meet the needs of the user.  
5.5.5 Vulnerability of the Design Product 
The design products were vulnerable. The product had high technical debt. Because 
of postponing the investment of design resources, as highlighted in Section 5.4, the 
software designed accumulated technical debt that was not addressed. Compromised 
quality decisions and tightly coupled interdependencies meant that there was the need for 
future redesign. For example, in the HealthCom case, every deployment of the designs to 
the production server was always defect-ridden. The designers were up to midnight or the 
early hours of the morning trying to resolve defects and error messages because the 
components that were designed were not compatible.  
To meet the financial-directed deadlines, the designers compromised quality, for 
example, by employing interns and contractors. The designers knew that the decisions 
compromised the quality of the final design. For instance, in the design of the web 
dashboard, the CTO and Chief Designer engaged contractors in order to get the design 
done quickly. The patient web dashboard was a requirement of Client B, and as the CTO 
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said, “The original architecture of the dashboard is not that good, ... You know we hired a 
contractor to build it. I don’t think it’s built as well as it could have been built.” Part of this 
was also because the CEO, Chief Designer, and CEO did not believe the web dashboard 
was a feature the clients needed given their goal to target large clients with their own health 
IT software. The following is a discussion about the web dashboard defects and the 
resources that were needed to fix it:  
 
CTO:  We also have a lot of technical debt in the dashboard 
CEO:  Is that the fault of the contractor guy? 
Chief Designer: I think most of that got worked out and it’s just [the contractor] 
not being an expert on [a particular aspect of web design], but he 
just trying to make things work. 
CTO:  So that will be yes 
CEO:  How much did that actually cost us? We got a sweet deal from 
that guy, so I’m just wondering if we are on the upside of our 
investment? 
Chief Designer: It got us where we needed to be. 
CTO:  It’s hard to evaluate that right, because we needed it done and he 
was our only option. But certainly, it’s added a couple of months 
of work for [Web Designer O] at least. 
Chief Designer: But I wouldn’t say that it’s [the contractor’s] fault, would you? 
CTO:  But he wrote the thing 
Chief Designer: Yeah but… 
In the discussion above, the CEO was focused on trying to determine the appropriateness 
of the decision of the quality compromises. Quality or financial implications of the decision 
could not be evaluated post hoc because the alternative was not getting Client B’s contract. 
Although the contractor was not as skilled at web design, he was the only resource they 
could find on a short notice to design the web dashboard for Client B. Therefore, it was 
hard to figure out if the quality compromise was worthwhile because they had to look to 
the short-term to meet the client’s deadline. As the CTO said, “In the end, the thing you 
can deliver now is probably worth more than the thing you deliver in 6 months and wait 
for it to be perfect. It’s one of those things that is different about [selling to] enterprise.” 
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The CTO accepted the fact that having to sell to businesses and meet investors’ 
expectations meant focusing on creating design products that met the clients’ deadlines and 
requirements. The CTO explained how the web dashboard was a bootstrapped design that 
was put together at the request of Client B. They had not intended it to be patient facing. It 
was supposed to have been a temporary solution for nurses to configure the care plans until 
they could be integrated into the healthcare provider’s electronic medical record. As a 
result, the web dashboard was a hodge-podge of code that did not function well together.   
The focus on the designs that would improve financial performance drove decisions 
to focus on new features that would increase revenue generated from clients. The tension 
was articulated by another platform engineer, who said, “Generally, [these backend 
technical designs] stay in the low priority bucket until they become critical.” Prioritization 
of resources for iterations and integration was not observed across the data sources of 
observations, interviews, or chat transcripts. For instance, as one of the platform designers 
confirmed:  
 
So, the site will be slow, or [the nurses] won't be getting their notifications or 
something along those lines. Meanwhile, alerts and emails and all kinds of things 
are firing off into our inboxes. We're staying up night after night trying to figure 
out how to solve the problem. That's usually how it sorts of gets from, "Well, we 
sort of anticipate it a little bit." to then all of the sudden, the sky is falling, and we 
need to fix it. That's been true almost every startup I've been at where you sort of 
know when you build something that it has a certain life span in it. Yeah. It's 
always a balancing act between “do I build this for tomorrow" or “do I build this 
for today?” 
The other issue, as mentioned previously, was that investment in resources in the reduction 
of technical debt could not always be justified given the need to design features to meet 
clients’ deadlines. For example, the CTO said,  
 
You got to start thinking about whether, “Do I care [about the slow performance]? 
What about this other thing that takes 2 seconds? It’s not terrible, but it’s not 
great. You know. Is that thing now that is 2 seconds – when I have 1 million 
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patients. Is that still going to be 2 seconds? Or is that going to be 200 s? So, for 
e.g. the dashboard, we know that it’s broken [ridden with performance issues]. 
But we don’t have resources to do anything about it. 
As described in the mechanism section, the preference of many designers was to adopt 
quick fixes or “band-aid” solutions that resolved the defects symptomatically but did not 
get at the root of the problem. Cumulatively, this resulted in technical debt over time. 
Instead of focusing on eliminating technical debt, the focus was on the “shiny features” 
described by the Platform Designer L: 
 
Shiny [HealthKit] didn't have anything to do with our customers needed. It made 
us look progressive. That's just an example of [something] that helps with 
marketing. It's something that makes you look more presentable. If you think on a 
scale of functionality versus technical performance, frequently on a feature 
functionality takes primary and performance takes secondary place. 
Consequently, flashy designs and new features were prioritized. They did not contribute to 
the improvement of software performance. For instance, when there was poor use of the 
software among the nurses and patients at Client D (terminated contract) and Client B, the 
designers were not interested in understanding the root causes. The Chief Designer 
contended, “One might argue it has to do with our app, but I would argue it has to do with 
the content [generated by the user].” Instead of trying to fix the content or enhance existing 
features, they built a secured messaging feature in attempts to increase software use. The 
designers believed that building a messaging app would encourage nurses and patients to 
communicate using the software. Software use continued to fall. For instance, with Client 
B, application use fell from 100% to 5% in the first ten weeks.  
5.6 EPILOGUE 
  To provide insight into the outcomes of the firm, I closed my time in the field with 
a series of interviews with the external players. I asked these participants to articulate their 
thoughts about the HealthCom business and design product. I used this exercise to spark a 
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broader discussion of the financial-focused designs that would become an avenue for future 
research. 
5.6.1 Difficulty Getting Contracts with Larger Clients 
With the design product, it was difficult getting contracts with larger clients with 
more stringent evaluation criteria for software quality. For instance, many of the larger 
healthcare providers had a due diligence process during the contract negotiation during 
which their IT teams would visit HealthCom to evaluate the quality of the design code of 
the software they were licensing. One of the major health IT firms interviewed said:  
 
We felt, after evaluating their code and what was actually available in the product 
and the number of resources they had implementing it, that they were a little top 
heavy on management. They lacked the design resources and that there was a 
good percentage of the code on that front end that would need to be rewritten in 
order to conform to a larger audience. 
In this conversation, the client alluded to the difficulties they would face and the work they 
would have to invest in updating the code to make sure that it would be able to serve the 
hundreds of thousands of users the health IT firm was serving. Being able to license the 
software to a major client would be a boost to the funding goals. However, the existing 
design product made it impossible to develop software that would be good enough for these 
clients to license.  
Another prospective HealthCom client similarly recognized the constraints of 
working with a growing startup that faced funding goals. The client spoke to the challenges 
of integration for themselves, “It's not like it's all win and no cost. Besides [losing control 
over] the patient experience, you become less flexible with your own road map. All these 
factors lead us to make the decisions.” There were costs associated with trying to integrate 
and work with HealthCom because it was a software that patients would be using and 
representing the client’s name. Therefore, the combination of losing the control of the 
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patient experience and watching HealthCom defer to other clients in the pursuit of business 
opportunities, did not bode well. As the client explained:  
 
Basically, HealthCom said, "Oh, we'll do whatever you want." What I meant is, 
let's say, for us maybe it wouldn't have been that big of an issue because we were 
probably the biggest client of HealthCom, but let's say they got another really big 
client. They got another really big client and that big clients starts saying they 
should start dictating the road map... At this time, they've taken the road map and 
that road map basically doesn't match with our road map. It doesn't cover the use 
cases that we want to cover. What are we going to do? We're already invested in 
integration. We already pushed all this application and in the launch. To our 
patients. That's the cost to consider. What's going to be my switching cost? 
The client saw how willing HealthCom was in deferring to the client to meet their 
requirements, as it was a publicly listed firm. If HealthCom were to capture this business 
opportunity, it would alleviate HealthCom’s pressures from their funding goals. It would 
also help HealthCom to sell its software to the other clients given the credibility gains. The 
co-founders’ deference to the client also worried them. They recognized that they were 
losing control over the patient facing version of the software, and they might also lose 
control over the design process time should HealthCom work with another bigger client.  
5.6.2 Technical Challenges in Design 
As the conversations throughout the chapters have highlighted, the design product 
created technical challenges in design over time. Because of the quality compromises and 
coupling actions, the designers often had no idea how the interdependencies in the software 
had been designed. Coupling increased technical debt and defects that were difficult to 
troubleshoot. For instance, the night of the deployment of the software, there were major 
defects that would hinder the implementation at the client site the following day. 
 
CTO:   Basically, activation was fully and completely busted, among 
other things. [Describes the problem] Definitely not our finest 
hour. 
Chief Designer:  Well I think this is representative of a lot of misjuggling 
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CTO:  Yeah, a lot of distraction and context switching definitely 
contributed on the engineering side, and I'm sure for other people 
as well. 
Chief Designer:  All good problems we need to figure out but not ones we WANT 
to have as professionals. [Complains about testing vendor they 
have been using] 
Chief Designer:  I agree with resource constraints but want to also make sure we 
don't over-correct. At the end of the day, we haven't had a lot of 
breathing room to test *new* features. [Client C] is now (after 
months) up to just 72 patients and [Client A] barely scratches 50 
patients.  
CTO: That's true; but we're building a product that can accommodate 
vastly larger numbers in a more and more complex software. 
Chief Designer: [Client B] has asked for a lot, to deploy to a lot, without a lot of 
breathing room. I agree 
CTO:  I think we're doing the right things - adding an engineer, maybe 
an implementation person. I don't think we have the signals for 
much beyond that yet. 
 
The impact in the software was a “adequate for now” design that was not necessarily 
coherent nor robust. In the discussion above, the CTO admitted his mis-juggling of the 
design work that was exacerbated by the constraints and Client B’s deadlines. The QA 
vendor they engaged also failed to detect all of the quality issues. The user engagement 
rate was also dismal - Client C had only 72 patients and Client A had only 50 users. The 
low user engagement rate also led to the reduced desire to invest design resources to design 
for the robustness that was needed for a bigger user base. The Chief Designer believed that 
more features would resolve the problem of low software use, without understanding the 
reasons for low use of the software. The conversation also reinforced how the Chief 
Designer and CTO believed that the software quality could be addressed when the firm had 
more resources.  
The CTO also recognized the challenges of the technical limitations of the existing 
software. As the client of the chief health IT described, it would require major redesign. 
Similarly, in response to the interest from another major client, the CTO said, “They were 
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pretty heavy on the enterprise data architecture front. Being on top of our game there is 
going to matter.” He recognized that the weak link in the design of HealthCom was the 
enterprise data architecture. It would require more resources to ensure that it met the 
specifications of the larger firms.  
5.6.3 Impact on the Organization 
Platform Designer L revealed that he did not feel that HealthCom was going to 
succeed. He elaborated on the difficulty HealthCom experienced in getting Series A 
funding and how they could not demonstrate the product market fit that the investors 
wanted. The iOS Designer and Android Designer also left shortly before the end of my 
study. The iOS Designer made significant quality compromises in the design process to 
meet the deadlines. He said:  
 
There wasn’t a ton of discussion. [The Chief Designer] mostly decided what was 
worked on, what would be in each release…Occasionally, [the CEO] would bring 
in requirements from client calls... To be brutally honest, one of the reason I chose 
to [leave HealthCom], Chief Designer controls process and would not let us own 
more of the product and drive product decisions. There were moments I requested 
more control – Chief Designer said I was not meeting with clients, he should hold 
the control. 
Throughout the discussions, the iOS Designer’s perspectives were often not respected. In 
the end, the iOS Designer decided to move to another startup, where he felt that he could 
have more voice in the design process.  
5.6.4 Acquisition 
Despite the quality concerns that were highlighted in the earlier sections, one of the 
intriguing results was that HealthCom was acquired by a major health IT firm eight months 
after the termination of the study. The acquisition is the happily-ever-after that many 
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startup entrepreneurs desire. The CTO credited the sale of HealthCom to his design of the 
software architecture:  
 
In a startup, I think good software architecture almost always takes a back seat to 
rapidity of design and ability to change quickly. I think in a lot of ways, 
HealthCom was over-engineered. I would argue that probably I just too much 
energy into making a pretty good architecture from the beginning.  
 
On the other hand, had I not done that, [Client E] never would have bought us. To 
some extent, they were actually buying that architecture. Probably while it was 
more robust than extensible and clean, particularly initially, it slowed our total 
velocity. I think that the path we were going down, that going down it faster 
probably wouldn't have helped. And it would have hurt, in a sense, because I 
think that we actually would never have been acquired.  
Retrospectively, the CTO believed that the architecture helped facilitate the acquisition, 
although it slowed down the initial growth and design of the software. The comment was 
intriguing, given knowledge of how the software was designed. Two weeks after the 
termination of the study, HealthCom signed contracts with two major clients with whom 
they were in negotiations throughout the duration of the study.  
5.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I explained the design actions: reframing, simplifying, coupling, 
and postponing. Subsequently, the design actions culminated in a design product that was 
disposable, quick to build, limited in adaptability, spartan, and vulnerable. The 
characteristics were a result of design actions to enable the firm to capture the emerging 
business opportunities and improved financial performance. Finally, I closed the chapter 
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Implications, and Future Research 
6.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 
The goal of this dissertation is to understand the research question of:  How does 
the entrepreneurial context in which the startup operates affect the software design process 
and product in the early years? In this chapter, I briefly summarize the major findings from 
the dissertation and triangulate them with the existing literature. I discuss some of the 
theoretical and practical implications that can be drawn from this research.  
6.2 IMPACT OF THE EARLY STAGE ENTREPRENEURIAL CONTEXT ON DESIGN ACTIONS  
The findings suggest that the entrepreneurial context influences attention allocation 
amongst the designers and create tensions between financial and quality-focused designs.  
Time and financial constraints intensify the tensions between financial and quality-focused 
designs. Additionally, the search for the suitable market in a tight time frame throughout 
the early stage entrepreneurial context renders the financial-focused players critical (e.g., 
Nambisan, 2017; Antonopoulos et al., 2014). The salience of the financial-focused players 
and rules of the game have resulted in a prioritization of financial-focused designs over 
quality-focused designs.  
These findings extend the existing literature on software design in entrepreneurial 
firms. Yet, the focus of existing research on design in entrepreneurial context has not been 
examined the impact of attention to financial-focused designs on the software design 
actions and product. Antonopoulou et al. (2016) has examined the use of repurposing, i.e. 
modifying and reusing, code for different business contexts to increase the startup’s ability 
to capture emerging business opportunities. However, the authors do not describe the 
tensions designers face and instead present repurposing as a panacea for designing features 
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quickly for product market search. Repurposing is afforded by the modular architecture of 
software, but as my findings indicate, the designers tend to create more tightly coupled 
designs, which would make repurposing challenging. So how can designers in early stage 
entrepreneurial contexts adopt coupling in ways that provide the flexibility needed to 
support business model exploration?  
My findings also highlight a departure from existing software design practices. The 
software design literature maintains that a typical design process starts with requirements 
analysis, design, testing, maintenance, and revision (Royce, 1970). The proportion of time 
spent in each phase varies, depending on whether it is a plan based or flexible approach 
(e.g. Beck 2001, Royce 1970, Sommerville, 1996). During the analysis phase, designers 
adopting the Waterfall method seek to elicit documenting requirements accurately (e.g. 
Royce, 1970, Sommerville, 1996). My findings show that in the early stage startup, 
designers reframed and simplified the requirements based on the clients’ requirements and 
the designers’ choices. In the design phase, designers using the Waterfall method would 
map the architecture (Royce, 1970), or design prototypes for feedback and analysis in the 
Agile and Lean Startup method (e.g. Beck 2001, Ries, 2011). Conversely, designers in the 
early stage startup adopted coupling and postponing actions and paid little attention to 
software architecture. Lastly, the findings highlighted lack of revision and iteration in the 
early stage startup. The lack of iteration differed from the revision phase in the Waterfall 
method and extensive feedback and learning conducted in Agile and Lean Startup methods. 
The design process in the early stage entrepreneurial context thus suggests extreme 
minimality in the design process.   
Existing research on Agile methods has stressed the lack of rigor in application of 
software design practices (Conboy, 2009; Fitzgerald, 1997). Examining how designers in 
an early stage entrepreneurial setting depart from design practices provides insight into the 
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design actions are undertaken and the rationales for adopting or departing from the 
espoused practices.  
6.3 IMPACT OF THE EARLY STAGE ENTREPRENEURIAL CONTEXT ON THE DESIGN 
PRODUCT  
My findings suggest the creation of an alternative design product in the early stage 
entrepreneurial context. My findings show that attention to scale and robustness in designs 
were not perspectives that were rewarded in the time-constrained, entrepreneurial 
environment. Rather, they were viewed as over-optimization of design quality. Conversely, 
designers viewed compromised quality as a necessary evil in their pursuit of emerging 
business opportunities. These characteristics have been identified by Elbanna and Sarker 
(2016) in their review of designs completed using the Agile method. Elbanna and Sarker 
(2016) find that the short design cycles and prototypes in Agile methods lead to cumulative 
technical debt. However, Tumbas et al. (2017) suggest that early stage startups have little 
technical debt. This contradicts my findings which show that designers compromised 
quality and postponed investments in design that lead to accumulation of technical debt.  
To enhancing the understanding of the impact of the early stage entrepreneurial 
context on the design product, I propose the notion of a digital exoskeleton. I will offer my 
conceptualization of the digital exoskeleton, before delving into the similarities and 
differences between the digital exoskeleton and other design products studied in existing 
research. 
6.3.1 The Exoskeleton and Parallels to Biology and Software Design in 
Entrepreneurial Contexts   
Biology defines the exoskeleton as the external skeleton that supports and protects 
an animal's body (“Exoskeleton,” n.d.).  Like the design product, exoskeletons are rigid 
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and present some limitations to growth. While some organisms can add new materials to 
their shells, exoskeletons often must be shed or molted when outgrown by the arthropod. 
Examples include hermit crab that moves into a new shell when it outgrows the old shell 
or the caterpillar that undergoes a metamorphosis transformation into the butterfly.  
Parallels can be made with the phenomenon of software startup building a software 
and digital business concurrently. The software created by a digital business startup is akin 
to the exoskeleton, where the arthropod is the digital business (startup). As the digital 
business grows, so does the exoskeleton, but only incrementally. The digital business can 
add new features to its software, but as the findings indicate, the design actions have little 
consideration for software architecture and result in a tightly coupled software with limited 
adaptability.  
In the case of a startup, as the digital business unfolds and grows, it reaches a point 
where it outgrows the existing software (i.e., the software becomes too rigid for growth). 
Redesign of the software is needed. The need for a new design has been observed and 
documented in the practitioner literature (Tran and Zhu, 2016), in which evolution of the 
business model led to the need for redesign of the exoskeleton. Information Systems 
scholars have alluded to the need for redesign and changes in design because of the 
technical debt accumulation in the use of Agile methods (Cao et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2010), 
but the impetus for change in design does not arise from business model changes. The 
evolution of the digital exoskeleton is linked to the design of the digital business. The 
startup must hence shed its existing exoskeleton (i.e., design code) to grow its digital 
business.  
While the exoskeleton metaphor does not translate perfectly to the software design 
context, what the startup is building is a digital exoskeleton that is deployed to users. The  
designers see the digital exoskeleton as short lived. The findings highlighted the designers’ 
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expectation that the existing product would be redesigned when they had more resources 
or were required to scale the business and software. The designers expected to build a new, 
larger exoskeleton or, in an extreme case, a complete metamorphosis may have been 
needed to achieve more drastic strategic changes.  
6.3.2 Value of the Digital Exoskeleton 
Designing software as a digital exoskeleton helped the designers meet their 
deadlines. By designing software as disposable, spartan and with limited adaptability, the 
designers could build the design product quickly. The problems with working with a design 
with limited adaptability and high vulnerability were redesign costs incurred in the future. 
The digital exoskeleton reflects a design process that is focused on the short-term financial 
performance with disregard for the impact on quality, as short-term firm performance and 
survival are paramount to the entrepreneurs. Like the exoskeleton that protects the 
arthropod from threats to survival (“Exoskeleton,” n.d.), the digital exoskeleton offers the 
startup protection from failure, by serving as an asset for marketing and revenue generation.  
The existing literature in the software design recommended the use of prototypes 
and MVPs in uncertain contexts. Both of these design methods focus on the design of 
separate features in each prototyping cycle, but do not examine the impact of uncertainty 
on the design of the product as a whole (e.g. Elbanna & Sarker, 2016; Sharkey, 2013). As 
such, like the digital exoskeleton, MVPs and prototypes have high technical debt and are 
thus vulnerable. 
To that end, the digital exoskeleton deviates from the current understanding of 
prototypes and MVPs, in its origin and perception to users. The prototype and MVPs are 
designed for the entrepreneur to learn about the users (Eisenmann et al., 2013; Ries, 2011) 
so as to create a product of value to the users. The findings suggest that designers in the 
  152 
early stage entrepeneurial context are not using the digital exoskeleton to learn about the 
users and their requirements. Instead,  it is used by the startup to increase its own value.  
Additionally, for the user, prototypes are interim products used for feedback and 
communication (e.g. Beck 2001) but the digital exoskeleton is viewed as a working 
software that did not appear to be a temporary software to the user. In HealthCom’s case, 
sensitive patient information was communicated on this vulnerable, disposable digital 
exoskeleton. The vulnerability of the software raises concerns about the tension between 
quality and novelty that could be addressed in future research.  
 
6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY  
6.4.1 Attention Allocation and Design Actions in the Early Stage Entrepreneurial 
Context 
I contribute to the ongoing discussion on software design. Scholars have pointed to 
the interdependencies between design of software and digital business in the 
entrepreneurial context (Antonopoulou et al., 2014, 2016). I highlight a critical difference 
in the salience of the digital business rules of the game for designers in early stage 
entrepreneurial contexts and how it impacts the designers’ attention allocation and actions.  
Firstly, the influence of the investors in the design process was intensified in the 
early stage entrepreneurial setting. Although investors were not directly participating in the 
software design discussions, their influence could be felt through actions, such as the 
withholding of subsequent funding. 
Secondly, existing research has pointed to the differences in designers’ attention 
allocation depending on their roles in designs (e.g. Sawyer, 2001; Lyytinen and Newman 
2015). These roles influence what designers pay attention to and actions they take in the 
  153 
design process (e.g. Austin, 2001; Abdel-Hamid et al., 1989; Lee and Xia, 2010). For 
instance, Sawyer (2001) find that even among designers, they can have different and 
divergent goals that vary across roles. These goals create conflict among the designers and 
the differences are difficult to reconcile (Sawyer, 2001).  
The tension is intensified in the case of designers in entrepreneurial firms who face 
different attention drivers. Unlike the Sawyer (2001) study in which the designers adopt 
single roles, designers in the early stage startups may take on multiple roles (such as 
entrepreneur and software designer). The multiplicity of roles drives the difference in 
salience of attention drivers and affects the designers’ attention allocation and action.  
The designers’ limited attention is pulled between the different attention drivers. In 
large organizations, although designers face budgetary or schedule constraints (e.g. Austin, 
2001; Abdel-Hamid et al., 1989; Lee and Xia, 2010), the work of the design and business 
units are separated. While uncertainty may persist, uncertainty for designers stem from 
design process uncertainty (Lyytinen 2001; Tuomi, 2002), such as the ability to meet 
deadlines and stay within budget. Conversely, designers in startups face uncertainty with 
regards to the product, product-market, design process and survival of the firm. Similarities 
to the early entrepreneurial context may be observed in new product innovation teams in 
large firms, but these design teams are often isolated from the rest of the firm or sheltered 
from the uncertainty with the resources of the parent firm. In contrast, in the early stage 
entrepreneurial context, the designers acutely feel the financial pressures and urgency to 
generate designs that improve financial performance. Uncertainty is heightened 
particularly if the firm is also operating in a nascent market (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005). 
 My findings highlight actions designers have undertaken to work through the 
tensions. The study did not examine the goals of the individual designers and their 
motivations for joining a startup, which may affect how they allocated their attention in the 
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design process. For instance, some designers may not be interested in making quality 
software at all but instead using their skills to make money. Designers in the entrepreneurial 
setting might differ in their design approaches or expectations of quality from those in 
software design teams in large firms. Hence, designers in entrepreneurial settings may be 
more likely to make quality compromises in design. 
 The discussion on attention allocation, tensions and adopted design actions can 
benefit from an understanding of the various intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of 
designers in entrepreneurial settings. 
6.4.2 The Changing Relationship Between Software Quality and Firm Performance  
Adopting the ABV in this dissertation allowed me to systematically analyze the 
attention drivers that originated from various levels of analysis (e.g. organizational or 
environmental) (Ocasio, 1997). The external, internal, and economic factors were observed 
to affect the designers’ attention allocation. While the ABV has shed light on the 
relationship between the design efforts, puzzles remain on the relationship between 
software quality and firm performance.  
Previous IS research has emphasized the need for software designs that meet user 
requirements (Guinan et al., 1998). The pursuit of designs practices that facilitate the 
process of designing for users have motivated research on ways to improve the 
requirements elicitation process (E.g. Iansiti and MacCormack 1997; Banker and 
Slaughter, 200; Guinan et al. 1998).  The need for designers to pay attention to the users 
have also catalyzed research on software design approaches (e.g. plan-based versus 
controlled) to streamline the design process and account for contingencies, such as task 
complexity (e.g. Maruping et al. 2009).  
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Yet, the creation of spartan functions, vulnerable product and lack of user-
centeredness in my findings provide a stark contrast to the research in software design. 
How do we make sense of the relationship between software quality and firm performance? 
This dissertation begins to highlight the designers’ locus of attention throughout the design 
process. When faced with tensions between quality and financial-focused designs, the 
designers’ attention was on the latter. Only in the case where an inferior design product 
would inhibit the pursuit of business opportunities would attention be redirected to quality-
focused designs.  
The findings begin to suggest an alternative view of software design as a means, 
instead of an end (Antonopoulou et al. 2016). Given the attention of the designers on 
revenue target, the software becomes an enabler of funding and thus effort has been 
directed into designs that help designers meet that goal. It likens the designer to a Pied 
Piper of startups, who leverages the design product and its existing portfolio of clients to 
attract more and bigger clients.  
The findings also suggest the need for researchers to consider redefinition of 
metrics upon which the quality of the digital exoskeleton should be defined in the early 
stages of a startup’s life, if the digital exoskeleton’s purpose is to help the startup achieve 
revenue targets.  
6.4.3 Leveraging Chat Transcripts for Insights into the Micro-Processes in Design  
Although research has begun to focus on the work of startup entrepreneurs (e.g. 
Tumbas et al., 2015, 2017; Antonopoulou et al., 2016), this dissertation is one of the first 
that provides fine-grained insights into the decisions and discussions amongst designers. 
This analysis was made possible through the availability of chat transcripts that 
documented daily interactions in real time.  
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Approaching design at the interaction level of analysis can provide deeper insight 
into understanding of the relationship between attention, action and product, without post 
hoc rationalization that is common in interviews. Attention has often been measured 
through text analysis of letters to shareholders or annual reports (e.g. Cho and Hambrick 
2006), but these indirect methods reflect self-serving and retrospective reporting biases 
(Barr 1998; Osborne et al. 2001; Yu, Engleman & Van de Ven, 2005). Use of chat 
transcripts as a data source thus allows for analysis into the messy (Zahra, 2007) and 
nonlinear design process in the entrepreneurial context. 
6.4.4 Limitations of the Digital Exoskeleton 
Lastly, I elaborate on my conceptualization of the digital exoskeleton construct. 
Different constructs were compared and contrasted when trying to label the resulting 
design product. The software was not created to support a firm’s operations, as in the digital 
façade (Tumbas et al., 2015) but instead was the core of the digital business. The design 
product was thus constitutive of the business and designer activities that shaped the digital 
business and the emergence of the eventual software. Constructs, such as scaffolds 
(Orlikowski, 2006) and facades (Tumbas et al. 2015), were explored in my search for a 
construct that captured the essence of the design product.  
These scaffold and digital façade concepts suggest that the function of the software 
in the early years was a temporary support used in the design of the eventual software. It 
is important to note that what HealthCom was designing is not a support but rather a 
working version of the software that was licensed to clients for use in a high-reliability 
context. None of the existing constructs captured the function of the design product as a 
working product that is in use, but yet constantly evolving.  
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The digital exoskeleton introduces risks that would be particularly salient for clients 
in high-reliability settings. While some of the characteristics of digital exoskeletons has 
been acknowledged among the practitioners, a design product, like the digital exoskeleton, 
has received limited attention in academic research (Rakitin, 2001, 2005). The nature of 
the digital exoskeleton goes again software design principle of software quality and user 
centered design processes, as opposed to disposable code that is thrown together with “little 
or no respect for engineering discipline” (Vidgen & Wang, 2009). 
It is important to note that my current conceptualization of the digital exoskeleton 
is relevant only to startups in their early years. During this stage, designers are still 
searching for the appropriate product market fit. The designers feel most strongly the 
tension between financial-focused designs and software quality-focused design. 
Consequently, they adopt the design actions highlighted in this dissertation, which 
culminates in the digital exoskeleton. Beyond this stage, funding received is used to design 
more robust software (Delventhal, 2017) The designers would have the resources to adopt 
the software design methodologies reviewed in Chapter Two and be more user centered, 
or attentive to the quality-focused attention drivers, depending on the organization’s stage 
of life (Adizes, 1979). 
6.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
6.5.1 Implications for Designers  
Designers in early startups need to recognize the limitations of espoused software 
design methods and to identify the relevance of these practices for their design process and 
context. The ability of the digital exoskeleton to continue to help the startup meet revenue 
targets may be short lived. Vulnerability in the digital exoskeleton may eventually inhibit 
the startup’s exploration and exploitation of the market opportunities. Thus, designers 
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should recognize the need to balance the benefits of the postponing investment in design 
with its costs over time.  
6.5.2 Implications for Scaling 
Attention needs to be allocated to the pursuit of these quality related designs, or 
else the quality of the design product may atrophy. Use of flexible design methods, such 
as Agile, has been found to compromise quality over time, as a result of inadequate 
architecture planning, low levels of test coverage (Highsmith & Cockburn, 2001; Boehm, 
2002). Attention away from quality leads to problems with architectural scalability, which 
prevents the achievement of agility (Conboy, 2009).  
The goal of the design actions outlined in this dissertation was to generate new 
features for the capturing of business opportunities. The quality of the design or 
architecture is under-prioritized, as observed by the use of coupling and postponing in the 
design. These design actions exacerbate the intensity of technical debt beyond that 
discussed in traditional software design or Agile design methods (Elbana & Sarker, 2016). 
The shortened timeline and ambiguity in quality further increase the designers’ ability to 
adopt quality compromises, as quality is difficult to evaluate in novel software. Repayment 
of technical debt is also postponed until resources became available in the next round of 
funding. Specifically, the Series A and B funding rounds provide funding that are meant 
for the design of robust and scalable software. However, postponement of attention 
allocation to architecture and coupling will lead to difficulty scaling in the future. The 
digital exoskeleton is thus inappropriate for digital businesses with rapidly expanding user 
bases.  
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6.5.3 Implications for Investors 
The findings can also inform investors about adapting to the rules of the game to 
include quality-related metrics for longer-term investments. The startup growth metrics 
suggest that investors view software design as secondary and as a vehicle for generating 
financial returns for the firm. However, they should recognize the impact of their rules of 
the game on the creation of the digital exoskeleton, and unsustainability of the digital 
exoskeleton over time, as it will inhibit the startup’s ability to exploit opportunities with 
bigger clients. 
6.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.6.1 Relevance in Diverse Organizational Settings  
Startups and entrepreneurs vary in their objectives, opportunity recognition and 
exploitation capabilities, and access to resources (Zahra et al., 2014). All of these factors 
can affect attention allocation in design, the design actions and design product. The 
dissertation has pointed to several contextual factors, such as stages of the firm, 
involvement of financially-oriented players, novel nature of software and ambiguity 
around quality. The dynamics may change in the design of a consumer software. Designing 
software for enterprises in a high reliability context with long negotiation cycles presents 
challenges for early stage startups that are in severe need of continued revenue. Further 
conceptual and empirical development can help disentangle the interactions between the 
contextual factors.  
As researchers build on the findings in this dissertation to identify how attention of 
designers can vary or be directed, researchers can perhaps begin to identify ways in which 
the individual’s actions and firm structure can mediate or moderate the occurrence of 
quality compromises in these settings. Startups in the early years might differ in terms of 
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the organizational culture or power relationships that might be different than those in the 
large companies. For instance, Adizies (1979) described how the founders might be the 
only management body involved in governing the firm during the early years. The 
decisions in startups could be made in a collaborative or hierarchical manner, which would 
shape how attention is allocated. In the case of HealthCom, the cofounders were observed 
to adopt a more hierarchical approach by limiting opportunities for communication within 
the firm about quality-focused issues. Researchers studying attention structures can also 
examine collaborative startups versus hierarchical decision-making to see if one is more 
likely to adopt financial-focused designs compared to the other. Consideration of the 
relationship and dynamics of power within startups and or even beyond the startup (e.g., 
dynamics between the investors and founders) can also shed light on attention allocation 
and the subsequent design actions undertaken.  
6.6.2 Relevance across Stages of the Firm  
The findings on the design actions and digital exoskeleton is relevant only for the 
early years of the startup’s life. During the early years, the focus of the entrepreneur is on 
sales and involves constant experimentation (Adizies, 1979). Different attention structures 
will lead firms to create forms of digital exoskeletons with varying levels of these 
characteristics. One product design is not, ex ante, inherently superior to another, especially 
when evaluated by different players with distinct rules of the game.  
 Future studies could focus on the impact of financial-focused designs for firms in 
the mid- to long-term. Longitudinal methods are necessary to understand the changes over 
time, for instance, if financial-focused design becomes less practiced with resource 
acquisition. Future studies could take into consideration more fine-tuned controls, such as 
the nature of the digital business (e.g., consumer software versus enterprise software), 
  161 
origins or absence of financial-focused attention drivers and whether they lead to variants 
of the digital exoskeleton.  
6.6.3 Assessing the value of the Digital Exoskeleton 
It is also difficult to disentangle the effect of the design actions on performance, 
which is a result of the interaction between the contextual factors and the actions of the 
designers. Future studies using methods, such as multiple case studies or simulation, can 
be used to assess the value of the digital exoskeleton to the startup’s survival. At this 
moment, the ABV does not provide insight into the superiority or inferiority of the digital 
exoskeleton but, instead, highlights how the designers’ actions, intentions, and attention 
vary according to the context.  
The digital exoskeleton enabled HealthCom to exploit emerging business 
opportunities, which led to its eventual success (i.e., an acquisition). Conversely, if the 
digital exoskeleton led to a poor-quality design that inhibited contract negotiation with 
clients, this would have been a poor design product. The counterfactual could also occur. 
If the designers had paid attention to quality-focused designs, but the time taken to develop 
high quality designs led to missed opportunities, then the current investment in design will 
be viewed negatively. This dissertation sets the stage for future empirical research that 
looks beyond a single firm and opportunities for studying the financial-focused design 
approach over time and across firms.  
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this dissertation was to understand the impact of the 
entrepreneurial context on the design actions and design product in the early years. The 
findings suggest that the uncertainty, financial and time pressures led to design actions that 
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resulted in a digital exoskeleton. In a startup marked by high uncertainty, the design actions 
reflect how the designers allocated their attention and resources to manage the tensions. 
The design actions and digital exoskeleton highlighted depart from the recommendations 
of existing software design methods.   
These influence of the entrepreneurial context on the design of a digital exoskeleton 
are not likely to dissipate anytime soon. In fact, as criteria for funding intensifies, it is likely 
that more extreme design actions and minimalist forms of digital exoskeleton may emerge. 
I hope that this study can raise additional questions and answers that contribute to an 
understanding of this burgeoning phenomenon.  
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